



ITALY AND THE WAR

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Associazione Nazionale per la Pace e la Giustizia
" TRANSLATED FROM THE ITALIAN

BY

ANNIE HAMILTON

TRANSLATOR OF "ROME IN THE MIDDLE AGES"
AND "THE GERMAN COLONIAL EMPIRE"



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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

“ IN publishing this volume for the benefit of the Italian Red Cross, the National Association of University Professors has been actuated by the desire to place before the public a further expression of the justice and sanctity of the cause for which Italy is now fighting, and to which the Italian University, proud of the glorious pages inscribed by it in the history of the Risorgimento, has consecrated its entire ardour and faith.”

With these words the following essays by different writers, originally issued under the title *La Nostra Guerra*, were introduced not only to the Italian, but also to the French public, and with the like aim they are now given to English readers. The English version has unfortunately suffered from the delay inevitable in translation and publication, during which period the rapid march of events that has taken place, causes some of its contents already to appear belated. Nevertheless, as depicting the reasons, the aims and ambitions with which Italy entered on war, it is hoped that the little volume may awaken some interest among Italy's Allies.

I here take the opportunity of expressing my thanks to Mrs. Cimino-King for her revision of my MS, also to my kind neighbour, Signor Leopoldo Jung, for the help and suggestions he has given me from time to time.

A. H.

Bordighera,

April, 1917.

CONTENTS

SECTION	PAGE
I. THE MORAL REASONS OF OUR WAR BY GIORGIO DEL VECCHIO— <i>Prof. of Philosophy of Law, University of Bologna</i>	3
II. THE NATIONAL IDEAL AND THE DUTY OF ITALY BY PROSPERO FEDOZZI— <i>Prof. of Inter- national Law, University of Genoa</i>	27
III. THE POLITICAL REASONS OF OUR WAR BY PIETRO BONFANTE— <i>Prof. University of Pavia.</i>	53
IV. THE RIGHTS OF ITALY OVER THE ALPS AND THE ADRIATIC BY CARLO ERRERA— <i>Prof. of Geography, University of Bologna</i>	79
V. THE UNREDEEMED PROVINCES IN THE HISTORY OF ITALY BY PIER SILVERIO LEICHT— <i>Prof. of History of Italian Law, University of Modena.</i>	103
VI. THE NATIONAL STRUGGLE IN THE UN- REDEEMED PROVINCES BY LEONARDO BIANCHI— <i>Prof. Univer- sity of Naples.</i>	125

SECTION	PAGE
VII. DENUNCIATION OF THE TREATY OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE BY PROSPERO FEDOZZI— <i>Prof. of Inter- national Law, University of Genoa</i> .	157
VIII. ITALY'S WAR AND ITALY'S WEALTH BY GINO ARIAS— <i>Prof. of Political Economy, University of Genoa</i> . . .	181
IX. NECESSITY AND REASON FOR THE PRESENT WAR WITH TURKEY BY ARRIGO SOLMI— <i>Prof. of Ecclesiastical Law, University of Pavia</i>	211
X. ARTES ET ARMA BY GIUSEPPE ALBINI— <i>Prof. of Latin Language and Literature, University of Bologna</i>	255

I

THE MORAL REASONS OF OUR WAR

PROF. DEL VECCHIO

ITALY AND THE WAR

I

THE MORAL REASONS OF OUR WAR

It is not enough for us to know that our war is strictly legitimate and irreproachable, responding as it does to diplomatic stipulations, which, for some time back, must have led it to be recognised as inevitable even by such as now affect surprise. Certainly our "legal fibre," matured by thousands of years of civilisation, would not have permitted that contempt for every juridical form, that disregard of the most solemn international conventions, of which other nations have lately given so disgraceful an example. A remarkable evidence of the acute juridical sense of our people was shown in the watchful and apprehensive anxiety with which, not only educated Italians, but also the simple and unlettered, waited to learn the tenor of the mysterious treaty of the Triple Alliance, doubting whether by chance it did not constitute a tie from which we were not yet unloosed, nor from which we could shake ourselves free without loss of honour. And how great was the joy, how profound the relief experienced when we knew for certain that we had not failed in any duty, and that the road of our future stretched free before us, since the compact to which we had adhered, and to

which we would have kept faith, had been set aside and openly violated by our Allies themselves. We were thus spared a terrible dilemma. We were spared it because our diplomacy, whatever may have been its former shortcomings, had not been so improvident in defining the clauses of the treaty as to forget to safeguard our equality with the other Allies, and the essential reservations which were logically derived from this equality. If the Allies, acting on their own judgment, have now practically mistaken us for servants, let them bear the blame and suffer the consequences of their fallacy. We are innocent and have but narrowly escaped becoming victims.

But the respect due to form, the deference to legality is not sufficient. Neither does it appear sufficient to consider the benefits which we may expect from the war, or rather the increase of power and prosperity to be acquired. Considerations of this kind do not satisfy our conscience, whether the incalculable value of the lives which must be sacrificed to attain such a purpose be reckoned, or the utility of the enterprise, which, great though it be, does not constitute its sanctity. We are far removed from the conception of life peculiar to primitive races, in whom the predatory and conquering instinct was in itself esteemed above all others lawful and noble. As Tacitus, for example, said of the Germans: "*Materia munificentiae per bella et raptus. Nec arare terram aut expectare annum tam facile persuaseris, quam vocare hostem et vulnera mereri. Pigrum quin immo et iners videtur sudore adquirere quod possis sanguine parare.*"¹ Violence even when victorious has

¹ Tacitus, *Germania*, Cap. XIV.

not for us any intrinsic claim to dignity, and only from the cause it serves can it derive its justification. Thus war is not justified by the fact that there is strength sufficient to wage it, or that the favour of circumstances or the number of allies may permit of a large harvest to be reaped from the enemy's field. War, in our opinion, is justified only when it serves to vindicate a right, which cannot be vindicated in any other way ; that is, when it is necessary as the only means for restoring an ethical truth overbearingly repudiated by others ; when in short it constitutes a moral duty. Such precisely is the case of our present war.

Any one whose mind is still wrapped in the coils of individual selfishness, who is a slave to the illusions which spring from the empiric individuality of his own person, deems himself fortunate and safe so long as he remains materially unaffected. When a person simply exists for non-essentials, no transcendental or universal principle seems to concern him. Such an individual then esteems others as entirely outside himself. But a process necessarily goes on in the conscience, by which each man on closer self-examination finds himself possessed of faculties that reach beyond empiric idiosyncrasies, even beyond his own personal individuality ; he finds he is a rational or universal entity, capable of recognising, and even compelled to admit, that others are identical with himself. Refuge in the narrowness of his own transient and petty *ego* then proves illusory ; the soul recognises the necessity of resolving itself in harmony with ideas which soar above this narrowness, and in themselves virtually contain an entire world.

No longer then the crude and petty opposition between one individual and another ; no longer the possibility for us passively to contemplate the evil that is being done to others. Then from the depths of our being arises an intimate participation with life in general, and the sense—purely human—of justice ; whence no one, according to a sublime saying, can rest in peace so long as a single human being in the world suffers injustice.

In advancing towards this supreme degree of theoretic and practical truth, it is given to us in the first place to transcend the limits of our individuality, recognising our own individual nature in those who, coming from our own country, bearing the imprint of a like historical tradition, reveal in their common language certain proofs of interchange of thought and affinity with the past, and at the same time the means of innumerable other common ties in the future. The nation is precisely the living and concrete exponent of our individuality, reflected and indefinitely enlarged and multiplied in the past as in the future. Every man must feel himself part of a nation, because his conscience dictates purposes which his individual life cannot encompass and because his activity presupposes a tradition of culture, on which it is necessarily grafted, and also because without a link of active and intense spiritual brotherhood human liberty could neither live nor assume a concrete attitude. Where the national link is weakened, disowned or broken, the individual is lessened ; where the nation is enslaved, the individual is also fettered. The defence or reconquest of national integrity is therefore for each and all a right and a duty, equally absolute and binding.

In any place wherever it be attempted to suffocate or destroy the characteristic signs of our nation, the offence, even though directed against the person of others, far away and unknown to us, affects ourselves and that too in our inmost soul. The right violated is our own right ; and the necessity of rising to vindicate it appeals so imperiously to our conscience that, until the vindication has been effected, we are goaded by the ineffable bitterness of remorse.

Such bitterness has been too long suffered by Italians in presence of the outrages inflicted on our race in the Austro-Hungarian Empire ; outrages that were neither temporary nor accidental ; neither mistakes nor abuses inflicted by individuals or organs of the government—in which case they might have been remedied—but were instead the direct result of the very essence of the dual monarchy. This monarchy, owing to the heterogeneous character of the peoples subject to it, cannot exist otherwise than on the basis of their discords. Hence arises a curious policy and a cold and cruel art of governing which, not satisfied in maintaining the antagonism between races obliged to live under its yoke, takes measures to exasperate them and at times even sets up new rivalries, instituting privileges on one side and oppression and persecutions on the other. Under such a rule, which would be ludicrous were it not a solemn outrage on the first principles of civil justice, no nation has suffered so much as the Italian, because the Hapsburg dynasty not only of set purpose resolved on the subjection and humiliation of the Italians in favour of other races, but also decreed the total annihilation of the most noble part of our population which remained

in its hands. A long series of acts, reported and denounced by us repeatedly and in vain, does not leave any doubt as to the reality of this purpose ; frustrated hitherto only by the heroic and desperate valour of our people, who like Romans have suffered and resisted, and who, now with the aid of their liberated brethren will conquer like Romans.

In giving this aid, which is now imperative, we therefore fulfil a sacred duty. We do not covet other men's soil, nor do we harbour unjust desire of domination ; we demand the life and liberty of our brothers, which are one with our own life and our own liberty, when considered as a concrete image of the nation. We desire that it should no longer be a crime for Italians to acknowledge Italy as their mother country.

Austro-Hungarian State control has presumed to fashion at pleasure both the soul of the people and also the nature of the country. That Italy is bounded by the Alps and the sea is a physical truth, consecrated by the uninterrupted historic tradition of a thousand years, since even in the time of the greatest foreign dominations the passage of the Alps always signified even to the conquerors themselves the invasion of Italy. This divine name was to them at least a cause of iniquitous glory. But now to speak of the upper valleys of our rivers as Italy is considered a crime in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, constrained by its inherent sin thus to brand itself a forswearer of nature. In truth what else constitutes " the political nexus of the Empire," fearfully guarded by its penal laws, if not the separation of that which nature intended should be one ?

“Italy ends at Ala,” said the public prosecutor in an infamous trial held at Trent. In reply we recall the words of Petrarch and Dante and the splendid definition of Augustus. Our answer points to the verdict traced by nature on the crests of the Alps and in letters that cannot be cancelled.

“*La situation des montagnes, des mers et des fleuves qui servent de bornes aux nations qui l’habitent, semble avoir décidé du nombre et de la grandeur de ces nations ; et l’on peut dire que l’ordre politique de cette partie du monde est, à certains égards, l’ouvrage de la nature.*”¹ All the events of modern history have confirmed the hidden sense of this maxim of Rousseau, since they have shown the irreparable precariousness of States, arbitrarily constituted in contempt of natural laws, to meet dynastic convenience or similar external demands. The weight of arms and the arts of diplomacy, however multiplied, do not avail to produce a lasting equilibrium between heterogeneous political elements ; nor can they prevent the germs of the nations, even when dispersed and stifled for a long period, from developing and finally joining and becoming one. “What result,” we ask with Romagnosi, “have the successive efforts of France, Spain and Germany had in annexing to their own dominions different parts of Italy ? Has time been able to destroy the natural repulsion to foreign dominion and to consolidate the union of one part of a nation with another ? Never. How then not listen to the cry and the untiring energy of nature, bent on repelling the agglomeration of heterogeneous elements, and tending on

¹ Rousseau, *Extrait du projet de paix perpétuelle*, etc. (*Œuvres*, Ed. Lefevre, Vol. IV. p. 262.)

the other hand to consolidate those which are homogeneous? I defy all the perversity of the decorated satellites of brigandage to stifle this cry or suppress the proofs of this force.”¹ The law which assigns to each nation a physical constitution of its own corresponding to its “moral constitution” is indeed a universal one; and nothing short of the concourse of such elements (“the complete possession of all its national territory limited by its natural confines and a temperate government ruling the entire nation”) can produce that *costituzione politica nazionale* that Romagnosi even styles “ethnic-archy,” on which ultimately depends the general balance among the nations. “The final aim to which nature appears to call the people” (still according to the same philosopher) “is that of adjusting the size of the States to the territorial dimensions visibly traced by nature on the face of the globe and forcibly endorsed by a common language, a common genius and common and enduring affections. There are moral and political affinities as there are material and chemical. Nature of herself tends to bring the homogeneous together and to separate the heterogeneous.”² By a slow, insistent, progressive force, nations are thus led to acquire “their natural dimensions.”

According to this theory, Italy should be re-integrated, that is to say united within her natural limits; she should be politically one, as she is one morally and physically. “Geographical conditions, tradition, language, literature,

¹ Romagnosi, *La scienza delle costituzioni*. P.I. *Teoria speciale*, Cap. III. 22.

² Romagnosi, *Instituzioni di civile filosofia ossia di giurisprudenza teorica*, P. I., L. VI. C. II. (ed. De Giorgi, 2177).

need of political strength and of defence, the vote of the people, the democratic instinct innate in the Italians, anticipation of a progress to which all the faculties of the country are necessary, the consciousness of her initiative in Europe and of the great things to be accomplished by Italy for the good of humanity, are concentrated to this end. We are faced by no insuperable obstacle, no objection that cannot be historically or philosophically confuted.”¹ Thus, when upholding our unity, said Giuseppe Mazzini, who delighted to repeat the words of Napoleon, “Italy is surrounded by the Alps and the sea. Her natural limits are determined with such precision as if she were an island. Italy has only a hundred and fifty leagues of frontier in common with the European continent, and those hundred and fifty leagues are fortified by the highest barrier that can be opposed to man. . . . Italy isolated within her natural limits is called to form a great and powerful nation. . . . Italy is a single nation; the unity of manners, of language, of literature, should in a future, more or less distant, re-unite her inhabitants under a single government. . . . And Rome is beyond doubt the capital which the Italians will choose for their country.”² As far as possible the prediction has already been fulfilled: we must have sufficient courage to crown it, and with the avenging force of arms, since every other means has proved vain. To agree any further to a mutilation or laceration of Italy, when a

¹ Mazzini, *Dell'unità italiana* (in *Scritti editi ed ined.* Vol. III. p. 256).

² *Mémoires de Napoléon.*, Vol. I. *Description de l'Italie* (in the Paris edition, 1867, *Commentaires de Napoléon Premier*, pp. 105-129).

new order is about to be established in Europe, would be an inextinguishable crime ; to forgive those who at present usurp a part of our soil, while we have the opportunity of driving them forth, would not be a merciful act, but ignominious cowardice and complicity in crime.

We little reckon the economic value of the lands which we aspire to redeem. Even if, instead of being grain producing and abounding in woods, they were sterile as bare rocks ; if instead of meadows and deep and ample rivers, which could be converted into vast sources of industry, they could only afford arid sand, even if lacking the crown of sunny coast line, cut into ports and bays, which disclose an infinite possibility of traffic and world-wide expansion, our longing to liberate them would be no less strong. For a moral reason, higher than all calculations of interest, unites the nation to its territory and causes foreign domination, even assuming the injury to be insignificant, to be regarded as an offence by each and all. Similarly in private life we should not tolerate an intruder occupying at will a part, however small and negligible, of our house. Every dispute on the greater or lesser interest we may have in the possession of this or that fragment of our native soil is therefore superfluous, since already decided *a priori* by a superior ethical reason.

Moreover, no one ignores that even considered from a utilitarian point of view, the regions under discussion are of vital importance to us, from the very fact that they virtually dominate the other adjoining cisalpine regions, and therefore represent the requisite condition for the safety of our State. Would not this be a sufficient reason to justify our war, according to German

learning itself, which now exhausts its energy in vain accusations against us? Has not Lasson (one of the true and most eminent teachers of modern Germany) written for instance : " A State bereft of the dominant heights or the water-courses, on which its defence should naturally rest, has the natural and entirely legitimate desire to rectify the defective conditions of its existence, by means of the acquisition of that which it lacks and which is necessary for its safety." And that not being able as a rule to obtain such by gentle means, " it should obtain it by force, taking advantage with dexterity and energy of any favourable opportunity."¹ But in truth we need no such arguments, for the question here is not one of establishing a new right, but simply that of taking what is ours ; and "*quod proprium est alicujus, amplius ejus fieri nequit.*"

The plain justice of the Italian national cause and the impossibility of defending it otherwise than by arms, renders our war sacred. But a new and more solemn consecration is given it by its significance in the general conflict of nations. Into this conflict Italy has deliberately entered. She knew better than all other nations that had previously entered the lists, the terrible nature of the risk and the extent of the sacrifice. She entered knowing that some of the chief belligerents had confessedly adopted a system of warfare that observed no moral, juridical, nor civil limits, did not respect treaties, spared neither neutrals nor non-combatants ; a system in fact that infringed all rules by which war is distin-

¹ Lasson, *Das Kulturideal und der Krieg* (2. Aufl. Berlin, 1906), p. 60.

guished from riot and rapine. These belligerents are precisely the States which in peace time were already accustomed to put force before liberty and justice, purposely harrowing smaller nations which former acts of violence had brought within their boundaries. Against such belligerents Italy has thrown down her challenge. This challenge consequently serves a greater design and obeys a deeper motive than the re-integration of dismembered Italy ; that is to say it tends to the restoration of legal authority in general, to the preservation of the supreme ideals of humanity and to impose respect for them in the new order of the world.

Italy's good fortune lies in the fact that she cannot defend herself without at the same time defending universal civilisation ; that she cannot arise and act as a nation without at the same time affirming the sanctity of all nations. " The liberty of a people," wrote Guiseppe Mazzini as an Italian as well as a humanitarian, " cannot conquer and endure, if not in the faith which proclaims the right of all to liberty. . . . I adore *my* home-land, because I adore home ; *our* liberty because I believe in liberty ; *our* rights because I believe in justice."

This wonderful chain of circumstances, which reveals the secret of our mission in the world, has lately arisen again. When, owing to feigned and miscalculated dynastic interests, some " decorated satellites of brigandage " determined to destroy Serbian independence, Italy found within herself, in the very conditions of her own life, in the traditions of her own past and in her aspirations towards the future, positive reasons which forbade her sharing in the unchivalrous enterprise.

And when, with insolent contempt of a right sanctioned by solemn compact, Belgium was invaded and tortured by one of her own sureties, it appeared beyond doubt to every one that the destiny of Italy could not drive her to the side of the aggressor.

It would be superfluous here to enquire into the causes whereby the German nation, having risen to political union, such as our own, modelled and founded on national unity, a champion, first in the Reformation movement and later in her greatest philosophers—Kant and Fichte,—of the inviolable autonomy of the individual, has by degrees changed into a powerful instrument of menace to universal liberty. It would appear indeed that her people, while bringing to perfection the machinery of her industries, have fallen away from the idea of the ethical and rational limits of her power, and hence from that sublime idea which was at one time also German, of a society based on the rights between free and equal States. The latest philosophy derived from Hegel (in whose system under the fragile wrapping of idealistic formulas were already harboured the germs of the most crude materialism) has given various and ornamental names to the overbearing desire for domination, which has now become the mark of Germanism, but it can neither ennoble the essence, nor render it tolerable to the community of civilised nations. These nations on the contrary, owing to the unbridling of this appetite, find themselves morally drawn together and bound as by a treaty. People of entirely different temperament and habit, some inclined to commerce, some to art ; others seamen, others again agriculturalists ; some filled with enthusiasm and ardour, others

methodical and slow ; some refined and apparently exhausted by centuries of history and glory and others with energies intact, having scarcely yet faced the arduous and numerous trials of modern European life ; some living under a republic, others under an empire ; some few in number and confined within a limited space ; others almost innumerable with vast dominions spread over more than one continent, are all equally agreed in the supreme necessity of defending even with their blood the conditions of their own free development. These conditions are nothing more than the chief maxims of the law of nations, thus expounded for example at the time of the French Révolution : “ *Les Peuples sont respectivement indépendants et souverains, quel que soit le nombre d'individus qui les composent et l'étendue du territoire qu'ils occupent.*” “ *Un Peuple n'a pas le droit de s'immiscer dans le gouvernement des autres.*” “ *Les entreprises contre la liberté d'un Peuple sont un attentat contre tous les autres.*” “ *Les Traités entre les Peuples sont sacrés et inviolables.*” ¹

Not otherwise did the nobler spirits in Germany argue at this same period ; foremost among whom Kant in his memorable monograph, “For lasting Peace ;” so that rejecting these maxims to-day, Germany not only offends against the eternal right of justice but is false to the better part of her past. The wretched company that is reserved to her in this war confirms her deplorable error, one certainly not in conformity with the spirit of history ; respecting which it is on the contrary an unheard

¹ Art. 2, 7, 15, 21 of the *Declaration du droit des gens*, which the Abbé Grégoire presented to the Convention the 4th Floreal of the year III. (23rd April, 1795).

of aberration that a nation young, homogeneous and prolific as is the German, tempered to every discipline, capable of every ideal, of progress in every direction, should be reduced to serve as prop in their unhonoured decrepitude to two hybrid empires, Austro-Hungary and Turkey, powers which never possessed any innate capacity for development, nor any foundation in nature, but rested solely on corruption and trickery.

If however we now find ourselves opposed to that people with whom we were so long in collaboration and with which we still wish to collaborate in the work of thought, the fault is not ours. It is not we who have strayed from the path. When Germany was still in search of her national unity, Giuseppe Mazzini wrote to a German : " Leave the Austrian Empire to the condemnation which God and man have pronounced against it. . . . Wipe away from Germany's forehead the stain which Austria left there, when she exhibited to Europe the sons of Arminius and Luther in the guise of soldiers of despotism ; and the people will surround you with love and concord. . . . Uphold the principle that each country belongs to its own people. Let us accomplish our unity and found your own. . . . The German idea and the Italian idea will fraternise on the liberated Alps."¹ The sublime admonition which seemed to find a prospect of response in the facts of 1866, is now further than ever from fulfilment ; the stain which our great Apostle wished to see wiped away has spread over Germany's forehead, and instead of love the people surround her with a powerful hedge of arms in defence of their own

¹ Mazzini, *Italia e Germania*—*Lettera ad un tedesco* (in the "*Unità Italiana*" of February 28, 1861).

threatened liberty. But precisely in this lies the indirect confirmation of the profound truth of this admonition, which still preserves its ideal value intact and serves to define both the fatal error of Germany and the necessity of our resistance to her. "Do not reduce," wrote Mazzini again in 1861 to three Germans, who had replied to his exhortation with contemptible sophistry, "do not reduce the immense question that is agitating Europe to-day to that of knowing how many slaves will lose the livery of one or another master on a given strip of earth. . . . Do not collect, you men of thought and progress, your weapons from Chanceries, which trace their origin to the Middle Ages. Be Germans, you say to your people. What meaning do you give to that word? Of what Germany do you speak? Of the Germany that oppresses in the name of violence, or of that which blesses in the name of the might of intellect? Of the Germany of Luther, or that of Metternich? I too, though a foreigner, know a Germany, which I respectfully salute; the one which by the Reformation said to us: "Scrutinize"; which by her unheeded peasantry of the same period said: "the Kingdom of Heaven should as far as possible be reflected here below"; and by the glorious series of her philosophers and critics from Lessing to Baur said: "Meditate seriously on the great things of life, Thought, History, Religion." But to fulfil her mission in the world, this Germany has no need of the department of the Adige, of Trent, of Roveredo. She has need of unity. She requires harmony of Thought and Action, so that it may not be said of her: "She preaches to-day that which in practice she will renounce to-morrow." She must cleanse herself

of the crimes of her dynasties ; must reject the weight of injustice with which Austria intended to load her. She requires the love and esteem of nations ; not suspicion, not war ; she requires to concentrate her strength and to extract the utmost possible benefit from the soil where her language is spoken, where mothers repeat the legends of the people over the cradles of their infants ; not to squander her strength where it only can remain encamped like a hostile legion in the midst of enemies. It is to this Germany that I have spoken. Now this Germany will not have unity until the Hapsburg Empire has fallen. And she will not obtain the love of nations, the concentration of her forces, the knowledge of her mission so long as she sends her own sons to fight alongside those Croats, whom you gentlemen do not seem to care for, against the national liberty of peoples who have not offended her, who cannot become dangerous to her, but who ask to be masters in their own lands. . . . And you delude yourselves in thinking you serve the German Fatherland in such a way. Gentlemen, the Fatherland can never be served by a call to the arms of dishonour.”¹

The prophetic reproach illustrates, as well as it would be possible to do to-day, the essential reason of the present war ; which, if for us and for other nations is a war of liberation ; is for yet other peoples one of tragic expiation and in itself is, in short, a phase of the growth of justice in the world.

¹ Mazzini, To Messrs. Rodbertus, Deberg and L. Bucher (in the “*Unità Italiana*” of April 21, 1861 ; and in *Serviti editi ed inediti*, Vol. XI. p. 269-271).

Considered in its physical aspect this war also, like every other, is a trial of strength, a reciprocal attempt of several States for predominance. But in its inner spirit it is almost the negation of this attempt, since it tends to initiate a new order, in which no nation can be subjugated, and the ideal values may be equally recognised above the inequality of physical strength. The logic of history does not escape paradox ; thus in the present case we are fighting in a certain sense even for the advantage of our enemies, in that we aim at saving that common humanity which in them is for the moment obliterated and effaced. We aim, as we have already said, at defending not only our right, but right in general ; not only our country, but the principle of the inviolability of all countries. This principle we reaffirm in opposition to the false conception now dominant among our adversaries, that force and not justice is the foundation of States and that everything is lawful to a State that tends to increase its power and territory.

Even those who accepted or tolerated this false conception were its victims, not only because at a certain moment it was bound to stir up indignation and arouse the armed resistance of other nations, determined not to yield to violence ; but also because such an unlawful procedure taken as the basis of the outside workings of a nation, must necessarily have its counterpart in an analogous contempt of justice in the internal life of the State itself. The two as applied are inseparable both in practice and in theory : the spirit of aggression is naturally ungenerous, and the chains which one nation desires to fasten on others, first weigh heavily on itself. Now the war, which has as its primary motive the

necessity of placing a bridle on foreign arrogance, often surpasses in its effects this original intention and serves a bigger purpose, that is, it creates in the very State against which it is directed, a moral and political crisis, the result being that while individuals perish, the nation may well come forth regenerated. And this is one of the most typical cases of that law of the progressive development of aims which Vico held as a proof of the order or "providence" immanent in the course of history.

No one may now determine with exactitude what modifications the present war will produce in the adjustment and in the conscience of the nations that are taking part in it; especially through what changes and revolutions the German nation will regain its lost sense of right, and will be led, or will lead itself and its rulers, to that cult of the idea of liberty which it boasted in former times. But this we can say with certainty, that the principles for which we are fighting, the ideals which we are trying to safeguard, are not by nature exclusive and restricted and do not belong to us alone, but virtually to the entire human race. They are precisely those principles and ethical values—the autonomy of individuals and nations, the supremacy of right over force, the sanctity of the given word—which alone make life worthy of being lived by mankind in general. If the tragic struggle leads, as no doubt it will, to securing more than in the past the vitality of such principles, it will be regarded by future generations of both the victors and the vanquished as the beginning of a new era, and the present carnage will appear as the atrocious but necessary means for the greater moral and civil elevation of the entire human race.

This intrinsic efficacy of our war, which happens to reach beyond the particular and immediate intentions of the combatants, shows itself in various ways. When for example we protect the greatest monuments of history and art, the most sacred patrimony of our nation, against the barbarous fury of modern iconoclasts, we preserve them not for ourselves alone, nor even for our descendants, to whom we owe the duty of handing them down as we have received them from our ancestors, but for those throughout the world who have and will have the divine sense of beauty and even for the gentler offspring of our present adversaries. Thus not only for our sole advantage do we reject the imposition of a mechanical scheme of culture, which though technically perfect, is devoid of moral substance and at variance with our temperament, all spontaneity and harmony ; not on account of sacred egoism only do we rebel against the attempts at deformation or belittlement of our national being ; but because we are conscious that we Italians, such as we are and such as we wish to be, have a higher mission in the " organisation of the work of Humanity," which is the final outcome of the natural individuality of countries. If, through inconceivable cowardice, we had consented to occupy a subordinate place in a monstrous political and military hierarchy, directed by others, renouncing the free initiative and purpose of our spirit, we should not only have betrayed ourselves and our own destiny, but should at the same time have betrayed the cause of human civilisation. This civilisation expects further inestimable contributions from the genius, pure and unalloyed Italian genius, such as it has formerly received. That this may

remain such as it has been, no effort is too heavy, no sacrifice too great.

In the secure consciousness of the essential justice of our cause and of its perfect harmony with that of humanity in general, we face the supreme test of arms without fear and together with its horrors and its suffering shall experience the salutary effects of war. Like a flame which, as it burns, purifies, war destroys selfishness, awakening thus to a truer life the spirit of the nation and hence the universal spirit. It reveals to us our mysterious aptitude to rise above ourselves, delivering our soul from fallacious individual affections, which in ordinary days too often chain and oppress it. It brings unexpected evidence to prove that despotism must be sacrificed to make way for liberty ; that isolated efforts are vain if they are not subject to discipline and order, that hence in the masses, cohesion is necessary in order that the activities of all may accomplish the most arduous aims. War, which in remote times promoted the pacification and the political union of the *gentes* in the common cause of defence, still leads us to bridle our individual desires and to lay aside private animosity, to abolish differences and quarrels among ourselves, in order that the sovereignty of the State may be strengthened and the indissoluble compact of national unity be sealed afresh. War, which formerly availed to spur the human intellect forward and to temper it to the utmost in the effort to create more efficacious means of defence and offence, now impels us again towards a like eminently progressive effort, fruitful of innumerable applications even in art and peaceful industries ; it creates fresh resolutions and new ideas, evoking, out

of the extreme tension of our minds as by a crucial experiment, wondrous revelations of aptitudes formerly dormant or ignored.

Never more than now have shone these characteristic virtues of war, because no war has ever been more profoundly felt or more intensely willed than this war of ours ; none has answered to a higher moral command as a war of justice and redemption, not only national but human. In waging it our conscience is clear, as our enthusiasm is ardent and as our faith in victory is certain.

GIORGIO DEL VECCHIO.

II
THE NATIONAL IDEAL AND THE
DUTY OF ITALY

PROF. PROSPERO FEDOZZI



II

THE NATIONAL IDEAL AND THE DUTY OF ITALY

IN the solemn documents which transmit to history the motives and aims of our action, it is asserted that the defence of our national status is our first and greatest duty, the highest objective possible to be attained through this terrible ordeal of fire. And certainly no other theme finds so deep and rousing an echo in the soul of the people. Many of us are justly proud in the thought that our patriotic cause coincides with larger and greater ideals, that the sword unsheathed in defence of our rights and aspirations is brandished moreover in the great crusade for justice and civilisation. But as simple ideas and elementary feelings are endowed with the greatest force of expansion, the national ideal and sentiment raise the most vivid and universal flame of enthusiasm. Thus for all Italians the present war is supreme, a last and fateful consequence of that policy which led to our unification ; a belated renewal of the wars of independence to complete the work of liberation, which our fathers were obliged to leave unfinished. The spectacle of intense moral beauty which fills the history of our *Risorgimento* is revived under our eyes, since a breath of the past has been wafted down to us,

and after having been obscured for many years, our ancient national ideal, the strength and mainspring of our life, again inflames our hearts.

The terrible war which has burst over Europe has made shipwreck of all we believed to be an intangible patrimony of civilisation, that is of fifty years of philosophic, economic and political theories ; but in compensation it has suddenly revived the ideals which were thought to have been submerged beyond hope of revival. Thus patriotism, the generating flame of sacrifice and heroism, has burst forth again in all its splendour in nations which many believed to be far removed from all warlike enthusiasm ; and with it the sentiment of nationality, which had drooped and withered under so many opposing forces, has been restored to its ancient dignity.

The theory of nationality, which arose in times of patriotic poetry and was consecrated on fields of battle, at first met with universal acclamation, attracting to its banner ranks of ardent supporters, proud of their glorious predecessors from Dante to Petrarch, from Vico to Romagnosi and Mazzini. But very soon the theory was stifled by criticism. The study of international law proclaimed its formal severance from the teaching of Mancini, for whom in the genesis of international law the Nation and not the State represents the elementary unity, the rational monad of the science. Increasingly inspired by a rigid positivism it clung, as an essential point of departure, to the consideration of States as *de facto* existent, and rejected from its perspective a principle which at the utmost could be considered only as a found-

ation of the problem of justice in international relations. On the other hand sociological studies, penetrating into the intimate constitution of the theory of nationalities, expected an easy triumph by demonstrating that nations are not a natural phenomenon, and that none of the elements indicated by Mancini are essential in their formation. Man is not the slave either of race or language, either of the course of rivers, or of the direction of mountains. "The existence of a nation," says Renan, "is a plebiscite of every day, as the existence of an individual is a perpetual affirmation of life: the vote of the people is ultimately the only legitimate criterion to which we must always resort." Thus the principle of popular sovereignty began to take the place of national conscience, which is the characteristic and indeed indestructible element in Mancini's theory.

Enthusiasm, which was so great and universal at the period of our *Risorgimento*, has in the course of time greatly diminished owing to the disappointment produced by the many national States, which were no sooner united than they inveighed against outlying populations. Austria was, and has always remained, the typical prison of nationality, and we cannot wonder that de Laveleye's comparison of the Circle of Dante's Inferno, where the poet depicts the strife of the damned in the starless night, should continue to be applied to her. But Hungary, which in 1848 had taken up arms against Austria to defend the right of her own nationality, afterwards joined with Austria in oppressing Italian nationality, and with persistent violence continued to stifle the national sentiments of the Roumanians of Transylvania. So United Germany continued to

inveigh against the Danes, and entered on the work of denationalising the Poles with unparalleled violence and brutality. Having conquered their own rights, nations seemed generally to have forgotten their duties, so that the national idea came to lose part of its essence of justice and goodness.

Nevertheless, the chief weakening of the national spirit, and consequently the chief discredit for the theories of the Italian school, arose from the humanitarian and cosmopolitan tendencies which had pervaded the *bourgeoisie*, as well as from the socialistic ideal prevailing among the proletariat. Patriotism was a sentiment relegated to the museum of psychological antiquities by illustrious writers, whose works formed the intellectual food of the rising generation, and had been represented by socialism as a phantom encouraged by the ruling middle class to divert the attention of the people from their work of oppression and exploitation ; also as the counterpart in the political world of that which capitalism is in the social and economic field. The politics of the middle classes on the other hand, influenced by the general economic trouble and by the formidable problem of the working classes, had both in words and actions given credentials to the belief that the question of nationality was dying out to make way for the social problem. The people seemed day by day to lose faith in its destiny. Everything that spoke of the Mother Country, or of glories achieved or hoped for, was classed as rhetoric. The pacifist propaganda, spread among the working classes and lacking equity and proportion, seemed to have hopelessly weakened the national character and energy. The ideal of Irredentism had

fallen into discredit, since it had become almost a monopoly of those parties who, with consummate inconsistency, had always opposed the military budget. Finally we must acknowledge that even our government contributed not a little towards the decline of Italian national feeling, too often caring solely for parliamentary balance, repeatedly denying to the people any ideal incentive, and persistently, embracing a weak and undignified foreign policy.

The crisis was serious ; and our enemies were pleased to think it irreparable. A pseudo-German science already detected an odour of death and wove fables about the fatal decadence of the Latin race. France too, being afflicted with evils even greater than our own, on the eve of war appeared to the Germans to have fallen into the last stage of degeneracy, and therefore likely to become an easy prey to the strong and virile race which bears within itself the germs of every virtue ! Imbued with a preposterous idea of their own mission of supremacy in the world, the intellectual classes of Germany were fatally led to ignore the evident signs of a great national awakening in Italy as well as in France.

Even the most modest student of history and observer of life ought to have perceived the existence of permanent moral values, which in the struggle with passing interests might for a period suffer moments of eclipse, only to acquire fresh strength and rise loftier and purer from the tempest. As our faith was steadfast, so should also have been our certainty of a return to that national idealism, which is grafted on the imperishable tree of patriotism. It sufficed that the impetus of those opposing forces should meet with a check for patriotism to issue

forth in all its vigour and avail itself of every favourable element.

The first impulse came with the re-awakening of an ideal in almost every manifestation of thought and life. It seemed as if a vivifying breath had entered even into politics, where a new party, young and ardent, had arisen, with the special aim of restoring in the souls of men, as well as in the concrete forms of public life, the empire, absolute and complete, of national idealism. Some intemperance or exaggeration of Italian nationalism is not only natural but inevitable, seeing that it agitates to counteract the enveloping darkness which threatens national sentiment and to steel the nerve of the people against overbearing and menacing foreign nationalisms. Excessive ebullition of literary froth, untimely political moves, some unhappy and misdirected efforts in moulding nationalism into a political party, are trifling faults in view of the great merits which it has acquired. Nationalism has wakened in the people a better knowledge of themselves, educating them to the idea of war as an antidote to the pacifism of the lower middle class. By seriously reconsidering the problem of Irredentism, it has appealed to greater military strength as the necessary antecedent of a strong and dignified foreign policy ; it has proclaimed above all the absolute need of moral unity in order victoriously to face the inevitable struggles in the future.

The movement in its spiritual aspect found adherents in every party, and penetrated insensibly even among those intellectual classes, who by mental habit were more inclined to the extravagances of internationalism. The levelling tendency in the main, instead of blurring

the distinct character of nations, and enveloping them in a veil of monotony, does no more than cover with a uniform varnish the outer form of those radical differences inherent in every race. Facts determine the balance in the field of thought, producing the conviction that national unity should be strengthened rather than submerged, and made to attain the fulness of individual life, in order that each nation should contribute according to its power to the completeness of universal life. The proud and humane words of our poet, "*ripassin l'Alpe e tornerem fratelli*," express the happy union which exists in the spirit of the people between pride in its own independent national life and a wide international good will.

The same feeling exists in full harmony even among the working people, guided as they are by their native instinct, and for whom the restoration of the national ideal was prepared and rendered possible by the improvement of economic and social conditions. The idea first upheld by solitary and enlightened minds, that the phase of nationalism is a necessary historic antecedent of future socialist control, has in later years gained so much ground, that the heads of the socialist movement in the great European countries were able in solemn congress openly to assert the nationalist feeling of the respective working classes. The latter, especially in Italy, had too often experienced how the internationalist tendencies of socialism in practice had almost everywhere been shattered by the interests of a proletariat, enjoying high wages, and resolute in maintaining the positions conquered against the invasion of foreign labour. And this in order not to submit to the necessity,

however transitory, of a collaboration with other classes against foreign competition, seeing that the prosperity of every class is in strict dependence on the general prosperity of the nation. This upheaval of minds, already expressed in certain deeds during our Libyan war, has received the highest and most apparent confirmation during the present war.

According to the Italian school, founded by Mancini, nationality is the result of natural factors and historic factors, neither of which, however, are essential, or of themselves alone sufficient to constitute it. Race, language, territory, historic events, customs, laws, religion are only passive material, lacking the vital breath, the animating principle ; and this principle, this breath is given by the national conscience. A factor of sentiment rather than one of reason, and, therefore, more easily felt than logically explained, the national conscience absolutely represents the latent force of the Italian theory, that which has rendered it capable of victoriously resisting all doctrinaire attacks, massed against it during the last fifty years. If notwithstanding all the criticisms against theory, nations still continue to exist, it is precisely because they express a spiritual reality. This certainly cannot be formed out of nothing, no more than a will can work without a motive. And neither are its factors constant ; a circumstance which explains why the definitions of nationality vary in different countries, as well as according to different writers. But however much we try to sound the question, we must recognise that such factors can only be natural or historical according to the definition of Mancini.

Nevertheless we may assert that as the constituents (of those factors) are more or less vast and fortunate in their varied combinations, we accordingly find among the various nations a consciousness more or less energetic of their own moral unity, and hence a national structure more or less solid.

There is, perhaps, no country in the world which in the same degree as Italy represents so magnificently all the united constituent elements of nationality. In one of his brilliant articles on the questions raised by the war, our colleague, Borghese, wrote · “ The ethnical and intellectual unification in this country, so energetically, and we may say so plastically, moulded in space, was accomplished by Rome with extreme facility and good fortune ; so that favoured by geographical conditions, and by the form of the vase in which crystallisation took place, there resulted the strongest, most compact, and most regular of the national blocks that exist in the world.” Indeed in the admirable concourse of all the factors, which make her a typical nation, Italy may boast above all of the eternal unity of her territory, which is greater than all, because unalterable in spite of migrations and dominations, and equal under all human currents and tempests. The Italian race is like all other races, an historic product, but such as it has historically become, it is now a type, clearly defined, with an illustrious language, a language which symbolises an intellectual activity nursed at the fountain head of the greatest human culture and expressing a single soul, a homogeneous thought, a uniform direction in religion, law, manners, in history, literature and in art. In these conditions the spiritual element of our nationality

may have some moments of weakness, but cannot absolutely perish. By a necessity, of so fatal a nature as to be styled almost a physical necessity, every offence not only leaves her unhurt, but even awakens her and rouses her to fresh efforts.

The spirit of nationality is a force, the degree of which we fail to apprehend in a generally diffused state of quietude ; it requires compression in order to explode. Under the strokes of the mallet the good metal of a race gives forth flashes and sparks. Thus Austria, by her ignoble policy against the Italians subject to her rule, has kept the spirit of Italian patriotism whole and firm beyond the Italian frontier, and within our boundaries, even in times when adverse circumstances have combined to depress it, has constantly sustained it.

Notwithstanding the paradoxical alliance, which was defined as the only means to prevent a war between the two countries, Austria, in fact, has always treated Italy as an enemy, fortifying her own frontiers in order to subject and oppress us by her increasing vigour, pursuing at the same time a constant and methodical work of humiliation and destruction of the Italian element within her empire. Considering Austria's line of action the political tie had become positively monstrous ; and our patience in submitting to it for more than thirty years was heroic, enduring, as we did for the love of peace, the hardest and most bitter sacrifices of self-respect and national dignity. But a day came when the measure was full. When it was known that Austria had perfidiously meditated to betray and attack us from behind, during the saddest and most difficult moment of the most recent phase of our national life, when events not provoked by us clearly

revealed that Austria had violated the treaty ; our self-respect, repressed and mortified, suddenly revolted, and the people unanimously demanded that an end should be put to the martyrdom of our nationality ; demanded that our national dignity should be reinstated and the independence of our life secured, that we should demand of our mountains and our seas the surest defences that nature has given us and on which history has impressed the ineffaceable traces of our right.

Germany, who ought to have been induced by historical, moral and political reasons to exercise a strong moderating pressure on Austria, had fallen away from the traditions of her national unification, and, following a grandiose dream of expansion towards the east, had entered into closer relations with Austria and had even gone so far as to form an alliance with Turkey. This dream, the realisation of which would be disastrous for us, will fade owing to the firm decision of the Quadruple Entente, and even Germany will realise, will understand the mistake made in her political calculation in binding herself to a power which only represents a murky past, and in the near or distant future cannot await anything but fatal destruction. It is indeed extraordinary that the history of the last fifty years should be sufficiently forgotten for even the strength of that spirit of nationality, which formed the common basis of German and Italian action against Austria, to be no longer understood. Prussia had completely reached her aim after the war of 1866, the Germans having acquired a safe and dominant position in Austria ; not so Italy, who instead had always seen the danger of her people being reduced to impotence and absorbed by a hostile

policy. If for Prussia every reason for enmity towards Austria had been removed, this was not a just motive for ignoring Italy's persistent calls for hostility and denying her the right to aspire to the completion of national unity. An anonymous German writer has lately recalled the fact that in former times even in Germany the most enlightened men never admitted that the Italians, a people who came of a good stock of civilisation, should remain subject to the political rule of Austrians, Tyroleans, Croats. But the spirit of justice during the whole course of the Triple Alliance never moved the leaders of the imperial policy, who, as is evinced by the Green Book, even went so far as to display an ingenuous surprise at the firmness with which, after the outbreak of the European war, Italian determination centred on the Austrian frontiers.

The phenomenon, which may seem strange to the limited Teutonic penetration, appears to us on the contrary most natural. Territories geographically Italian, inhabited by populations of our race, speaking our language, are still subject to France, Switzerland and England ; nevertheless, a strong sentiment of Irredentism has never existed among us, save with regard to those lands subject to Austria. Undoubtedly historic reasons have also had their influence in this direction, but people do not feed eternally on hatred ; elementary political wisdom, however, is necessary, in order to lead them to forget. Austria on the contrary has with constant and deliberate purpose done all that was possible to prevent Italians forgetting her iniquitous work of oppression. Renewing at Trent and Trieste the same tyrannical system formerly practised in Milan and Venice,

she continually brought to our minds images of bloodshed and of infamy. The paternal Emperor, who, able to remit the sentence of death on a boy, neither giving heed to the entreaty of a great poet, nor to the anxious expectation of the world at large, signed the death warrant with a steady hand, was indeed the same whom all Italian hearts had learned to execrate for the prisons of Spielberg and the gallows of Belfiore !

Renan has justly observed that in national traditions, sorrows are of greater value than triumphs, since they impose duties in common ; whence it can be said that a nation represents solidarity, in so far as it is constituted by sacrifices which have been made, and which it is still disposed to make. Austria, and Austria alone, has united by solid bonds Italians separated by the frontier ; Austria alone, threatening our nationality with destruction, has forced us to an urgent work of defence. In France, Switzerland and England, Italians adapt themselves to, and develop under, a régime of liberty ; Italians subject to Austria, notwithstanding an heroic resistance, seemed likely to be swallowed up in a sea of different races. We had a well-founded fear that Trieste might end in becoming Slav, and worse still that on some unlucky day might actually become the southern lung of Germany, thus transforming the Adriatic into a German lake. The war has caused the imperialist and pan-German aims to pass from the realm of literature into the open air of freely avowed politics, and shown that the possibility of Trieste being chosen as the first necessary stage for Germany's march towards the East, could no longer be considered simply as a nightmare. Neither could we any longer consider vain

the menace of the German wedge, which had already for centuries been pushed across the Brenner, thrusting its point towards Trent, and even invading the lake of Garda. Through Austria as through an instrument, we were able clearly to see Germany, and all the more speedy and urgent arose our need for defence.

On the other hand a political sentiment, such as Irredentism, has no value nor does it stimulate to action if not shared on both sides of the frontier. Now the communion of aspirations has revealed itself if not exclusively, certainly chiefly, among the Italians of the kingdom, and those of the lands subject to Austria. In all these lands national defence has run parallel to the struggles for our unity. Italians of the Trentino, of the Julian region, of Istria, of Dalmatia have fought by hundreds in our first wars of independence, as they are now fighting in this latest war. Promises and flatteries of every kind, violence and persecutions, arrests and trials innumerable never checked the fervid growth of Italianism, never stemmed for an instant the hereditary hatred towards the Austrians, nor, even in the darkest moments of our national history, damped our faith that every joy and every grief was passionately shared by those living and admirable offshoots of our race. A journalist of Trieste speaking of his city was able to say that hitherto Italy, not possessing it by force of arms, had held it in her power by the religion of ideals, which Trieste symbolised in the presentation of the ampulla (containing the oil of the lamp which is kept perpetually burning over Dante's tomb), taken to Ravenna in 1908 in a great Irredentist pilgrimage.

Life has now become so delicately attuned that we

respond to the echo of every sad event that takes place in any part of the world. Our sense of liberty is so acute that we suffer at every abuse of power, at every act of violence committed against any nation whatever on the earth. Sensitiveness has been intensified a hundredfold by the sorrows and violence to which people of our race, speaking the same language and possessed of the same nationality, have been subjected. Thus the long martyrdom endured by our compatriots under Austria found an echo in the depths of our soul, producing a state of disquiet, a latent but lasting agitation. Our university students, mindful of their noble traditions, were in a perpetual state of unrest on account of the bloody struggles endured by their brethren, subject to Austria, in order to satisfy an elementary requirement of culture. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the two countries might well repeat to satiety, that according to the principles of international law, it was forbidden for one State to meddle in the internal affairs of another ; diplomatic non-intervention could not exclude the active and passionate intervention of the people, whose politics more than once proved to be superior to those of the cabinets.

Our Government's position towards Austria has been one of permanent and dangerous discomfort. It has frequently been placed under the hard necessity of repressing the most innocent manifestations of Italianism, curbing our national feelings and giving to the Italian populations subject to Austria the well-founded impression that Italy abandoned her own sons to their fate. This was sometimes due to weakness, but certainly never meant renunciation. It is on the contrary at

present suggestive to remember that Irredentism, combated by the executive power, was openly proclaimed by the State, in numerous legislative enactments, which placed in a privileged condition all those subjects, who belonging politically to another State, are nevertheless Italian by race, or originating from territories belonging geographically to Italy.

This legislation, unique in the world in its energetic consecration of the political principle of nationality, had its origin in a clause contained in the Piedmontese Edict of March 17, 1848, regarding the Electorate and the eligibility to the Chamber of Deputies, which was afterwards reproduced in all the successive electoral laws of the kingdom of Italy. But time produced the significant phenomenon that while with the process of unification the number of "Italians outside the kingdom" was growing more and more restricted, their privileged juridical position was gradually extended. From the original concession in electoral matters they passed to the fruition of the greater number of public rights normally reserved to citizens. Thus at present in the matter of public appointments the equality between Italians outside the kingdom (*Italiani non regnicoli*) and citizens may be said to be the rule; a rule always applicable, provided there is no formal exclusion. Hence men belonging politically to another State may aspire to the highest and most responsible offices in our State owing to the simple fact that they are of Italian race.

It suffices now to think of the origin of this our most singular legislation, in order to be convinced that by it our State, anticipating our future destinies, wished

to foster the Italian national sentiment, and almost, as it were, to place in evidence aspirations towards the achievement of our national unity. Certainly legislative Irredentism was not and could not be specified against any given State. But its special orientation against Austria was derived primarily from historic reasons, which arose when Piedmont, after having assumed the representation of the Italian cause, with youthful ardour endeavoured to drive Austrian rule out of the peninsula, on the basis of the very principles contained in the brief formula of her laws. The movement was then continued by the irresistible voice of the popular conscience, which of all Italians outside the kingdom, conferred the name of *Irredenti* on those alone subject to Austria. It was finally consecrated by an authoritative current of learning and jurisprudence, which voicing general sentiment, claimed as characteristically Italian the permanent aspiration of any people in provinces which form part of other States in the desire to be united to the Italian kingdom; a characteristic which has been ascertained to exist only in the lands subject to Austria.

Even if the above interpretation of our laws should appear better inspired from a patriotic point of view than juridically correct, a certain political kernel may, nevertheless, be gleaned, reaffirming once more the duty which Italy is now about to fulfil; it is the absolutely transitory character which necessarily accompanies these laws in their rise and during the course of their existence. It has been justly observed that in substance and by virtue of these laws, and effectually "a true and proper fictitious annexation is unilaterally accom-

plished,"¹ but we may at once add that a fictitious annexation has no *raison d'être* apart from the hope of a not far distant real and effective annexation. When in order to specify the individuals whom he intends to favour, our legislator indicates that they should belong to "the Italian provinces not included within the territory of the State," we are induced to believe that in such an expression the words "not yet" have been omitted as being pleonastic. Since an aspiration cannot remain merely an aspiration for ever in the mind of him who cherishes it, it would be truly absurd to conceive a time measurement of a national aspiration as permanent and immutable. Nations are themselves a historic product, and are therefore subject to continual movements of expansion and contraction. The altered historical and spiritual conditions serve to diminish or destroy the moral possibility of revindication. Our State therefore having energetically manifested an intention of national integration in its laws, has signified its assumption of a pledge of honour to translate on the first favourable opportunity the intention into reality, if not in all, at least in part, and in that part where is most urgent the need of defence and where the national conscience is most alive and active.

Italy, a typical nation *par excellence*, the creator of a theory that has made the round of the world, inscribing a glorious page in the history of humanity, Italy would not have been able to remain inactive, even had she not been obliged to rise for the defence and accomplish-

¹ Ricci-Busatti in the *Rivista di diritto internazionale*, 1908, p. 188.

ment of her own national unity. In a struggle, the aim of which is to shatter an insane dream of universal hegemony and to place peace and future civilisation on the basis of respect for accomplished national autonomies, the rôle of Italy was assigned to her by fate. To enter into war on the side of the Central Empires, to aid Austria in strangling Serbia, Germany in destroying Belgium and crushing France would have meant for us the betrayal of our historic mission, the most tragic denial of that principle of nationality to which Italy owes more than any other country, since to it she owes her whole being. But even the simple maintenance of neutrality would have been not only a mistaken calculation of interest, but a renunciation of the ideal course of that policy, which had succeeded in attracting numerous sympathies from abroad and obtaining enthusiastic approval among our own people.

Nationalist individualism has not met with wide theoretic developments during the last few decades, but has nevertheless exercised the deepest influence on contemporary politics. On frequent occasions Italy has therefore been able to show that she wanted and knew how to favour the universal triumph of the principle of nationality. It is just to add that if sometimes this took place with a reluctance, that appeared excessive in regard to her direct and evident material interests, her voice acquires greater authority now that she revindicates for herself the integral application of the same principle. In the Eastern Question which has so vexed and continues to vex our aged Europe, Italy has always developed activity favourable to the free development of the Balkan States; so that with

perfect coherence and sound political consistency in the diplomatic conversations which followed the outbreak of the European war, Signor Sonnino could inform Count Berchtold that Italy had "interests of the first order in the preservation of the full integrity and political and economic independence of Serbia."

Our people have always actively seconded the work of the government. Constituted by the cult of a glorious tradition, as it were the champion of an ideal, Italy has sent her red legions to fight wherever the cause of liberty and that of the independence of a nation were to be defended. And even in the Balkan peninsula, where the problem of nationality is so intricate and difficult, when we have not had the opportunity of shedding our blood, as on the fields of Domokos, we have always given our active sympathy to the work of reconciliation between the different nationalities, a work which until the present has always been pursued by our diplomacy. Consequently, it is not surprising that the Italian people to-day feel acutely how their cause is blended with that of other nations, nations which are awaiting their own integration or national reconstruction from the war.

The mutual attraction between Italy and Roumania, which traces its remotest origin to the history of Roman civilisation, endured throughout centuries, and appears during the last thirty years to have been consolidated by a singular correspondence of political situations. The reasons that induced Italy to enter into the Triple Alliance are in substance similar to those that counselled Roumania to give her adhesion to the same political system; which however could never

become popular either in Italy or in Roumania on account of the Irredentist spirit which in each of the two nations was kindled against the same power of the Triple Alliance, the monarchy of Austria-Hungary. The constant struggles of the Roumanian youth of Transylvania against Magyar despotism commands our sympathetic admiration almost as much as those which animated Trent and Trieste against the brutal arrogance of Austria. As the thought of our own fate weighs on us, in almost like measure does anxiety for the Roman colony to whom Trajan committed as a title of honour the defence of the Danube, and who for centuries jealously guarded the Penates of Latin civilisation, menaced by the invasion of barbarism. Like us and along with us may she resume the power of her traditions, the thought of her future and her mission in Europe.

No country perhaps, after France and England, who were immediate witnesses of her misfortunes, felt for Belgium such passionate sympathy as Italy. The likeness between the present fate of Belgium and that of Italy fifty years ago, and of a part of it even now, has produced a deep response of feeling between the two countries. The joy with which the Belgians received the news of our entry into the campaign corresponded to the impetus with which the Italians raised their cry of execration against one of the greatest political misdeeds that history records. Fighting on the side of the Allies we share with all our heart their firm intention of averting the danger and the shame of a Belgium effaced from the map of Europe ; we feel with them that fighting for Belgium means fighting for the right of nations, that

is, everything considered, for the just peace of all nations and for the right of the weak to existence ; with them we intend to pay our debt of gratitude towards one of those little nations, which were poetically compared to great souls, whose little bodies being insufficient to contain them were irresistibly driven for the sake of humanity to expand outside ; of those little nations to whom, as a gifted English minister—Lloyd George—justly reminds us, the world owes the most perfect art on record, the most enduring literary works and the most real social progress.

Another resurrection, added to that of Belgium, will find in Italy an enthusiastic supporter in the midst of liberal Europe. The three Empires which shared in the dismemberment of Poland under the pretext that she was no longer necessary, now vie with one another in thrusting on the Poles the most solemn promises. We should be tempted to say that they feel the weight of their former odious crimes and the necessity of making amends in some way, but that the moment chosen for the acts of repentance and the violations committed in the past lead us to the most prudent scepticism. This scepticism appears entirely irresistible when we think of Germany, whose oppression was the harshest and most cruel that can be imagined, attaining to a systematic spoliation of those lands in a degree such as no pitiless tyranny of overlord had ever dared attempt. The restoration of Poland as a national and really independent organism cannot be achieved otherwise than by the victory of those Powers, which have as their final aim the revision of the map of Europe according to nationality. For the sake of her ancient glories, her

century-long martyrdom, the powerful vitality which she has manifested through misfortunes, the Polish nation is well worthy of liberty. Italy, which had intimate commercial and political relations with her in the past, and which still maintains solid intellectual and sentimental ties, gives her hopes and aid along with France and England to the end that the work of reparation may be accomplished.

Thus it is not an empty boast to say that, taking part in the war of giants which is being fought throughout the world, Italy has imprinted it with the seal of her spirit and strengthened the hope that such slaughter and such ruin may not have been in vain, that at least they will have served to establish the reign of international justice.

PROSPERO FEDOZZI.

III
THE POLITICAL REASONS
OF OUR WAR

PROF. PIETRO BONFANTE

III

THE POLITICAL REASONS OF OUR WAR

WHY have we entered into this gigantic conflict ? The redemption of our brothers, the conquest of our natural frontiers, the defence of oppressed nations, of tortured Belgium and downtrodden Serbia are evident motives, but motives that appeal to sentiment. And ought a nation to throw itself head foremost into the most terrible *mêlée*, to cast away millions of lives and millions of money, to bleed the race and disorganise national economy from purely sentimental motives ?

The politician will tell you that statecraft is a cold affair, that it looks more to interest than to sentiment, indeed that in order to safeguard interest it even tramples on sentiment.

Nevertheless the man who speaks in this wise is always the commonplace politician, not the highminded statesman : he is the prudent, practical minded man, the ideal of Francesco Guicciardini, not the far-sighted creator of the destinies of a people ; not the type of Niccolo Macchiavelli.

Owing to a law of social psychology the feelings of every people are moulded by their great interests, which in turn are exalted into ideals.

And when an entire people is carried away by a

sentiment, it is because this represents a vital and fundamental interest, for which it is right that they should risk everything that they hold most dear. The statesman should in no wise set himself to oppose this feeling—on the contrary he should understand and appreciate it, and keep in touch with its moods in order to grasp the interest of the moment.

Every nation as well as every individual has a spirit and a guiding motive due to its environment, its strength and its formation. The close analogy between the organism of the individual and that of society is, perhaps, reflected more clearly in these general tendencies than in the infelicitous comparison of single peculiarities. In this respect Italy is in a sharply defined position, closely resembling that of England. The "*bel paese*" is not a continental region ; but almost forms an island ; it does not extend over far-reaching plains to indefinite confines, uncertainly marked, now by a river, now by an arbitrary mathematical line, which in reality are always held or changed by force ; it is limited instead by well marked barriers ; where the coast line ceases, the proudest chain of mountains in Europe, forming an eternal semicircle, crowns her continental side. To this is due the fact that in spite of all the medleys, in spite of all the varied immigrations and invasions, the numerous elements have always fused together as in an actual crucible, in such a way as to form the most homogeneous group in its various essential traits which go to the conception of a nation ; but with the result that Italy has neither hopes, ambitions, nor aims towards continental expansion. Her future is entirely and always has been on the sea. Even that which seems to contradict this

assertion, when viewed more closely only confirms it more strikingly.

In spite of a party that invariably opposed every annexation and even under the Republic effected such unwillingly, whether suggested or enjoined by urgent political reasons, the empire created by Republican Rome is a Mediterranean empire ; every province is reached by the sea.

The territories in the interior as far as the Rhine and the Danube were added by the imperialistic policy of conquest pursued by Cæsar and Augustus. These almost reached the boundary of the Elbe and the conquest was justified by the necessity for defence. But when after the long night of the Middle Ages the world again awoke, the Italian nation remained still within its ancient confines ; new sister nations were created ; but the older did not gain any increase of territory.

At present this limitation of her aspirations on the side of the European continent is imposed on Italy by a just knowledge of her strength and of her interests, fortified, moreover, by the instincts of her people, which no infusion of nationalism, that is to say of anti-national propaganda, can modify. On the outbreak of the European war and in its earlier phases, German newspapers and circles had the bad taste to speak of acquiring Savoy for us ; the suggestion undoubtedly appeared outrageous to a great number of Italians ; to colder minds ridiculous ; to none worthy of consideration. Such are the different attitudes of mind which reveal spiritual antitheses between one race and another, and which are utterly irreconcilable. The more immediate reasons of the war, the determining factor on one

side and on the other, afford a fresh example of this antithesis. A Prince, an Anointed of the Lord, has been assassinated ; the German world trembles with indignation and horror and cannot conceive that an equal degree of indignation for such an abominable act should not be felt under every sky. A policy obstructing the punishment of a people held morally responsible for such a crime must be ruthless and unclean. The Latin world mourns the dead and keeps silent. The scene changes. A free country, peaceful and neutral, is invaded, trodden under foot, tortured. And now the Latin world is horror-struck, and in its turn cannot understand that horror should not fill the soul of the old idealist—Germany. Instead, it is the German world that remains insensible, dumbfounded, and has some slight idea that the case is one of feigned indignation. Why such an uproar for such a small nation ? For a parasitic people ? And is it not lawful for a great nation to crush a small one, as one crushes a parasite ?

Turning to ourselves, our position, our limitation, the experience gleaned from our history, and our conscience impose on us a European policy which is the policy of England ; the balance and the multiplication of free States, not the further aggrandisement of the great States ; nor the aggrandisement of Italy beyond her natural and national confines, nor yet the aggrandisement of others.

Our lasting agreement with England has not, after all, any other foundation : it may be strengthened by accidental circumstances, as it may be shaken by others ; a particular and persistent reason has maintained it throughout every vicissitude : our common policy of balance.

But policy of balance does not necessarily imply a policy of peace. Undoubtedly, States with a tendency towards expansion, towards continental hegemony, have naturally a more aggressive spirit, a **more** military temperament; but the maintenance of **equilibrium** also exacts entrance on to the field at the critical moment, sometimes even the striking of the first blow. In the war against Louis XIV., England and Holland were the first to attack. A really pacific policy would have counselled them to allow the grandson of Louis tranquilly to accept the crown of Spain and would have prevented the maritime powers being unduly offended by the swaggering boast: "*Il n'y a plus de Pyrénées.*"

Nevertheless, the lot of Italy in following her policy is not that of England. On the west our frontiers everywhere reach the Alps. Assuming our acquisition of Nice, they would be worse, not better. Nice would be lost (as it was formally lost to Piedmont) at the beginning of a war with France, unless the war opened with an offensive on our side. But on this side of Nice, along the Ligurian coast, which becomes a corridor (a cornice as the first part of the road is actually called) and in several places it is not even a corridor or cornice, a modern army would not advance merely for the pleasure of being struck down or cut to pieces from the mountains.

The times of Buonaparte are passed. Napoleon himself even in his day invaded the northern plain across Liguria, because Liguria was a foreign and a neutral State. On that side, in short, France lies open, since the Ligurian corridor leads to the plains of Provence, not to Italy. But on the eastern side our actual bound-

aries are well known. If England can follow her own policy of equilibrium, owing to her splendid isolation (which in reality she has never abandoned in Europe), only throwing her sword into the scales at the critical moment; and at the most in time of peace, indicating by means of *ententes*, agreements, preferences and sympathies, which side in her opinion should be upheld, and which is the one that threatens the balance of power, Italy on the other hand cannot live in this state of repose, nor watch the varying fortunes of Europe from so serene an Olympus. To safeguard the equilibrium Italy should study the situation in time of peace and side with whichever group upholds it, or is least likely to disturb it.

Now after 1870, when the era of autonomous policy really begins for Italy, the conditions were singularly critical. But we cannot deny that if France for some time seemed crippled and exhausted, she very quickly recovered. Since the time of the Carolingians, France has always been the country of sudden falls, after periods of great splendour, and the country of equally great recoveries. That she meditated recovering at our expense cannot be denied, any more than that Germany, born in the same year and somewhat surprised by her good fortune, suspicious of her neighbours on every side, followed a more or less conservative policy, one of concentration, and at times even a timid policy. She was agitated by serious internal questions; socialism appeared to undermine the foundations of the new empire, criminal attempts succeeded one another, the great Chancellor seconded the movement by bringing into the State the socialism of the platform; colonial

policy never entered in the very least into Bismarck's visions, and under the direction of Delbrück, Germany, in spite of the crisis of 1873, followed with confidence the free trade policy of the *Zollverein*, which had so powerfully contributed to her redemption. The Eastern question was not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier. Bismarck frankly avowed that German policy ended at the Danube. "I do not even open letters coming from Constantinople: it is a waste of time."

If Italy left the Congress of Berlin with empty hands ("with clean hands" was the euphemism employed by the unfortunate authors of this policy), we must not forget that she had Germany as her solitary companion. All the other powers, Russia, Austria, England, even France herself, had had their share of the Ottoman Empire, or had pledged it.

As opposed to Germany, France had been animated by the desire for revenge, possessed the second fleet of the world, was extending her possessions in Asia and Africa, fighting bloody colonial wars in Madagascar, at Tonquin, Annam, about to become, as she has become, a great Mohammedan power, coming into collision with Italy and England at Tunis and in the Soudan. Russia, too, who after '70, her vengeance for the Crimea satisfied, sympathised with France, pursued a formidable expansion in Asia and Europe. She advanced in Asia year by year. England gradually yielded, but never did she tremble so greatly for her Indian Empire.

The war of '76-77 brought Russia almost to the very door of Constantinople, and gave her ascendancy in the Balkan peninsula. England and Germany,—Germany acting on pressure from England, and in the interests of

peace,—hastened to the defence ; and after the Congress of Berlin, a violent outburst of hatred among the Russians against England took place, and a still greater against Germany, which meanwhile found its manifestation in a war of tariffs. Two men of great aspirations and restless genius directed the threads of French and Russian policy—Gambetta and Gortschakoff.

In these conditions it was no wonder if Italy, like England, leaned towards the Central Powers.

Vigorous forces, it is true, were working in opposition : invincible repulsion towards Austria, the difference of race and temperament ; the opposed political constitution of the people whom we were approaching, a feeling of diffidence on account of the gratitude which Italy owed to France, and the tradition of the political men of the old conservative party, with which, by chance, was allied the democratic vigour of the extreme Left. But French policy took upon itself the task of breaking these hostile forces and overcoming our scruples. Still, it was not the affront about Tunis that threw us into the arms of the Triple Alliance. It availed, at most, to silence the opposition which arose out of this contrast between foreign policy and our feelings and home policy. It was essential that we should approach the Central Powers. Germany was satisfied with territory, had no colonial ambitions, had no fleet worthy of consideration, nor ties, nor aspirations in the Levant. She desired peace. England, who owing to her freedom of movement, is the true barometer of international politics, decidedly leaned towards Germany. The Congress of Berlin was Lord Beaconsfield's great diplomatic victory. Bismarck aided, but was merely

the ornamental victor. And in the following years the relations between England and Germany were for a long time most cordial, whichever of the two great rivals and athletes—Gladstone or Beaconsfield or adherents of either—was in power. England's attitude towards France on the contrary was suspicious and sometimes hostile. In these circumstances the treaty of May 20, 1882, the clauses of which are open to criticism, was in its essence the product of the fundamental motives of our foreign policy.

Even setting aside the antagonism with our feelings and our home policy, in this foreign policy there was certainly a dark spot. If Germany had no ambitions in the Mediterranean, the same could not be said of Austria. Austria too, following a former political bent (her error was indeed to have forgotten it from time to time), aimed at extending her possessions in the Balkans. Our policy on the other hand here also tended towards the balance of power: the Balkans for the Balkan peoples.

Nevertheless, in the treaties of the Triple Alliance the *statu quo* was implicit, and in consequence it was expressly established that every change effected by Austria in the Balkans would have given a right to compensation in order to re-establish the balance between Italy and Austria, and, on the other hand, only in so far as we adhered to the Alliance would Germany fulfil her rôle as moderator with regard to Austria.

The nineteenth century was nearing its end without bringing any change in our foreign policy. On the

contrary the French and Italian differences had been accentuated by the commercial rupture dating from 1888, and thus Franco-Italian as well as Anglo-French rivalry culminated at the expiration of the century in our disastrous African war (1894-96) and in the Fashoda episode (1898). Nevertheless, a deep-set change was ripening. The progress of Germany had taken shape and developed after 1880 on economic and demographic lines (let us ignore her idealistic side) magnificently, as in no other country in the world, and had radically modified the guiding lines of her politics.

The population, which had been 40 millions in 1870, had risen to 60 millions at the end of the century; already in 1878, before any other power, Germany and Austria had initiated a new protectionist policy,¹ the sting of which was, above all, directed against England. The contagious example suppressed in every other State the free trade policy propagated by the English school and English policy. German industry having overcome the first trying crisis and the period of social adjustment, ended by outstripping even English industry.

¹ Austria was really the first of the powers to initiate the revival of protectionism. Her notably high autonomous tariff, issued in consequence of the open and secret opposition on the part of the manufacturers, under the leadership of the woollen drapers of Brünn (Alfred Skene), against the treaties inspired by free trade and especially against the Anglo-Austrian Convention, belongs to the year 1878 (Chlumetzky's Ministry). Germany followed with her universal autonomous tariff of 1879; the scheme already maturing in 1876, in consequence of the retirement of Delbrück, when Bismarck personally assumed the direction of the economic affairs of the empire; even Austria was finally driven to abandon free trade because of the repugnance manifested by Bismarck for the first time against treaties and conventional tariffs.

At the close of the century Germany asserted herself as the first industrial power in the world ; her commerce was greater than that of France, equalled that of the United States (surpassed it early in the new century), and was second to that of England alone, with an annual yield ever increasing beyond that of her rival. Since 1884, Bismarck himself had cast off his indifference to colonial matters and set himself to lay the foundations of a German colonial Empire in Africa and Oceania. A formidable fleet was created, and while in 1893 Germany still occupied the sixth place, lower even than that of Italy, from that date onward she made enormous progress. With her scheme of 1900 she rapidly advanced to the second place, which she attained in 1906. She no longer concealed her designs of annexation in Holland, both to secure adjacent territory and to hold over the big rivers together with their outlets and to acquire Dutch colonies. In the Balkan peninsula, that region which in 1878 was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier, she spread the greatest network of interests. Constantinople becomes the keystone of German politics, and it is precisely in Asiatic Turkey, in the territory of ancient Mesopotamia, that she meditated the creation of a centre of expansion for the German race, after the African colonies had begun to appear a delusion. The syndicate of the Bagdad railway was to prepare the ground. All this movement was still subdued, as yet it enjoyed no clamorous recognition. On the contrary, attempts at conciliation had been made. By pacific methods England tried to stem German expansion in Africa and obtained a noteworthy success with the minister, von Caprivi, who returned temporarily

to the former methods of Bismarck's policy, and in exchange for the little island of Heligoland, renounced a considerable part of East Africa and the protectorate of Zanzibar.

Anyhow, though outwardly still cautious, the Teutonic advance was none the less sure.

On the other hand in France the aspect changed in a radically opposite sense. A great and mysterious phenomenon, one of those phenomena which rule the course of history, but which science has hitherto approached with mysticism in so far as its remote and secret causes are concerned, thus revealing lack of positive knowledge, began to afflict French society—the decrease of the birth rate. Population, which increased to such an imposing extent in Germany, remained stationary in France, where it is still maintained solely by effect of immigration. The industrial and commercial activity of France is declining, and from the second place, nay from the position of rival to England, she is passing to the fourth. The spirit of initiative is failing, and the inexhaustible wealth of accumulated and ever-increasing capital, due chiefly to the thrift of the peasants who cultivate the most fertile soil of Europe, is mainly invested in loans to other States. Like all other great economic powers in their decline, like Genoa and Florence of the seventeenth century, like Holland of the eighteenth, even France, the ancient industrial and commercial power, was on the way to become a financial and banking power. Her colonial empire is vast, but she is incapable of populating it, of exploiting it, and notwithstanding political rivalry, the French companies in Tunis, at

constant though latent strife with the State, are obliged to resort to immigration and the employment of Italian labour. Her naval power is also on the wane ; from the second rank, France fell to the third, and with the present century has fallen to the fourth. Nor can the army either in quality or even in technical progress stand comparison with the increase and progress of the German.

The usual international barometer marked the change. When the Anglo-French crisis came to a head in the Fashoda incident of 1898, the danger, that is of loss of balance, was already manifest on the other side. Russia quelled by the arms of Japan in 1904, England immediately shaped her new political course, and leaned towards the Dual Alliance. The colonial agreement with France in 1904, the attitude of England in the Algeiras Conference, the journeys of King Edward and his policy of isolating Germany, were but the most evident symptoms. The days of cordial agreement with the Triple Alliance had long passed after more than ten years of crisis, the new tendency was confirmed by the constitution of the Entente Cordiale with France and Russia. In 1902 we renewed the Triple Alliance and again in 1912 ; but in 1902 England was no longer on our side, and in 1912 she passed over definitely to the other group.

When the Triple Alliance was concluded in 1882, the German plenipotentiary exclaimed "*Que Dieu benisse cette œuvre de paix.*" As stated, this was the simple truth : Italy then joined the Triple Alliance because of its marked guarantee of peace, and participation in the Alliance corresponded to her natural policy of

balance. She would be obliged to change her course the day on which the Triple Alliance changed its character. Perpetual alliances are possible only between aggressive and expanding powers: of such a nature are the primitive leagues "*sine die*" to divide the land conquered and the spoils. Why did Italy not change her course? Why did she not follow the barometer of her own policy—England?

Deep and slow treachery, woven partly by events, and partly by man, had altered the purpose and the basis of the Triple Alliance.

The transformation of aims in two of the contracting States of the Alliance had been radical; the covering shield had become an offensive weapon; a weapon of attack even against the third party concerned. But we were prevented from clearly recognising this new menace, this aggressiveness of the Alliance, or from hastening to avert it, because of the slow, fatal nature of the change; almost imperceptible in its single phases and also because of the remote theatre on which Germany's activity was more openly displayed. We had, it is true, a vague feeling of the change, that measures had been taken, that others were about to be taken, but the idea that this activity, displayed in scattered lands and on distant seas, was part of an actual programme of conquest, and that the attitude of England was evidence of a new departure rather than the reflection of her own individual hostility, escaped us.

Ancient Mesopotamia also seemed a remote region, and the activity of Germany in the Mediterranean territories of the Ottoman Empire was intense but

stealthy. The action of Austria in the Balkan peninsula was contemplated in treaties, was constantly watched, and this seemed sufficient.

The actual feeling of danger came with the aspirations of Germany towards the Mediterranean. The visit of the Emperor William to Tangiers, the first noisy stage of Germany's violent mission into the Morocco question (1905), roused even Italy, who in the Conference of Algeiras found herself for the first time on the side of the Entente and not on that of the Central Powers. For the time being the storm that had threatened war and overthrown the minister, Delcassé, was averted, thanks in part to our attitude. Again in 1908 the storm gathered near us at the time of the formal annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina ; we saw nothing more than the isolated event and yielded. Moreover, all Europe bowed its head. King Edward saw the failure of his policy, and died, it is said, of a broken heart. Once again the appearance of the cruiser *Panther* in the Moroccan port of Agadir during the French work of conquest opened the Morocco question afresh. With the agreement of Berlin (August—October, 1911), France appeased Germany for the time being with the cession of the Congo. Again almost at the same time the Teutonic advance threatened us near at hand in the centre of the Mediterranean opposite us, at Tripoli, which was intended for us. And even in this we saw nothing more than an isolated phenomenon, a slight restless aspiration, which it seemed a matter of pride to suppress by our immediate action.

German literature was the mirror of this evolution. Nevertheless, it was only the outbreak of the European

war which clearly revealed how this literature expressed an actual programme,—a thought cherished amid the ruling classes of the German nation,—and laid bare the aggressive spirit of the Teutonic powers. The Balkan war, which seemed to arrest the march of Austria and therefore in a certain sense to have secured peace, gave rise to an indescribable ferment and discomfort in her midst. For the first time in four centuries she found herself checked in her expansion and drawn still closer to Germany, who had again actually driven her to the East, first by her hostility in 1866, then in the most cordial manner from 1878 onwards. As in 1908 the cloud gathered afresh from the Balkans and this time the storm broke.

Events cleared the situation and determined the crisis for us also. Doubt was no longer possible. Facts not only spoke clearly, they spoke a language which revealed a conscient will, a deliberate and matured purpose. What we have just been considering refers more or less, and broadly speaking, to that fatal chain of events ; Germany's overbearing power of expansion ; Austria's push towards the East. Austria, moreover, followed an old incentive, a natural aspiration, a tendency towards hegemony, which she had laid aside during the war of the Spanish succession, during the wars of the Revolution, during the Napoleonic wars, during the struggles for supremacy in Germany and Italy, but which now reappeared as the sole basis of her policy. It arose indeed too late, and without any moral or civil justification, since, precisely from the date of the Congress of Berlin, Austria was no longer

confronted by the Turkish Empire alone, but by the free Balkan States and after the Balkan war by these only. At no single point did her boundaries now touch the Turkish Empire. What need was there any longer for an Austria, that is, for a rampart against the Turk? But now the treachery of man comes to the fore, which is of much greater importance in that it discloses that change of aim which made it absurd for us to adhere to the Triple Alliance, a change moreover which throws a light on our policy; that light which is kindled by the categorical dictates of moral law. If in fact our entry into the conflict on the opposite side to that of our allies of yesterday was justified from the point of view of logic and political necessity because of the very insidious treachery of events which had transformed the Triple Alliance into an apparatus of war and territorial conquest, it was also vindicated by the wiles of man as a holy rebellion against a revolting betrayal, a premeditated attack.

The scourge of invasion had but shortly spread in ancient Flanders and Eastern France, when day by day it began to appear evident that the material and spiritual progress of Germany, her great commerce, her grand industry, her glorious learning, all had been an immense organisation for war, and prepared in the most sinister, vindictive spirit, with the most evil desire for rule. The dream of universal dominion by sea and land again arose, and the great dream justified the means.

The spy system seems to us ignominious. Even in a serious hour, such as the present, even while we are engaged in a fierce contest, surrounded by Germans disguised as Swiss, or, owing to the singularity of our

political position, not even disguised at all, this aversion does not cease ; but though such is our feeling, all Germans (it is now well-known) residing abroad—commercial travellers, waiters, employés of firms, students—were, we say, close observers of the country which sheltered them. and bound to give an accurate and supervised account, not only to the Ministers of Education and Commerce, but also to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and to the War Minister.

German commerce invaded every country—a legitimate conquest of work and tenacity. Less legitimate might appear the system of dumping, selling below cost price, in order to beat down and eliminate foreign competition. And this forms a serious and disputed question between free traders and protectionists. I incline to the belief that even from the economic point of view, dumping ought not to be regarded with that indifference shown by the genuine free trader. But the present war brings to light the political side of the question. We can entirely accept the thesis of the free trader ; we are ready to believe that dumping does not economically redound to the advantage of him who practises it, does not damage the country that endures it. But if the German Government favours and encourages the system, it now seems clear that it was not so much from an economic as from a military point of view ; to prevent the rise of workshops, which on the outbreak of war might be transformed, even although with some effort, into factories for munitions. The great German factories had been ordered in such a manner as without the slightest trouble to be transformed immediately into military factories, and all,

or almost all, have effected this transformation. To this Germany owes the fact that economically speaking she is still alive, notwithstanding that all the markets of the world are closed to her ; that from the military point of view, as regards preparation and warlike instruments, she is still the strongest country.

The provision, the obsession of war savours of the infernal. Even the goods which Germans sent to foreign countries were eventually to serve their military aims. Their path of progress was widely advertised. German motor cars sold abroad became a military asset and had been built to become such.

Notwithstanding every effort, Germany felt that she could not face the English navy ; but she prepared her submarine warfare against the merchant fleet, against neutral vessels. Germany was foremost in military industry and had surpassed England, the ancient queen of iron, in metal work and mechanical industries, more immediately intended for warlike uses. She had surpassed France in chemical industries. With this she was not satisfied. German science set to work and created the most perfidious arm of war—asphyxiating gas. Even in the air the Germans were confident that they had achieved supremacy ; but here their genius or their evil genius betrayed them.

The delinquency or the collective madness of an entire nation has been discussed. An illustrious Italian brain specialist, Ernesto Lugaro, has seriously taken up the question. The thesis is less unreasonable than appears at first sight ; only we must abandon the preconception of race, which the Germans themselves have favoured, and substitute instead the fatality of

history. Every nation aspiring to hegemony is overtaken by an access of madness, forgets what is due to humanity and intoxicated by the aim seeks to justify the conquest. At the beginning of the modern era it was first Spain's turn, and this same Flanders now trodden underfoot, beheld thousands of burning pyres and scaffolds erected for the sake of the faith, cities devastated and the most prosperous regions of northern Europe reduced for the space of more than two centuries to a country of lifeless towns, of convents and beggars ; while England, winds and storms being in her favour, escaped with difficulty the horrors of invasion threatened by the invincible Armada and of servitude to the same rulers by whom Italy was then crushed. A century later, France of Louis XIV. having entered the field with the same claims to hegemony, and obeying the distinct orders of the Minister for War, the infamous Louvois, the Rhinelands were devastated in an iniquitous manner, even as Belgium in the present day, and reduced to a desert by the troops of the most courteous people in the world. A century later and the attempt at hegemony was renewed by Napoleon with the same arrogance and the same madness, the loudest manifestations being the continental blockade and the Russian expedition.

An Arabian allegory seems to me to afford an illustration of this historic fatality. Ali Ben Hamed, questioned by the unknown guest, whom he received with due regard, as to what he thought of his bloodthirsty Caliph, replied that he held him a monster worthy of every punishment. "Thou knowest with whom thou speakest?" answered the unknown one. "No." "Thou

speakest, wretched man, with thy Caliph." The Arab was not disconcerted, and in his turn replied: "And knowest thou with whom thou speakest? I am descended from the line of Ben Hamed, whose members go mad one day in every year. To-day is my day."

The wave of 'madness, which passing from one to another, attacks the chief members of the European family, has now submerged Germany. To-day is Germany's day.

The political exigencies of which we have spoken are inherent to the very existence of the State.

Added to the defence of existence is the custody of our future. We have already stated that, owing to the physical constitution of our country, and the psychical constitution of our people, once the natural and national barriers of our country are attained we cannot have territorial ambitions in Europe. Everything instead tends to commercial life; all our future is on the near and distant seas. Our territory is restricted; and if not sterile—a subject on which there has been exaggeration of late years as a reaction to earlier illusions—a large proportion of it is certainly less adapted than other soils to the cultivation of the most common alimentary products, while it is splendidly adapted to the culture of special products far beyond the needs of home consumption and consequently destined for exportation. Our sub-soil also is poor in essential products, such as iron and coal, but has nearly a monopoly in the markets of the world for certain special products. Lastly, our people are very ingenious, and they also are fitted for special, and particularly for artistic, industries, take

easily to emigration and seeking their fortune. Admitting the victory of a nation professing the most rigid Protectionist ideas, to which she gave the impulse in 1878, and rich in human resources, what would become of us? What would become of our trade and of our emigration?

German expansion, during the first phase, in the Atlantic and in the Pacific, had come into collision with England, but in its second phase threatened the Mediterranean powers and above all Italy. From Tangiers to the Persian Gulf, in the Mediterranean and the Levant, in the Balkan peninsula and in Asiatic Turkey, that is, in the zone that has always represented and still represents the true field of action and expansion of our people, Germany would have spread her tentacles and her invading and exclusive activity.

But two imperative reasons still more concerned with our future imposed on us the duty of taking part in this difficult war. On one hand the moral abasement, into which non-intervention in a general conflict of principles and nations would have thrown us, the universal contempt shown for our people and our emigration, unfortunately so low, and as an instrument of work almost on a level with negro or Chinese labour; on the other hand the possibility of conquering our eastern frontier and establishing the natural barrier of Italy. Never, and again never can we hope to represent our true potential policy in the Mediterranean and beyond the Mediterranean, if we have not the security of our boundaries in Europe.

To follow under every aspect and with full knowledge and coherence the ways of England, we must be in a

position analogous to that of England, even on the side of the defence of our confines. To sustain the same effort and to aspire to the chief rôle, or even one of the chief rôles by sea as well as by land is impossible. Spain and France have been the victims of this ambition, without which Spain would not have declined so terribly, and to the immense advantage of mankind France would have spread beyond the seas. Now Germany is the victim. Bülow, the cold Bülow, even he has cherished this illusion.

The policy of balance in its most ideal sense is a policy of peace with justice ; it is the struggle for right, the true antithesis of the policy of conquest and hegemony. Peace and justice are precious possessions, and nothing of great value can be bought for nothing. He who proclaims or hopes the contrary is deluded or deludes others : the great phenomena of history obey no different laws than the small phenomena of everyday life. If we want peace and justice we must pay for them with blood and money. Fathers fight in order that their sons may attain a peaceful and laborious youth ; brothers fight in order that their younger brothers may be spared scourge and outrage. All sacrifice themselves to avert sorrow and ruin from future generations, and at the price of blood to restore throughout the world a rule ever more just and more humane.

PIETRO BONFANTE.

IV

THE RIGHTS OF ITALY OVER THE
ALPS AND THE ADRIATIC

PROF. CARLO ERRARA

IV

THE RIGHTS OF ITALY OVER THE ALPS AND THE ADRIATIC

IN the peace of 241 B.C. following the first Punic war, the name "Italy," which had arisen out of obscurity from a small territory between the Ionian and Tyrrhene Seas, already following the growth of the history of Rome, seemed to have spread and to have described the entire peninsula. About forty years later, while the Second Punic War was nearing its end, the name, according to Polybius, had already crossed the Po, and then comprised under one name all the territory from the Alps to the Faro. Forty years, the brief period of a human generation, therefore sufficed to make the great northern plain one with the peninsula and to endow it with the same name. So evident, so *necessary* appears the connection between them; so immediately linked together, so intimately adapted under every respect with the peninsula appears the concave plain, which from the central chain of the Apennines receives, fuses and blends the accretions of the mountains, the waters and roads of the valleys, and the uninterrupted ebb and flow of human movement.

The name Italy having therefore already covered the entire Apennine peninsula and the great northern plain

two hundred years before the Christian era (and several centuries before it included the islands), no uncertainty raised either by the poet's voice, by political considerations, by scientific criticism, or by doubt in the popular conscience, ever succeeded in overthrowing this fundamental idea of an Italy ; an Italy that comprised under one single name both the peninsula and the ample base on which it rests.

This granted, no one from Polybius onwards, conceived, or could conceive, of frontiers of Italy other than those which surround the peninsula and the valley of the Po. Hence, whilst according to Cato, beyond the sea, the Alps are the wall of Italy, and for Cicero the Alps are placed "*non sine aliquo divino numine*" for the defence of Italy ; so for Brunetto Latini, Italy is "*finée au joug des montaignes qui sont vers Provence et vers France et vers Alemaigne,*" and according to Francesco Petrarca, Italy is defined in the classical lines "*il bel paese ch' Appennin parte e'l mar circonda e l'Alpe.*" The opinion of the modern student, so rich in points of view and subtle distinctions, does not differ substantially from the simple intuition of the poet and the ancient sage. This geographic unity which for twenty centuries has been styled Italy, composed of two plastic forms of the earth's surface, the one mountainous—the Apennines—the other a hollow, the low plain of the Po,—can have no other limits assigned to it—United Italy—than the sea, which from Liguria to the Romagna forms an almost complete ring round the Apennines, and the Alps, which from the point where the maritime boundary ends, enter to complete the perfect circle and delimit the low lying plain of the Po.

But further—in the Alps which are not in themselves a simple and single line, but a mass, a twist of chains, of trunks, of groups connected in the most varied manner, there stands forth nevertheless a clear lineal boundary assigned by nature to our country. Given in fact the very rapid descent from the Alpine and Apennine summits to the lowlands of the Po, whence all the valleys and watercourses so evidently converge to only one and the same centre, the natural boundary of this part of our country is the mountain line, which forms the watershed between the rivers flowing towards the plain of the Po and those flowing to the other side of the Alps. Nor does the fact, that in the diminutive glacis at the summit of this or that opening, the watershed is flattened to such a degree that for a short course the waters flow neither to one slope nor the other, detract from the precision of the said lineal boundary. For this uncertainty of the *divortium aquarum* being almost everywhere limited to little points scattered in the immense line, cannot in any way detract from its admirable value.

No other limit therefore can be assigned to Italy than the Alps ; no other line in the Alps can be said to be the natural boundary of Italy beyond that assigned by the severance of our rivers from those flowing to the other seas of Europe.

It is indeed true that to the life of the inhabitants on this side, as to that of the peoples on the opposite slopes, such a line has never proved a definite obstacle. There is no one of ordinary education who does not know how often in past centuries Italians have spread their language, their culture, and their arms beyond the Alps.

How much oftener by the gentler declivities of the Alps on their northern slopes have not foreigners crossed over to us, above all Germans, rough and uncouth. But notwithstanding the invasions from beyond the watershed of the Alps, whether repeated a hundred or thousand times, or for the duration of centuries, and frequently marked by imperishable tokens of violence, here, and not elsewhere, remains indelibly traced the boundary line of the beautiful country. The heart of Italy beats as strongly in the low-lying plain, where between cultivated fields slowly flows our great river, as in the recesses whence from lofty sources spring the thousand waters which meet in the Po, or flow with it through the same plain, whether called the Po, the Ticino, the Adda, the Adige, the Piave, or the Isonzo.

But this which nature willed and which we, firm interpreters of a like tradition, assuredly affirm, is disputed by foreigners—that is to say by Germans. Because the upper valley of the Dora Riparia, lying more open towards France in the watershed of Mont Genève than towards the low valley at Exilles, has for centuries accepted French customs and spoken French :—because the Val d'Aosta, closed in below at Bard more than by the passes to the trans-Alpine valleys, has kept and still retains the French language,—no Frenchman, man of science or other, ever imagines that these valleys, in accordance with the theory of geographical division, should belong to any country but Italy. But because there are three convenient accesses to the upper valley of the Adige from the foreign basins of the Inn and Drave, while only one large outlet leads from it to the central valley which we call Trentino, and because the Trentino

itself has one, one only of its slopes facing the plain of the Po, almost disappearing in the gorge of Rivoli—for this reason the best (or almost the best) of the recent writers on Italy—a professor of Marburg, pronounces the whole of this mountain district “to stand orographically in closer relation with the mountains and districts of the northern side than with the plain and group of the Italian Alps bounding it on East and West.” Further on account of the geographical rather than the historical causes, he assigns Germany the entire basin of the Adige. And again, because in the extreme eastern curve of the Alps towards the Gulf of Trieste and the Quarnero the summits of the mountains, more than elsewhere, are here and there flat and the watershed, the lineal boundary, is occasionally uncertain owing to the streams not flowing on the surface, the German geographer teaches, “Thence from Pontebba, the boundary line, best harmonising with geographical reasons, is the line of Isonzo denoting the natural limits of the Carso!”¹ Let Italy therefore in deference to geographical considerations be stripped of the whole of her country on the other side of the Isonzo!

Now in face of this purely German manner of violating the formation and marks of the earth's surface, as every other thing mortal and immortal, to the aggrandisement of the German Fatherland, and the belittlement of other countries (and I have not quoted the ultra-fantastic sentence of those who assign the Po as the natural boundary of German territory), it is not sufficient to

¹ This quotation, as well as the former, is taken from the excellent monograph of T. Fischer, *La penisola italiana*, Turin, 1902.

emphasise generally the relation in which the Adige as also the Isonzo lie to that great depression, so well marked out and so securely defined, which collects and renders Italian all the southern waters of the Alps. It is also necessary to follow the German reasoning on its own ground and assert, decisively assert, that not even with German arguments can Italy be deprived of the Tridentine and Julian Venetia.

In fact, to begin with the Upper Adige, perhaps the three beautiful Alpine passes of Resca, the Brenner and Toblach, which open into the watershed summit are of more value, even to those who consider (as the Germans do) the human history of the district, than the flat, low-lying, easy approach by which the upper valley enters the central Tridentine valley? From beyond Botzen, among the mulberries and vines which conspicuously symbolise Italy, the German tongue may well have crossed the Alps; but it is from the Po valley that the Upper Adige received ancient civilisation; from Rome, for centuries civil life, customs and language, which endured in its Tyrolese continuity until the middle of the seventeenth century. Finally, from Italy, in no small degree, there spread modern language and customs which prevail even in Botzen itself, and which even still forcibly invade the neighbourhood and the Val Venosta. While as for the Trentino, we must shamefully close our eyes to the truth, if we do not see that this district, besides being open above by the pass that ascends to Botzen, and wide open below towards the plain of the Po by four approaches, all practicable in spite of the narrow defiles of the valleys, has never for one single moment during its two

thousand years of existence ceased to be entirely Latin and Italian to the exclusion of all real German contamination.

No less certain are the conclusions with regard to Julian Venetia, although they require to be treated at greater length. In fact the entire natural wall of the Julian Alps, an uninterrupted continuation, similar in every characteristic to the preceding ranges of the Venetian Alps, belongs on its western slopes to Italy, whereas the watershed between the Isonzo and the Save marks in the clearest manner with its own wild crest the boundary line of Italy. The whole of the valley of the Isonzo, necessarily enclosing the tributaries which have their source further east, slopes with its waters to the utmost extremity of the Italian plain, and is therefore Italy—whether German learning will it or not. This means that there are unquestionable indications that Italian territory reaches as far as 40 km. east and south-east of Gorizia, where from the wall of the Julian Alps or from the mass of Monte Re gush forth the Idria and Vipacco.

It is no doubt true that those who appeal to nature for the primary justification of our rights are accustomed to oppose the following fact: i.e., that the oft mentioned border line, so clearly marked for 1,500 kilometres from the Maritime Alps to the sources of the Idria, is from this point onwards somewhat vague in places, so that on the other side of the Isonzo fluvial basin it becomes a really debateable point. Against this the question arises, where in the rest of the mountainous zone from here to the Adriatic, disposed in great steps, like uniform terraces and no longer surmounted except

at intervals by higher chains, where indeed is the continuous mountain line which marks the parting of the waters? Even the waters, where are they in the unique region of the Carso, almost devoid of broad sloping valleys but formed entirely of cavities and tunnels, which, absorbing the waters, suppress so great a part of the superficial watercourse? But it is sufficient, we reply, that on the tableland of the Carso some massive stump of the Julian chain stands out clearly to mark the broken continuation of the distant Alps, until they reach or almost reach the Quarnero. It is sufficient that the only important river of defined course in the Carso district is the Timavo (Recca), which rises north of Fiume, flows for more than half of its course in the open valley at the root of the Istrian peninsula, and has its outlet at the extreme eastern end of the Venetian plain. Therefore, in spite of the fact that in the last seventy or eighty kilometres the Alpine watershed is not so clearly defined as in the rest of the chain, we definitely proclaim this district also Italian by natural right, attributing geographically to Italy the entire territory of the Istrian peninsula from its base to the extreme summits of Salvore and Promontore.

But why discuss this subject further? Even if the territories beyond the Idria and the Vippacco were a geographical matter of doubt, can Italy's right be founded only on the outward formation of the earth's surface? Can we continue to speak of Italy as we have hitherto done, as a country devoid of men, devoid of life and history, of which it was enough to discuss where it began and ended, simply regarding the formation of its mountains and valleys? But Italy means life,

means history, means a past filled with the glorious works of human skill of more than three thousand years, extending from the Sicilian Sea to the summits of the Alps. We claim therefore only the natural soil of Italy, and we uphold in their entirety the rights of our nation, so that the words of the poet : “ *O popoli, Italia qui giunse, Vendicando il suo nome e il diritto !* ” may soon be appropriately repeated on the Alps.

Together with the vindication of her own name, trampled on, usurped from the sources of the Adige to the extreme end of the gulf of Fiume, Italy ought to assert her rights, which have existed for centuries, as a nation. Not only our land but our people are trodden under foot by Austria. Not only, until the sword shall dictate other terms, does Austria crush with her heel about fifteen of our high valleys from the basins of the Oglio and the Adige to those of the Brenta and the Piave, but holds under her sway 420,000 Italians. These form a compact mass beyond the frontier of the kingdom as far as the Upper Adige ; beyond they are scattered in the district of the Upper Adige itself as far as Botzen and Meran ; and only thence are they hemmed in against the high passes by the 180,000 Germans who have crossed from beyond the Alps. Likewise the territories which Austria has usurped on the eastern edge of Italy are equally subject to her yoke ; mutilated tracts of the valleys of the Fella, the Natisone, the Judrio, the entire basin of the Isonzo, the plains of the Carso and the Istrian peninsula. On these lands 400,000 Italians are subjects of the Hapsburgs, living in a closely serried mass on the plain of the Isonzo, and along the coast district from Trieste to Pola, or scattered in the heart of

Istria and along the Quarnero as far as Fiume, while only the Isonzo with its tributaries, the territory of the Upper Timavo and part of the interior of Istria are inhabited by non-Italians, Slovenes and Croats.¹

Nor is the Italian nationality of the Tridentine and Julian Venetia borrowed ; it is original and has endured for thousands of years ; it grew and developed with that of the entire peninsula. The German language in fact, which penetrated through the Upper Adige in the Middle Ages, succeeded only in the nineteenth century in overcoming it at Botzen, and even there only with difficulty. Not even in the most favourable moment could it succeed in crossing the pass of Salorno, since it was only by a curious exception that the fifth part of the population of Trent—a thoroughly Italian city—was German in the fifteenth century, and this fifth was reduced to nought in a few decades. Thus the chief city remained thoroughly Italian, so did the smaller cities, the towns and country districts, even to the remotest valleys, and to the fastnesses of the wild Dolomites. Here with every right the people boast of being the true vanguard of the Italian nation, even the few inhabitants

¹ The best representation of the different linguistic elements in Tridentine and Julian Venetia is that given by the *Carta etnica linguistica alla scala di 1,500,000*. “*La regione veneta e le Alpi nostre*,” second edition, published by the Inst. Geogr. De Agostini, Novara, 1915. Nevertheless, even this chart is not a little defective as regards Julian Venetia, the uninhabited districts being represented less extended than they really are, also by the fact that the reciprocal distribution of the Italian and Croatian elements in Istria and in the islands is frequently insufficiently or erroneously represented. This, naturally detracting from the value of the Austrian official statistics, forms of necessity the basis of every similar work.

that speak *ladino* cannot be persuaded by either German blandishments or falsehoods to renounce their original Latin parentage.

Neither less ancient nor deep rooted than that of the Trentino, is the Italian character of the Julian territories. The neo-Latin character of the Friuli dialect has never detracted from the national Italian character of Gorizia and the lower Isonzo, and intact strongholds of our language and culture were always, and are to-day, the little Istrian towns from Capodistria to Parenzo, and the district from Pola to Fiume. Trieste has always remained entirely Italian and untainted, she also having passed from her former Latinity to the Italianism, which she vaunted four centuries ago as proudly as she does to-day. Do not the words of 1523, in fact, seem to apply to noble Trieste of to-day when, rejecting an Austrian attempt to impose the use of German in the tribunals, the Commune strongly proclaimed that the Triestines were Latin and consequently ignorant of the language of Germany : “ *Nos, cum latini simus, linguam ignoramus theutonicam ?* ”

Therefore the magnificent defence of the present day corresponds throughout to the proud and uninterrupted tradition of centuries. Pirano, protesting against the insult of a Croat inscription on the tablet beside the name of the hereditary Italian magistracy ; the little rural hamlet of Roverè della Luna proclaiming in the name of the Bronzetti, the great people of Trieste, in that of Domenico Rossetti by means of verses inspired with the same faith, the invincible right to their native language ; the citizens of Fiume in the year of the war of liberation renewing the bond of their outraged Italianism with

the immortal tutelary symbols of the great ancient mother.

We are therefore urged on towards the innermost bay of the Quarnero and the most elevated recesses of the Atesa and the Isonzo valleys both by the right, conferred on us by nature, of politically uniting that which was one geographically, and by the right conferred on us by the history of centuries, of receiving into the unified country all the territories of Italian nationality. Nevertheless, the objection might easily be alleged that neither in the Tridentine nor the Julian Venetia does the frontier of Italian nationality coincide with the line of watershed that bounds our country, and consequently the plan of liberation of the Italian *Irredenti* has an entirely different aim from that alleged by those who desire that the Italian State should reach its natural limits. A third right we should proclaim beside that suggested by nature, and beside that imposed by national ties:—the right which the Italian State has to adjust itself within boundaries, which, permitting of its necessary defence, may guarantee its liberty, self-government and in a word—its life.

What, with respect to the most vital necessities, to the most elementary conditions of the existence of the Italian State, was the political boundary which existed between the kingdom and the Austro-Hungarian monarchy until May 24, 1915, has too often been explained to require to be repeated at length. Suffice, it to say that, except the tract at the frontier of the Val Camonica, where for about eighty kilometres (50 m.) the division between the two States is formed by a compact series of high ice-covered peaks, and except the other

tract, where on the rugged brow of the Carnic Alps the political frontier unusually coincides for a little longer distance with the line of watershed, the boundary between the two States in its mountain course is so tortuous and irregular,—leaping from one crest to another, from one declivity to another, from the bottom of one valley to the bottom of another,—twisting and re-twisting at such angles as to seem traced rather by the strangest and most inexplicable of caprices, than by studied and judicious selection. And worse still is the case at its extreme eastern limit, where, with a great leap to the west, forsaking the entire main line of the Julian Alps and the basin of the Isonzo, and cutting at random in half all the upper valley of the Natisone, the political boundary rushes at will down to the plain of Friuli, passes capriciously across the open country, madly cutting across roads, paths, properties, leaping from one bank to another, doubling and redoubling on itself, until it meets the lagoon of Marano and the Adriatic.

What it is, and what is the worth of such a frontier may be illustrated by a thousand examples, showing how many valleys are barred, how many watercourses sequestered either at their source or in the middle of their course, how many villages severed from all convenient communication, how many roads forced to make long and absurd turns, how many impediments to daily life and to the possessions of the mountaineers, and of the inhabitants of the plains, how many obstacles prohibitive of any hydraulic arrangement, to the use of watercourses for water supply or electric plants, to any practical connecting of roads, telegraphic or railway lines, how many expenses for the repression of smuggling does not

the eccentricity of our boundaries impose on us at all times !

And yet all that we might say on these subjects would be trifling compared to that which regards our military defences. While in fact from the basin of the Ateso, a frontier carried to the Alpine watershed would not leave more than three or four entrances open to foreign invasion, the great triangle of Austrian territory that here thrusts itself into northern Italy, threatening at a distance of scarcely twenty or thirty kilometres the Venetian and Lombard plains, opens (between carriage roads and cart tracks) more than thirty avenues into the kingdom. And all are open in such a way that the entire advantage of the offensive lies with Austria and not with us. Austria stands planted in the higher and stronger part of all the valleys ; we in the lower, more open and more difficult to bar. Austria placed in a position of being able, as from a single centre, to overrun and invade the different parts (Valtellina, the Brescian and Veronese valleys, and those of Vicenza and Belluno), leaves Italy in the opposite condition of being obliged to collect for the defensive, or offensive, her forces from so many different and divided roads. Austria from her vantage ground is able to menace the Venetian plain in the very place where the plain is narrowed to about fifty kilometres between the foot of the hills and the marshy fringe of the lagoons. Italy on her side is so poor in natural defences in this part, that an Austrian *coup de main* would suffice to deprive her at a single blow of all Eastern Venetia, and to isolate our army operating in Friuli or the Julian Alps.

And this apart from the fact that the natural fortresses

of this privileged strategical position have been increased a thousand-fold by the Austrian Government, by the construction of a superb network of military roads, leading over the most difficult parts of the mountains, and by the erection of huge military buildings and fortifications of every kind scattered everywhere, in such a manner as to provide bases of exceeding solidity, not only to defence against every eventual attack, but still more against a meditated and long prepared offensive.

To this is owing the enormous military and financial burden that Italy in her turn is called on to bear for her own safety along the whole frontier of this great armed and menacing point, against which we require such defences as will not only counterbalance the military preparations of the enemy, but also all the natural advantages of his position. Let us consider for a single moment the importance of the effort that is necessary to defend a boundary more than 400 kilometres (250 m.) long, open and dangerous in a hundred places, requiring defences exceptionally strong and costly ; and compare with it the effort that would instead be required for the defence of a frontier only 300 kilometres long, and formed by an almost uninterrupted series of formidable mountains, such as would be provided by the natural line of the watershed, and see how forcible is the comparison !

But there is still worse. Sad as is the picture of the Italo-Austrian frontier of the Trentino, it has a still more serious counterpart on the eastern frontier, constituted only in part by a badly connected series of mountain tracts, or by negligible torrent beds, marked at random for too long a space across a plain devoid

of the smallest obstacle. Venetia consequently remains open, wide open for a distance of forty kilometres, undefended and indefensible, to the attack of assailants, while on her side Austria confronts us, as soon as the frontier is crossed, with the broad river of the Isonzo, guarded everywhere by such rugged masses of rock stretching outwards and above our plain, as here also to confer on Austria all the advantages and on Italy all the disadvantages.

And were this all ! But the inconveniences of the frontier towards the Trentino and those of the frontier towards Julian Venetia, already so serious in themselves, conspire together to the detriment of our defence. Consider in fact the entire outline of the whole frontier, traced in the form of a horseshoe, from the mountains of the Veronese territory to the eastern end on the Adriatic ; consider how the entire country outside this curve belongs to Austria, while the interior portion, enclosed as in a vice, belongs to Italy ; reflect how this latter part, or shall we say Venetia, thus badly served at almost all points by its frontier, may be invaded at the same time from opposite sides ; reflect again how Venetia for the most part is a uniform plain, devoid of river lines that could lend themselves to a long resistance ; (so much so, that until a few years ago, deprived as we were of fortifications on the frontiers, it was suggested in case of an Austrian attack, directly to abandon Venetia without fighting, so as to hold the enemy at the Adige)—think, I say, and consider all this, and we shall then see whether the conquest of a frontier, which enables her effectually to defend herself and to live without subjugation to others, does not

represent for Italy of to-day a supreme necessity, a sacred right.

In conclusion, our right is affirmed and proclaimed by the recently constituted supreme reasons of State, by the exigences of national life, which have their origin far back in the past, and by the influences which date from the earliest ages of the earth, the geographical entity which men call Italy. Hence it is not from secondary and transitory motives, but from necessary and perpetually efficient causes, that the Italians are now induced to secure to their kingdom the definite frontier of the Alps—a strong and almost entirely secure frontier which moreover completely satisfies the national aspiration that Italy should be the Mother Country of all Italians.

Italian claims, let us remember, are not concerned solely with the Alps ; they assert themselves beyond the sea, where it is true no right has been assigned us by the earth's formation, but where we are summoned by another right conferred on us by the past and present life of the nation, and still more fully and decisively by the right derived from the necessity of safeguarding the State of Italy.

Only those who do not look beyond the waves of the Adriatic, can escape the fact that if geographically the soil of Italy is limited by the sea with, perhaps, the outpost of small islands, Italy nationally possesses along the opposite coast rights that have existed for centuries, which still endure, and a vital necessity of military safety imposed on us most forcibly by all the ancient and recent history of our country.

Certainly the text-books of our schools no longer teach as formerly by an inexcusable mistake that Dalmatia forms part of the land geographically Italian; nor would any one be more justified in arguing from the proven geological affinity between the two shores of the Adriatic, that there was reason for reviving this old opinion. But, even if the territory itself is not united, yet through a long course of centuries the language has been one together with the culture and the course of historic events. Hence the right, which we claim by reason of the Italian character that still survives in Dalmatia, in common with the rest of the nation. This national tie is a phenomenon, so to say, essentially human on the Adriatic. In the first place the short distance between the two shores (not more than 100 to 200 kilometres—a brief passage even to navigators of other ages)—further, the almost insurmountable isolation of the Dalmatian shore, which is but a narrow strip of ports and islands along the coast, with a *hinterland* bounded by desert mountains and squalid tablelands—the hope that the waves alone bring to these solitary people—drawn by the sea into more easy intercourse with the attractive coast opposite, than can be afforded by land with its inconvenient means of access to the barred districts in the interior,—all this, we repeat, has caused the Dalmatian people, even if rejuvenated in great part by Slav blood in the darkest period of the Middle Ages, to be always more connected with reference to their everyday life with the Italians oversea than with the Slavs across the mountains. Hence it comes that after the ancient flourishing Latin period, the Romance tongue lingered throughout

mediæval times as a local echo, slow in disappearing, and consequently the Venetian dialect naturally imposed itself with the dominion of S. Marco, even on the masses who had come down to the coast with their Slavonic tongue. The country was, therefore, bilingual, part of the inhabitants representing the intact continuation of Roman Dalmatia,—the others,—the majority—maintaining along the coast the Serbian speech, almost as a domestic dialect, while making use of Italian as a language, the language of culture, of commerce, of the sea. Hence even now, although the substitution of the Austrian for the Venetian government took place with the beginning of the nineteenth century, and Austrian policy in the last few decades has signified first a slow weakening and then a violent compression and depression of Italianism, still even now a tenth part of the Dalmatians,—the flower, the most cultivated and civilised part of the population,—an absolute majority at Zara,—proud of the tradition of centuries, remains on the coast to represent our nation. And even by the majority which openly declares itself to belong to the other stock and its tongue, our language is still spoken in business, art, study, and in all the civilisation which reaches them from overseas.

This is the national right conferred on Italy by the number of Italian Dalmatians, rather than by the traditions of culture and civilisation, with which these shores, linked by the sea to our own, are indelibly imprinted. Even more than on this tradition and on this glorious survival, Italian claims are based on another right, stronger, safer—in our case—than even the national right itself; on the supreme right, that is,

belonging to the Italian State of assuring its own existence, placed on the maritime side absolutely at the mercy of every caprice of others.

What our Adriatic coast is, and what our maritime frontier toward Austria-Hungary, is, I say, too well-known to be recalled at length here. In the northern parts a low level coast of lagoon-like banks and delta-like projections, impassable to vessels of heavy tonnage except within the Venetian lagoon, difficult of access—a monotonous, rectilinear coast, smooth, almost levelled, exposed beyond belief to invasion, since the entire remaining tract between Rimini and Otranto, except for a single modest shelter (wretched from a military point of view) on the promontory of Ancona, and another, small in compass, within the gulf of Brindisi; without a maritime platform of strategic value, without a harbour capable of containing, to say nothing of protecting, a fleet; a prey in short, open and defenceless, to any attack—such is the Adriatic coast of the kingdom. On the contrary, intersected by mountains and rocks, by inlets, and projections, all dotted with islands which give the appearance of dykes against an approach, of tortuous and deep canals which seem made for every kind of snare, of creeks where any fleet might hide out of sight either for defence or offence; such is the coast where Austria, her forces collected in the magnificent ravines of Pola, Sebenico or Cattaro, or hidden in one of the innumerable windings of the canals on the coast, might swoop down unexpectedly with all her forces in two or three hours on any point of our shore! Italy, on the contrary, scarcely able to arm in defence of her poor coast the two extreme ends—Venice and Brindisi—

must keep her vessels,—the only garrison to which she could entrust the safety of her Adriatic coast,—must keep them, I say, at Taranto, several hours' distance from the very entrance to the Adriatic, if she does not wish to expose them to hostile snares with only the bare coast to the rear and the formidable enemy in front !

Such are the facts in themselves. Even without recalling the supremacy over Dalmatia, constantly upheld by ancient Rome and modern Venice, even without recurring to the examples afforded with overwhelming evidence by the warlike events after May 23, 1915, they show beyond all contradiction the condition of absolute servitude in which Italy finds herself in the Adriatic as long as a hostile State remains in possession of the eastern coast. This condition is still worse than that afforded by the actual frontier, where it is possible artificially and at ruinous expense to supply in part the crushing natural inferiority, whereas neither fortifications, nor vessels, offer a remedy to the irremediable weakness of our Adriatic coast. If, therefore, the Italian State cannot in any manner remain under the condition of inferiority, in which she is placed by her boundary on land, still less can she accept the absolutely intolerable vassalage in which she is placed, by the unfortunate formation of her eastern coast. Hence arises the inevitable necessity for a change which would deprive for ever the formidable coast opposite of the power to offend and dominate, at the will of its ruler, all the eastern side of Italy. Neither is it to be imagined that the guarantees which some one suggested, which were to consist in securing the neutrality of the Dal-

matian coast, in entrusting it to the future custody of a small State, which promised to remain undefended and without arms, would be sufficient for this purpose. How could the maintenance of such a compact be guaranteed except for a brief, a too brief, course of years? Who could believe that any guarantees might prevent a fresh supply of treacherous arms being silently collected on that coast which, deprived for a short time of armaments, would become again to-morrow the dominating coast opposite and against us?

Even for our Adriatic claims we must, therefore, speak forcibly of our supreme right, since beside the voice summoning us to the Dalmatian coast in the name of our civilisation and the language of our nation, a still stronger voice proclaims the unfailing necessity of freeing the country from the fetters which hold 1,200 kilometres of its coast, and choke the entire life of Italy on one of the two seas.

Only in this way, protected by a complete circle of strong and secure frontiers, and provided against every attack from the sea—with a force of only thirty-eight millions of sons united around her, with the few hundred thousands of Germans and Slavs, guests, who have descended into our valleys, or along the shores of our seas—mistress of the passes of the Alps and of the commercial and naval ports dominating the Adriatic,—will Italy be able finally to advance along her path, confident and sure of herself, having achieved the supreme task of her own liberation and her own unity.

CARLO ERRERA.

V

THE UNREDEEMED PROVINCES IN
THE HISTORY OF ITALY

PROF. PIER S. LEICHT

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V

THE UNREDEEMED PROVINCES IN THE HISTORY OF ITALY

AUSTRIA is an ancient State ; its dynasty together with its branches dates far back into the Middle Ages ; its sovereign is "doyen" of European princes ; around the Austrian system, the preserver of the most retrograde ideas, of the most antiquated privileges, there hovers an aureole of venerable antiquity that evokes the respect of the timorous and the pious. Truly this Government, by its insatiable thirst for domination, has set fire to the powder magazine that has produced a European catastrophe ; it is true that through centuries Hungarians, Germans, Bohemians, Italians, Serbs have been in turn cruelly oppressed and obliged to bear its yoke, that the aged Emperor has condemned to the gallows a legion of thinkers, of apostles, solely guilty of the crime of loving their country. Nevertheless, Austria does not fail to cloak herself on every occasion with her mantle of legitimacy and to assert that her sword "defends the rights of every people and of every State, the most sacred possessions of humanity." Even in the present conflict with Italy, the Austrian Empire ventures to represent "the perfidious enemy in the South," as eager to seize provinces and cities which the most lawful

possession assures to the House of Hapsburg. She thus succeeds in adroitly inverting the rôles, almost making it appear that instead of her holding by force that which belongs to Italy, it was we who sought to deprive her of one of her sacred heritages! History, fortunately, exists to prove the contrary; history is not only acquainted with the ties which for centuries have linked the inhabitants of the Trentino, Gorizia, the Adriatic coast to Italy, ties founded on an identity of race, culture, interests, but is also acquainted with the vices that lay at the root of Austrian dominion in these provinces and how it almost everywhere rests on foundations contrary to right.

The Italian provinces subject to the Austrian Empire are divided from the historic point of view into various groups, the domination of the House of Hapsburg over each having arisen from very different reasons.

One group is constituted by the lands which accrued to the Hapsburgs by hereditary reasons from the Counts of Gorizia and Tyrol. Among these the territories on the Upper Adige and the county of Gorizia belonged to Italy. The latter consisted in the thirteenth century in a feudal right of somewhat modest dimensions which embraced a short tract of country in the middle valley of the Isonzo, the castle of Salcano and Gorizia on the left bank of the river, and several villages, among them Gradisca, on the right. These lands were entirely surrounded by those of the Patriarchs of Aquileja, who in 1077 had received from Henry IV. the investiture of the counties of Friuli, Carniola and Istria. The Counts of Gorizia were advocates of the Church of Aquileja and had several lesser possessions in the interior of Friuli and

a vast network of feudal relations and adherences among patriarchal vassals, whom they often caused to rise against their lawful rulers. Taking advantage of the vacancy of the sees, or of the internal and external wars of the Patriarchate, they succeeded in rounding their dominions, occupying, in spite of the rights of the sees of Aquileja, Cormons, Vipacco, Tolmino, the defiles of Plezzo and other adjacent possessions. Not content with this they formed with the House of Austria reciprocal agreements of succession which were to secure to the Hapsburgs the possessions of the House of Gorizia in case the family became extinct, compacts which were at open variance with the rights of the Church of Aquileja and aimed at fraudulently depriving it of its heritage. The Counts had actually recognised in solemn agreements that their Gorizian possessions were fiefs of Aquileja, and were to return to the patriarchal see in case their family died out. This had been repeatedly agreed to in treaties between the House of Gorizia and the Patriarchs in 1150 and 1202.

In 1420 the Venetian Republic, at war with the Patriarch Ludovico II., seized on the territories directly subject to the Church of Aquileja, and the Count of Gorizia, who had been made a prisoner in battle, recognised the supreme domination of Venice and solemnly received from the Doge the investiture of his fiefs. The House of Gorizia became extinct in 1500 in the person of Leonardo the last count, and the Hapsburgs hastened to occupy all its dominions, among them also the lands owned by the family in Friuli. The Republic naturally did not recognise the legitimacy of the succession, and as soon as possible declared war on the

Emperor Maximilian. In 1508 she caused General Alviano to occupy Gorizia, Gradisca and even Trieste, which also belonged to the House of Austria. It is well known that this short-lived triumph of the Venetians was followed by the terrible war of Cambray, in consequence of which the Republic not only lost her conquests of 1508, but also various possessions in the Romagna and elsewhere. The Venetians undertook a fresh war in 1616 to recover the territory of Gorizia, but were unsuccessful. The Austrians meanwhile, in spite of the compact agreed upon at Worms, had occupied Aquileja, and their possessions thus reached as far as the estuary.

The rule of the House of Hapsburg did not however prevent Italian culture from spreading in the province of Gorizia; the attempts to introduce German as the official language of the courts of justice proved useless, and the government itself was obliged to revoke its decrees; the inhabitants were completely Italian, so much so that in 1732 Charles VI. was obliged to order the imperial captains of Gorizia and Gradisca, as also of Trieste, "to do their best to persuade the people not to ridicule the foreigners who spoke German." The Emperor Leopold wrote from Gorizia in 1660: "the country, the climate, the fact that one hears no other language spoken but Italian, causes me also to write in that language."

In 1692 the Emperor Ferdinand II. annexed the county of Gorizia to the German Empire. This annexation was made chiefly to satisfy the ambition of the Gorizia nobility, anxious to belong to the Holy Roman Empire. It was at variance with the ancient dependence of the Gorizia fiefs of the Patriarchs of Aquileja, already

declared princes of Italy by the Diet of Nuremberg in 1208 ; was also at variance with the nature of the inhabitants, who ever remained, not "*rechte geborene alte Teutsche*," as the decree unfounded on fact declares, but purely Italian, as is evident from the words already quoted of the same Emperor.

Let us now come to Trieste. This city with Istria had belonged for a great length of time to the dominion of Aquileja ; the Bishop with the other barons and prelates took part in the parliament of Friuli, and this link was never entirely broken, not even when he ceded the greater part of his rights as overlord to the commune of Trieste ; in fact the appeals in feudal lawsuits were always brought before the Patriarch. The traffic of the port of Trieste, which was the actual port for Friuli and the neighbouring provinces, speedily roused the jealousy of the Venetians, who in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries made several attempts to gain possession of the rival city. Trieste, however, always defended her autonomy with native tenacity, asking aid from her powerful neighbours—the Patriarchate, the Duke of Austria, the lords of Padua. In the second half of the thirteenth century, however, Venice succeeded in seizing the city, which was only delivered from enemy domination in consequence of the naval victories of the Genoese in the war of Chioggia and of the victorious action of the Patriarch's army over the Venetian troops. Trieste then delivered herself entirely to the Patriarchate and for some years formed an integral part of the State of Aquileja, sending its deputies to the Parliament.

Meanwhile, the sagacious and active Patriarch Marquardo, who had recovered the city, had been suc-

ceeded by a French prince, Philip d'Alençon, incapable of ruling the State amid the jealousies of the powerful enemies who surrounded him on every side. Trieste, threatened by the Venetians, who attempted to recover it, and by the Dukes of Austria, owners of the interior of Istria, asked aid of the Patriarch in the spring of 1382, entreating him to save "a city of such importance, so conspicuous a part of the Church of Aquileja." The Patriarch, however, harassed by factions at home, could not send sufficient assistance. In the beginning of August of that year the city fell into the power of the Duke of Austria; from Austrian sources we hear of voluntary surrender, but Friulian sources declare that the Lord of Duino, an Austrian feudatory, had seized the city by treachery and held it *de facto* contrary to the rights of the Church. This version is confirmed by the tumults and rebellions which took place in the city during the following years, in consequence of which the archdeacon, who was evidently a partisan of the Patriarchate, was hanged. The Austrian domination was very soon putting its methods of government into practice!

On the other hand can it really be maintained in good faith that the solemn act of surrender, formulated afterwards in September, 1382, when the city was entirely in possession of the Austrian prince, signified the renunciation of autonomy, the separation of the city from Italy, and adherence to a German potentate? The House of Austria then possessed Treviso, Feltre and Belluno in Venetia, as some centuries later she possessed Lombardy, and from the actual declarations of the Commune of Trieste it clearly results that it intended to follow the

fate of those Austrian possessions in Italy, but certainly not to become a German port on the Adriatic. A document of 1485 asserts that the city was subject: "*imperatoribus qui tunc in Italia dominabantur.*" The illustrious author Attilio Hortis, of Trieste, relates that in 1506 the Commune sent fifty pages, messengers of Trieste, to greet the Empress Bianca Maria with the following words, "Will your Clemency grant your protection to this band of Triestines and to the city which is the most important of your Italian Empire?"

This is not the place to describe the long struggles of the Commune of Trieste with the provincial parliament of Carniola, which wished to draw it into political dependence; suffice it to observe that in 1524 the city resolutely opposed the introduction of the German language into its own official acts, declaring: "Trieste is within the boundaries and limits of Italy, whose native inhabitants possess their own language,—Italian." In 1700 she founded an Academy Romano-Sonziaca (parallel to that of Gorizia) which later on gave a valuable library to the Commune. Trieste then counted among her jurisconsults, Casimiro Donadoni, among historians Giuseppe Bonomo, among her archæologists Aldrigo de Piccardi. All these elements of culture show how on the eve of the great re-awakening of nationalities, the life of Trieste was purely Italian.

The third group of Italian territories subject to Austria is formed by the Trentino, and this is another of the so-called "hereditary possessions," although the House of Hapsburg never held any real dominion there until 1803.

The Trentino, an ancient county of the Veronese *Marca*, was given to the Bishop by the Emperor Conrad

II. in 1027 ; to it was united a part of the Val Sugana (the rest belonging to the Bishop of Feltre), besides the Val Venosta and Bolsano (Botzen). The Count of Gorizia, Advocate of the Church of Trent, held in fief the last-named two territories, where until the thirteenth century the Bishop continued to exercise the highest jurisdiction. Later the Count strove to relax his feudal ties towards the see of Trent and to become independent ; the same system that we have already seen employed against the Patriarchate of Aquileja.

In the fourteenth century the Bishopric was entirely deprived of this part of the Trentino possessions, and in 1500, after the war of Cambray, the Bishop was obliged to renounce his rights over Botzen and Meran in favour of the House of Austria—which had succeeded as heirs to that of Gorizia.

The possessions of the Church of Trent were thus reduced to the city itself and its adjoining territory, that is Riva, Arco, the Val Lagarina, Val de Fiemme, Val del Noce and the Giudicarie ; Rovereto had been ceded to the Hapsburgs in the first half of the sixteenth century.

Although the County of Trent, even to the extreme northern parts of its territory, belonged to Italy, as the Counts of Gorizia had declared in the thirteenth century, nevertheless the Bishop held a seat in the German Diet as an independent prince. The contradiction need not arouse surprise, seeing that the Diet collected within it all the remains of the Roman-Germanic Empire, which had formerly stretched from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. Had it not also a "circle of Burgundy," although no province of the ancient Burgundian kingdom was within its boundaries ? That

Trent was considered an Italian city also in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, appears from explicit attestation even from a German source ; in 1546 the ambassadors of the Protestant potentates of Germany declared to Charles V. that they refused to accept Trent as seat of the General Council, because they wished for a place " free, Christian and in Germany, and Trent is not to be considered as German territory, but only as a domain of the Emperor." In 1547 the Imperial Ambassador in Rome, Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, wrote to his sovereign Charles V., "*Trento es en la provincia de Italia.*"¹ Anyhow, whatever the political divisions may have been, the culture, the language, the life were entirely Italian ; suffice it to recall the poet Cristoforo Buseti of the fifteenth century and later Tartarotti, Malfatti and the other correspondents of Muratori, and the Academy of the Agiati at Rovereto with its pleiad of authors. Jurists, physicians, literary men studied in the Italian universities, and many taught there, such as the famous Borsieri at Pavia, and the two Fontanas, one a mathematician, the other a physicist, the latter buried at S. Croce in Florence. There was no frontier between the Trentino and Italy !

The last of the unredeemed provinces is formed by those territories which remained under the dominion of Venice until 1797. First among these is Monfalcone. The little town formed part of Friuli until 1420, and after this year became like it a province of the Venetian republic, to which it had always been strongly attached.

¹ The Emperor Charles V. expressed himself likewise in one of his letters (July 18, 1524) to the Duke of Sessa, his ambassador in Rome.

In 1509, in the time of the war of Cambray, the territory was defended with fury by the populace against the troops of Maximilian, as, later in the seventeenth century, its magistrates invariably opposed with utmost energy the projects of exchange of the Venetian possessions of Monfalcone against the Austrian territories situated on the right of the Isonzo.

The territory of Monfalcone reached as far as the gates of Trieste, and from the other side was enclosed by the Venetian possessions of Istria, which extended as far as the valley of Muggia. Until the middle of the thirteenth century, Istria also formed with Friuli a part of the State of the Patriarch of Aquileja ; the cities on the coast were, however, very soon obliged by the Venetians to surrender to their powerful republic. In 1331 Pola also surrendered, and nothing remained to the Patriarch except Muggia and Albona ; a small territory round Pisino in the interior of Istria belonged to the Counts of Gorizia and later to the Austrians. The old principality of the Patriarchs which had endured for centuries fell into the hands of the Republic of Venice in 1420. The Republic also occupied the last Aquilejan possessions in Istria, which then became entirely Venetian, in the spirit of its people as in the mentality of its artists.

It is indeed sufficient to have visited, even hurriedly, some of its picturesque cities—Capodistria, Pirano, Parenzo—to be entirely convinced of this fact. At the end of the thirteenth century Istria had already given to Italy one of her most celebrated humanists, the elder Vergerio, she then gave birth to Goineo, to Muzio, famous for his literary and theological disputa-

tions, and later in the seventeenth century to Gian Rinaldo Carli, celebrated as a statesman and historian, a true follower of Muratori in his famous work on the Mints of Italy. This close intercourse between Istria and Italy was never lessened even for a moment. It is true that meanwhile the interior of the country was slowly becoming populated by Slavs. These had already crossed the frontiers in the ninth century, summoned by a Count Franco, against whom the Istrian landowners, despoiled of their pastures, had raised loud protestations, regretting the good old times of Byzantine dominion. It would appear that the envoys of Charles the Great had given them satisfaction, since we have no further tidings of the Slavs until 1100. Thence onwards some Slav names begin to appear in documents, but they are still very rare. The devastating wars of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the depredations of the Uscocchi in the sixteenth and the frightful pestilences which depopulated the interior, determined the Istrian communes and the Venetian Government to favour the immigration of Slav cultivators, who formed entire villages, dedicating themselves exclusively to agriculture and pasturage. Nor did they ever forsake these humble callings, so that we never find among them an illustrious name, or an initiative of any kind worthy of mention. Industries, commercial life, arts and culture were then as now, exclusively Italian.

This superior culture had under the beneficent rule of the Venetian Republic at that time completely pervaded also all the towns of Dalmatia. Here the Slav element has a much older history; and its political influence is very different to what it is in Istria. The

struggles of Venice, first with Croat kings and then with the Kings of Hungary, for the possession of the Dalmatian ports, lasted for more than four centuries. Finally, in the first half of the fifteenth century the great Republic had all the coast with the exception of Ragusa, which remained independent, and the tract of land from Fiume to the territory of Nona in the canal of Morlacca, which was subject to the House of Austria. From that time the Dalmatians, whether Italians or Slavs, were closely united to Venice ; and with Venice they fought memorable struggles against the Turks. From Venetian art are derived her immortal Schiavoni. Her literary men, the Dalmatians George of Ragusa, Crisolfo da Zara, and the Archbishop Spalatino de Domini taught in the University of Padua ! It is besides well known that the attachment of the Dalmatians to the great republic was so marked as to evoke at its fall manifestations of sorrow such as no other Government has ever called forth.¹

But it is now time to come to the great facts which so profoundly changed the structure of political divisions in this part of Europe.

We have seen how towards the end of the eighteenth century the Italian provinces of the extreme northern and eastern frontiers remained closely allied to their common country, and how even from the national point of view, given the political system in force in the peninsula,

¹ I recall the touching speech delivered by the representative of the people of Perasto in replacing the banner of St. Mark under the altar of the Church, before receiving the Austrians in 1797, and the speech of Gian Domenico Stratico, Bishop of Lesina and a native of Zara, against the enemies of the Venetian Government.

their political condition was good. The Trentino was independent under the government of its Bishop ; Istria, Monfalcone, the Dalmatian towns were joined to Venice. Trieste, although under the House of Austria, enjoyed complete autonomy ; and even the territory of Gorizia, which as we have seen became an imperial dominion in 1500, was defended by privileges of many centuries standing against the arbitrary rule of Austrian absolutism.

Let us now see how the House of Hapsburg succeeded in becoming mistress of so large a part of Italy.

The first victims were Istria and Dalmatia. The French having descended into Italy after Arcole and Rivoli, and having occupied the mainland of the Venetian Republic, which had declared its neutrality in the great struggle between the Empire and France, Napoleon's victorious arms pushed as far as the Semmering. The Empire sued for peace. The democratic Venetians clamoured to be joined to the Cisalpine republic, constituted a short time before in Lombardy, but the Directory was much more concerned with safeguarding the frontier of the Rhine. Consequently, in the preliminaries of Loeben (April 17, 1797) it was established that France should extend her frontiers as far as the Rhine, that the Cisalpine Republic should be maintained, but that in order to compensate the Empire for its loss of provinces it should be granted the right of seizing the territories of the Venetian Republic, which had remained neutral ! The Veronese Easter festivities (April 17, 1797) were then the pretext chosen to declare war on the Republic, and to justify the spoliation already agreed on beforehand. On May 12, the Venetian Government fell owing to French intrigue, soon after Austria swooped down upon her

prey ; it was an opportune moment to give colour to her " hereditary rights " !

In June and July Austrian troops occupied Istria and Dalmatia. In October at Campoformio it was decreed that all the Venetian possessions as far as the Adige should be transferred to the Empire. This bargain thus sacrificed to Austria a population that had been free for many centuries, a part of which demanded union with the Cisalpine Republic, part bewailed their former lord, but all desired independence from the foreign yoke, as shown by the attempt of Verona on April 17, by the tumultuous meetings in Venice to the cry of " S. Mark " on May 12, by the touching addresses of the Istrians and Dalmatians on the act of furling the beloved Venetian banner. When on June 10 it became known at Rovigno that the Austrians were about to enter, many of the citizens proposed to the municipality to drive them back by force of arms, and an octogenarian, brandishing a dagger, shouted, " We must fight and defend our liberty to the last drop of blood." It was not long before another Italian province was to fall under Austria's rapacious claws. The fortunate trend of the campaign which gave to the French arms the triumphs of Marengo and Hohenlinden brought a fresh humiliation to the House of Austria. She was obliged to resign herself to the loss of the grand duchy of Tuscany and the duchy of Modena, possessions of immediate branches of the imperial family. The generosity of the victor permitted the vanquished to receive compensation for these—but by what means ? By ceding to her the ecclesiastical principalities of the Holy Roman Empire ! Thus in carrying into effect the treaty sanctioned at Luneville,

the German Diet approved on February 25, 1803, of the cession to Austria of the bishoprics of Brixen, Salzburg, Passau and Trent in the name of the Archduke Ferdinand, ex-grand-duke of Tuscany. Thus the Trentino became incorporated in the "hereditary" estates of the House of Hapsburg!

In the years that followed, between 1803 and 1813, these new possessions of Austria had varying fortunes. The confines of the Italian kingdom were several times extended by Napoleon; with the peace of Pressburg (December 26, 1805) and with the treaty of Fontainebleau which followed (October 10, 1807) these boundaries were removed to the Isonzo, and Monfalcone was thus abandoned to Austria. The kingdom had besides Istria and Dalmatia; Trentino instead was ceded to Bavaria only to be taken away from her soon after, when the frontier of the Italian kingdom was removed beyond Botzen (February 28, 1810).

The peace of Schönbrunn again changed this state of things. The Napoleonic Empire had become enriched with the territory of Gorizia and Trieste, but by the decision of the genial despot these fragments of Italy were soon wrested from the kingdom and together with Istria and Dalmatia were fashioned into "the Illyrian provinces," a germ of disaster for the future. The Italian government did its utmost to save at least Istria. The Viceroy Eugene observed to his stepfather that it was organised in conformity with the other departments of the kingdom, that its economic relations with the rest of Italy were very close; all was vain. Yet Napoleon himself wrote, "*les provinces illyriennes considérées sous le point de vue de guerre ne doivent*

être regardées que comme complétant la possession du Frioul ! ”

Meanwhile the ruin of the Napoleonic colossus was approaching. The Kingdom of Italy fell in 1813 and the Austrian yoke weighed again on the former Venetian provinces and the Trentino. Austria, wishing to trace a boundary between her Lombard-Venetian Kingdom and the hereditary provinces, would not recognise the confines of the Italian Kingdom of 1806, nor even those more restricted of 1809. The Trentino was excluded, although the Grand-Duke Ferdinand had been replaced in Tuscany, for which the Trentino had been exchanged ; not only the territory of Gorizia but also that of Monfalcone on the left of the Isonzo were likewise excluded, and Grado, with several villages on the plain of Friuli, which had also belonged to the Venetian Republic, on the right bank of the same river. These annexations were made by the House of Austria with the evident aim of entirely separating such possessions from Lombard-Venetia, impressing on them a different character, almost as if they were hereditary possessions of the House of Austria, while in reality, as we have seen, Monfalcone, Grado and Istria were ancient Venetian territories ; Trieste was a free city and the Trentino an independent bishopric. And in spite of the opposition of the King of Bavaria and of English reservations, these provinces, with the exception of Istria, were joined in 1818 to the German Confederation. These annexations, supposedly justified by ancient ties, were in manifest opposition to the proceedings of Austria towards the magistrates of Trieste, who claimed the recognition of the ancient rights of the loyal and free

(*fedele e libera*) city. The imperial government willingly recognised the "loyal," but suppressed the "free," connected as it was with the ancient privileges that had been annulled, as they said, by the fact that the possession of the city after the Napoleonic wars devolved on Austria by right of conquest. Right of conquest or hereditary possession? One excludes the other.

These double dealings of Austria did not, however, prevent the Trentino and the Julian Venetia from taking part in the national movements, which, amidst persecutions and martyrdom, were preparing the way for the *Risorgimento* of Italy. Naturally in this participation we can sometimes discover a difference between province and province, between place and place; here ties of dynastic devotion must be overcome, there regional dislikes, all matters which were not lacking both before and after '48 even in other parts of the peninsula. But everywhere magnanimous men, such as the Istrian Besenghi degli Ughi (born 1797, died 1848), thought "that it was necessary to prepare the young for great things, to awaken in them the sacred love of country and of liberty, to rouse them against the arrogance of the foreigner, to make them genuine Italians." Suffice it to remember Nicolo Tommaseo, of Sebenico (Dalmatia), Antonia Rosmini of Rovereto, Giovanni Prati of Dasindo, Andrea Maffei of Val di Ledro, all natives of the Trentino; and then later I. G. Ascoli of Gorizia, Guiseppe Revere of Trieste, and the Istrians Carlo Combi and Luciano Tommasi, to mention only the dead. These are all names that openly show the intimate connection, even the identity of the intellectual

life, of the unredeemed provinces with the life of Italy. As for their participation in our redemption it is enough to recollect that among the forty sent into exile by Austria after the memorable siege of Venice in 1849 were Nicolo Tommaseo and Frederico Seismit Doda, Dalmatians ; Vergottini, an Istrian ; Malfatti, a Trentine ; while another Trentine, Tommaso Gar, became envoy of the Venetian Government to Paris. The bastions of Rome, the battlefields of Lombardy, of Sicily, of Venetia were bathed with the blood of the valiant natives of Trieste, Gorizia, Trentino and Istria, who with their heroism gave Italy a solemn pledge of the enduring loyalty of their native provinces. But all strove in vain at that time against the hostility of fate. Peace between Italy and Austria in 1866 confirmed the divisions established in 1815, boundaries devoid of any justification, either historic, geographic or legal, which separate people speaking the same tongue, using the same patois in the minor affairs of life, united by their identity of social organisation and by enduring economic ties. Fate willed that for another fifty years these provinces should endure the despotism of foreign dominion : the Trentino held by force in an abhorred union with Tyrol ; Trieste and Fiume deprived of their time-honoured privileges, the Italian University denied them, their brethren of the Italian Kingdom driven forth, illustrious men, such as Carlo Combi and Scipio Sighele obliged to die in exile ; such are the signs which once more show the truth of the saying of Vincenzo Salvagnoli : " The struggle between nationalities and the House of Austria is very ancient. Italian nationality has defied destruction, and no less have the aims and

objects of the House of Austria proved unchangeable from the days of Maximilian to our own." This opposition, the fruit of centuries, provides our deep and lasting justification for this war.

PIER SILBERIO LEICHT.

VI

THE NATIONAL STRUGGLE IN THE
UNREDEEMED PROVINCES

PROF. LEONARDO BIANCHI

VI

THE NATIONAL STRUGGLE IN THE UNREDEEMED PROVINCES

I THINK there is no one in the world who believes, or has believed, even in a thoughtless mood, in the friendship of Austria for Italy.

After 1866 Austria assumed towards us a spiteful and aggressive attitude, which often awakened serious anxiety. The Treaty of Alliance, agreed upon later, was nothing but a veil, in which the respective Governments intended to wrap the conscience of the people. The situation was most singular and embarrassing. On the one hand a despotic State, a conqueror by habit, domineering by temperament, whose long history of military oppression had created a conviction of superiority and of a right to dominate Italy, this right having long been exercised there. On the other hand, a people who for a century and more had been directly or indirectly subjected to the Austrian yoke, whose consciousness stirred, slowly readjusts itself, and turning to the light as after a long night, seeks its way, retracing it step by step to the distant and melancholy past, dedicates itself to extraordinary sacrifices, assumes a physiognomy of its own, has the feeling of its unity, reaffirms its reviving energies, and develops along paths of labour and

learning. All this unnerves Austria, who is not only obliged, with bitter resentment, to acknowledge the loss of some of the richest and fairest provinces of her Empire, but finds herself alongside a State and a race which has an account to settle with her ; an account reaching back for centuries ; an account of torture and exploitation. A situation of this nature, created by the wars of 1859 and 1866, in spite of the wretched economic conditions of Italy and the trend of her internal policy, which afterwards held her in the subconscious indifference of pacific internationalism, disturbed the dreams of her neighbour on the frontier and handicapped her in the execution of the plan of that Balkan policy, which was to lead to the constitution of a great Magyar-Slav Empire. This, with the advantage of the dominion of the Adriatic, was to counterbalance the Slav Empire on the north-east. The situation besides was unfavourable to pan-German policy, which in its turn tends not only to reunite under one sceptre all the Teutonic peoples, but to infiltrate, to penetrate with its spirit, its language, with the products of every kind of labour and with the might of arms the whole of Europe, more especially however the Slavs of the south, and thus to secure an absolute predominance in the world, with the clearly revealed aim of monopolising the industries, the trade, and even the talent, the genius, and the vivifying spirit of human labour.

Italy was intended to play the part of the docile instrument in the execution of this plan ; to lend herself to the pan-German aims of Prussia and the Magyar-Slav designs of Austria.

This policy, essentially prepared by German philosophy

and literature, systematised and clearly formulated by Bismarck, had begun its slow, gradual, sure development and was revealed in broad daylight by the breach of conventions and compacts on the part of Austria, always animated by covetous designs beyond her boundaries ; furthermore by her tacit annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately after a cordial meeting between the Italian and Austrian Foreign Ministers. The words of Berlin meanwhile, peremptorily imposing restraint, humiliated and wounded Italy's good faith.

This fact and others, which we shall later record, were not such as to cement between the two peoples that calculated friendship of statesmen, which can have no real value unless it represents popular feeling. It is vain to form illusions. Between Austrians and Italians neither before nor after 1866 has there ever existed beneficial sympathy. That which appeared to be friendship between statesmen was transformed in the clear prism of the popular conscience, and resolved itself into suspicion, envy, and rancour, which in their turn fomented insults and threats.

Italy did not present any obstacle ; on the contrary she offered an open and lucrative market for Austrian products ; but Austria, when able to do so, exercised restrictive power in commercial relations with Italy. Italy, yielding to the amicable impulses of her character, and with the intention of forgetting, and further of developing peacefully, rendered homage to the Emperor Francis Joseph in the visit of her King Humbert I. to Vienna. Austria did not feel it her duty to fulfil even the most elementary act of courtesy, that of returning the visit of the King of Italy to the Emperor, and thus

inflicted an offence that cannot be forgotten, on the self-respect of a young nation.

As by a natural social law, the development of the national conscience of Italy determined the trend of the nation towards the unredeemed provinces, at the same time as these were attracted more decidedly towards the Mother Country. Austria was aware of the physical and historic law, but did not obey it; she vented herself instead against the population of the *Irredentist* territories, opposing their most legitimate aspirations, and exercising over them an insupportable sway, an insidious system of *espionage*, and an oppressive and sinister rule which was for ever to alienate the sympathy of the unredeemed Italians.

One of the crucial questions of the strife reawakened half a century ago between Austria and Italy is therefore the *Italianità* of the Julian Venetia, which comprises Istria, Dalmatia, and the Trentino. Austria does her utmost to override, to benumb, to reduce it by gradually lowering the numerical and linguistic value of the native Italians; she endeavours to substitute for Italian another ethnic element, which should gradually impress its own character on the region, and eliminate the principal causes of *irredentist* tendencies of the Italians of these provinces and the aspirations of Italy to annex them. These aspirations are precisely based on the absolute majority of the Italians, at least in the Trentino and the Julian Venetia; a majority which Austria has striven by every means first to circumvent and then to hide. The day in which Austria succeeds in proving to the world that the Italian element is in a minority compared to the Slav, the reason for dispute will be ended, or at

least the justification on Italy's side for aspiring to annex these provinces. Austria has worked with inflexible tenacity to reach this end.

I shall not in this chapter occupy myself with the geographical and military reasons advanced by Italy, but shall recall a few facts, which speak with clear eloquence of the true Italian character of those provinces, and also of the means and arts used by Austria to combat and suppress it ; a fact in which lies one of the principal reasons of the present war between Italy and Austria.

A few reminiscences, for those unacquainted with them, will suffice to show the world the genuinely Italian character of the unredeemed territories.

On April 20, 1861, the Diet of Istria having been invited to elect its representatives for the Diet of Vienna, twenty out of twenty-nine voted " No One."

In June, 1866, the Municipal Councils of Pirano, Parenzo and Capodistria were dissolved because they " exercised an anti-Austrian activity."

On November 14, 1866, the Triestines, profiting by the journey of Victor Emanuel to Udine, sent to the Syndic of Udine a banner draped with crape and an appeal to the King, imploring the union of the Julian Venetia with Italy.

On August 14, 1869, the people of Trieste issued a proclamation to the Italians of the kingdom, " that they should not lose sight of, or become indifferent to, the cause of their brethren deprived of the joys of deliverance and of pride in the reawakened destinies of their Mother Country."

In March, 1877, the Triestine-Istrian Committee

presented to Agostino Depretis a vote in favour of the liberation of Julian Venetia, and in June of the same year the chorus of "Hernani" at the Teatro Rossetti gave occasion to popular demonstrations in the theatre, by releasing pigeons carrying the tri-coloured flag. The police intervened and proceeded to make arrests.

The demonstration of Italian feeling at Trieste when the people learnt of the death of Victor Emanuel was extraordinary. The Municipal Council adjourned the sitting, and the police did not succeed in preventing the "national mourning" of Trieste.

On the occasion of King Humbert's visits to Vienna (1881) a warm appeal from the inhabitants of Trieste in favour of Julian Venetia was presented to P. S. Mancini, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Triestines made a great demonstration of mourning under the Italian Consulate on the death of Garibaldi, and *vice-versa*, the same people paraded their implacable aversion to Austria by their entire absence from all the Austrian national festivals.

The first important monument to Verdi, which is one of the greatest proofs of the Italian character of Julian Venetia, was raised at Trieste by a large public subscription (1901).

After the earthquake at Messina, Trieste alone within a few days collected 170,000 crowns and a great and varied quantity of stores. As a retaliation, soon after in February, by order of the Government, 47 quintals of Italian books and papers were burnt in the furnaces of Servolo.

In order to prevent the demonstration, resolved

on by the Municipal Council of Trieste, to celebrate the Silver Wedding of Humbert and Margherita of Savoy, the Austrian Government invented a futile pretext for dissolving the Council.

In 1895 the Government prohibited the committee formed at Trieste to solemnise the 25th anniversary of the breach of the Porta Pia, but the people met on the evening of September 19, on the Piazza Grande, and acclaimed Rome Italian, while from the hills and sea tri-coloured squibs were thrown.

To the favourite methods of the Austrian Government against the Italians of the unredeemed territories, to the acts of violence used against the students of the Trentino and the Julian Venetia at Innsbrück, and to many other provocations, the Triestines and the Istrians, the inhabitants of Gorizia and Dalmatia, replied not only by protests of municipalities and committees, but also by sending large votive gifts to the tomb of Dante ; while two steamers conveyed deputations and a great number of citizens to Ravenna, to swear on the poet's tomb the brotherhood of all the Italian peoples.

The Government wished at all costs to show how artificial was the *Italianità* of Trieste, and ordered a census for December 31, 1910. The result showed that there were little more than 35,000 Slovenes in a population of about 200,000. As the proportion of Slovenes seemed somewhat exiguous and the Government—lavish of favours to the Slovenes to the detriment of Italians—was placed in the wrong, a revision was ordered, in consequence of which the number of Slovenes rose to 52,000.

The fraud was so evident that the Central Commission

of Statistics at Vienna was obliged to censure the fact as a falsification.

The census of Trieste showed roughly the following results: 142,113 Italians; 37,000 Slovenes; 1,422 Croats and 9,689 Germans. This proportion was obtained after the officers and the military employés, who had not hitherto possessed the right to vote, were in 1897 for the first time inscribed on the administrative list in spite of the protest and the resignation of the Mayor and the Municipal Council of Trieste. This fresh act of despotism was fêted by the Lieutenancy, which by means of the police organised and arranged anti-Italian demonstrations.

In this arid list of facts collected at random, in the long history of generosity and sacrifices on one side, and of tyrannical violence on the other, I have not given attention to the Trentino, where *Italianità* is evidenced by the daring statue of Dante, invoking the distant confines of Italia Irredenta on the north and by that of Carducci standing opposite, which recalls the Saluto Italico.

“ In faccia allo stranier che armato accampasi sul nostro suol gridate: Italia, Italia, Italia! ”

As for Dalmatia I quote two significant facts: “ Instructions on the treatment of the Italian element of the littoral ” sent to the Lieutenant; instructions which had for their aim the substitution of Italians of every class, “ by more loyal and useful elements ; ” and further the despatch to Venice, not only by Julian Venetia, but by Zara and other towns of Dalmatia, of deputations, addresses, photographs and reliefs of their belfries, fashioned on the model of the Campanile of S. Mark.

Each time that the patriotic societies were dissolved, they came to life again under the same or a different name. Let us recall among others the Gymnastic Society, which, dissolved five times, celebrated its fiftieth anniversary at the end of 1913 with 3,200 members.

The Society of Boatmen (Glaucò), for example, was dissolved for having taken part in the Venice Regatta (1883); many members were tried and sentenced.

The Lieutenant forbade the Society *Pro Patria* to accept the invitation of the Bologna University, to be present at the centenary festival of the *Studio* in 1888.

The same year the *Pro Patria* Society was dissolved on account of a greeting it had sent to the *Dante Alighieri* Association.

When the National League was founded for the defence of Italian nationality in the Julian Venetia and the Trentino the Lieutenant refused to recognise it. In spite of this it succeeded in forming 179 branches with 42,000 members, and in producing a balance-sheet with nearly 614,000 crowns of annual income and a patrimony of 1,128,382 crowns. The scholastic institutions supported by the League numbered 74; besides 136 which received subsidies; it also opened various evening classes and had 113 libraries for its members. At that time the society *Progresso* was dissolved, on the charge that the speeches delivered in a committee of protest were flagrantly guilty of the crime of sedition. In the following May the *Lega della Gioventù Friulana* (League of the Youth of Friuli) suffered the same fate, because it "developed activity in opposition to the Government."

The sequestration of newspapers, preventive arrests,

political measures were under the arbitrary control of the police, to such an extent that the Diet of Trieste decided to send a petition to the Ministers of the Interior and of Grace and Justice, which was drawn up following a vote in a public and popular gathering (May 26, 1899).

As all the youthful associations concerned with the propaganda of Italian nationalism had been dissolved, one was constituted under the title of *Società innominata* (Society without a name).

Seeing the uselessness of the acts of violence and the arbitrary proceedings of the police against the Italians, the Austrian Government incited and armed the Slav clergy to aid it in the bitter struggle, and the clergy did not neglect any opportunity of joining in the oppression, and of exalting their own race to the prejudice of the Italians. They even systematically altered the names of Italian families in the lists of the civil register. The alteration of names reached such a climax that the Diet of Istria passed a solemn vote of protest (May 13, 1899).

The clergy also attempted to efface every trace of Latinity from the Catholic rite in the Julian Venetia, as is shown by the fact that the Slovene Society of Propaganda sent a mission to Rome to obtain a reform of the liturgy. The reform was not permitted by the Vatican.

With the acquiescence of the Government the number of Slav priests increased out of proportion to that of the Slav population; they preached and chanted the liturgy in the Slovene language, thus provoking energetic protests, such as that of the Trieste Diet (1895), and that of the Municipal Council of Trieste to Leo XIII.

against the flagrant and anti-Italian action of the Curia. The Government, however, forbade this protest being sent.

The action of the priests, with the sanction of the Government, to substitute the Slav element in Trieste and Julian Venetia, was such that the Municipal Council of Trieste remonstrated against the propaganda carried on by the episcopal Curia. To what point things had arrived, may be judged from the fact that a parish priest refused to hear the confession of an Italian girl, because she was ignorant of the Croat language (1889).

Italian, which, until 1866, had been the favourite language of the Slavs and Slovenes themselves—immigrants in Julian Venetia—was no longer to be the only official language. The word of command from Vienna was—on Italian soil, the Slav language! A first step.

Notice-boards in the two languages were posted up in law courts. Indignation was general. The Municipal Council of Trieste and the Provincial Diet of Istria protested. The whole of Istria from Pirano to Albona rose; at Pirano the people forcibly prevented the bilingual notice-boards from being put up. The cry of anguish was suppressed by force of arms. The whole of Istria protested at the meeting held by the Mayor in the Municipal Palace of Trieste, and in the plebiscitary meeting held in the piazza against the fresh blow to Italian feeling in this region (1894). But of what avail? Not one single step was retraced along the path which was to lead to the destruction of Italianism in Julian Venetia and Dalmatia.

With the aim of reducing and gradually suppressing

Italian thought, Austria used every care to make the schools Slav, creating difficulties for the Italian schools.

But the hostility of the State towards the Italian schools, with grievous injury to the Italians, was counter-acted in Julian Venetia by the generosity of her sons. The contribution of the State for the Italian schools at Trieste was reduced to only 97,000 crowns, while 400,000 were allotted for the Slovene and German elementary schools alone, and 450,000 for the intermediary German, Slovene and Croat. Well! In its budget, the Municipality of Trieste allotted truly fabulous sums for elementary and intermediary education.

On July 31, 1911, new and sumptuous buildings were opened for the primary schools, the surest bulwark of Italianism; buildings capable of accommodating 352 classes and more than 16,000 pupils, with free schools and elementary and advanced courses.

The crowd of pupils to the Italian gymnasium increased to such a degree that it was found necessary to divide it into two, to which it was intended to give the names of Dante and Petrarch, names, however, which were forbidden by the officials.

As generations succeeded one another Italian national feeling incited youths to the cult of the Mother Country.

After the examinations for degrees at the Dante Gymnasium on July 20, 1913, the pupils offered to the Lega Nazionale 10,000 crowns, the fruits of the accumulated savings of these youths during the eight years of their secondary studies.

At the end of the scholastic year 1912-3, in spite of the immense hindrances inflicted by the Government on Italian schools, the number of schools in Julian Venetia

numbered 19 intermediate schools, 10 of which were Italian, 6 German and 3 Slav ; with the difference that while the German and the Slav were Government Schools and consequently maintained at the expense of the State, the Italian schools were almost all municipal.

An effective weapon of the Austrian Government was Slovenian immigration in the countries where Italian nationalism was most fervid and inflexible.

The great flow of Slav immigration to Trieste is of recent date ; a phenomenon which is clearly brought to light by the analysis made by the German Bernt between the years 1900-1910 ; in fact, of the 28,412 Slovenes who have penetrated to Trieste during recent years, 11,164 belonged to the Communes of Carniola and had recently immigrated.

This assertion is also proved by the fact that in 1912 of the 1,722 pupils in private Slovene schools, only 1,025 were born at Trieste ; the other 697 were not born in the city, but instead belonged to Slovene families who had recently immigrated there.

That the Slovene immigration was willed and encouraged by the Government is shown by the circumstance that in the Austrian Lloyd dockyards almost half the workmen are Slavs. Of the 828 paid employés at the railway station 728 are Slavs. This high percentage is due to the Government, which, as soon as the Taurus line was opened, imported 700 Slovene families to Trieste at a single stroke. These were housed and provided with all economic and social requirements necessary to their life, so that they should not need to come into contact with the Italian element.

The Government had conceived the design of preventing the absorption of the Slavs by the Italians, who were stronger and more civilized. And their calculation of success was well founded.

The phenomenon of the force of assimilation exercised by the Italian on the Slav in the sense of imposing on him language and customs is proved by the following statistics. While in the rural districts of the province of Trieste there existed in 1889, 32 classes of free Slav schools, with 2,600 pupils, and only 4 classes of Italian with 290 pupils; in 1909, the Slav classes had risen to 61, with 3,275 pupils and the Italian to 20 with 1,151 pupils. The proportion is to the advantage of the Italian element. The Italian language has always exercised a strong attraction on the Slav and Slovene elements of the territories bordering on the Italian frontiers. Prior to 1866 the Slovenes questioned as to which language they preferred, always replied: "Italian." The Slovene deputy Seriau, himself, in the provincial Diet of Trieste (1861) proposed that in the Slovene schools the Italian language should be taught instead of the German. From this originated the increasingly violent pressure of the Vienna Government against Italian nationalism after 1866.

Everything induces us to believe that the Austrian Government encouraged rather than otherwise the Slovene population to penetrate into the Italian zone of the empire, inasmuch as the Slovenes of Carniola represented an anthropological group still at a lower level of evolution, which however could make more rapid progress with the remnants of a civilization, destined, according to the Government, to perish in

Julian Venetia and Dalmatia, and then evolve a civilization of its own. The Slovenes had no literature as yet which could be called Slovene ; their language still remains poor ; until within half a century ago it had more the characteristics of a dialect ; it still lacked the unity, the precision of form and the inflection of languages which have been evolved. The fact is that Slovene schools did not exist, and when one was established at Lubiana it lacked at first pupils, professors, and text-books.

Such are the people most favoured and encouraged to penetrate into the Julian Venetia.

The cares of the Government, the easy access to public offices, the Church, the schools all combining to favour the Slovenes and Slavs of the western and northern part of the empire, succeeded in arousing the pride of race, and exciting the violence of Slavs and Slovenes against the Italians.

The examination of the state of things prior to 1866 shows clearly that up to that time the Slavs and Slovenes recognised Italian superiority, preferred Italian schools, and learned the Italian language for all the needs of life and for their spiritual development.

The preference of Austria for the Slav element was founded on the calculation—not devoid of foundation—that this race would definitely secure the Italian unredeemed provinces to the empire.

And the word of the day was : The Italians must emigrate or become Slavs.

In Dalmatia the Austrian plan was more successfully carried into effect, excepting at Zara and Spalato.

Everything was refused to the Italians of Dalmatia : all encouragements and the greatest facilities were

bestowed on the Croats and Serbians, whose linguistic propaganda was favoured by the efficacy of the scholastic institutions, maintained and encouraged by the State, in opposition to the Italian schools. These, on account of the meagre resources of the region, could not compete with the Slav schools of the State. And as the municipal administration, except that of Zara and a few others, passed almost entirely into the hands of the Slavs, the victory of the Slav language over the Italian, save in a few centres, met with no great resistance, and this only of late years in consequence of the greater activity of the Government of Vienna. Seen from a distance, the phenomenon of the Italian race seems rapidly inverted. Thus the Italian element, setting aside the exaggeration of statistics—undoubtedly falsified—underwent the process of assimilation by the Slav. But, I repeat, it is an artificial phenomenon of late years. Indeed while in 1880 out of eleven Dalmatian deputies in the Parliament of Vienna, nine were Italians—there is not one now !

The character of a race does not change in thirty years. The Italian character of Dalmatia is evidenced by the works of Nicolo Tommaseo of Sebenico, and the remains, not yet cold, of Arturo Colautti, whose spirit, vibrating with love for Italy, is often felt in his works of art, and in the magnificent leading articles which he wrote in the most esteemed Italian papers.

The fact that in 1912 Zara alone contributed 56,810 crowns to the *Lega Nazionale* is worthy of note.

The phenomenon of Slav immigration, although in every way favoured by the Government, was therefore partly selective and spontaneous, as in the past ; but

in these latter decades in great measure artificial and violent. Had the infiltration of the Slav element in the Italian provinces been left to itself as a natural phenomenon, deriving from the power of attraction which the civilization of one people exerts over another less developed, and in consequence poorer in history, language, and means of existence, it would have been very slow, and the Italian element would have continued gradually to assimilate the Slav to its language, mentality, and manners.

But on account of the overwhelming numbers, in a comparatively very short time, the Italians were not able, and would have been less able in the future, to sustain the encounter with the Slavs, who in several places had already succeeded in weakening Italian energies and impressing on the region their own ethnic character.

We find in this a perfect harmony between the laws that regulate individual and social life.

On the other hand the division into provinces of Julian Venetia which was at one time by geographical configuration, situation, and population, almost exclusively Italian, has been so ordered that the Slav element should find itself in each province in such proportion as to permit not only of the maintainance of its own ethnic character, but its preponderance over the Italian, thanks to the favours lavished upon it by the goodwill of the Government.

The political purpose in isolating the Italians of Austria from their mother country, of suppressing *Italianità* by intercepting and obstructing all the little

channels of nutrition through which the feeling of patriotism flowed, has for a long time been regulated with the most jealous vigilance in the relations between the inhabitants of the Trentino and Trieste with Italy.

This was indeed the one chief anxiety of the Austrian Government.

A personal anecdote will suffice. Some years ago, finding myself in the Trentino, I went one day to Trent and there encountered two friends, and while discussing politics and re-affirming the cordial racial sympathies, we waxed confidential, and I felt, and they with me, a ray of hope pass like an omen through our hearts. I drew from my pocket a visiting card, on which I wrote a warm greeting to the President of the Italian Chamber. To the illustrious man (the On. Marcora) I left the interpretation of the inner meaning of the greeting from Trent. But scarcely had I written the address on the envelope which enclosed the card, when one of my companions warned me of the grave and serious risk I should incur, were this note posted in Trent, since for several years a censor's office had existed there, instituted solely with the aim of opening all suspected correspondence with Italy, above all with the political men of our country.

In order to secure her domination over the Italian territories, Austria has not hesitated to resort to all the expedients of a disloyal and violent policy, whether at home against the Italian population of the Empire, or in the relations with the Governments which have succeeded one another in Italy. A university for the Italian subjects of the Empire has been frequently

demanding, especially by the people of Trieste, and has several times been the subject of diplomatic negotiations. It was promised, if I am not mistaken, but the good faith of an Italian minister was betrayed by his Austrian friend and colleague, who placed him in a most difficult position towards Parliament.

Austria has always behaved with surprising non-chalance towards Italy. She continued her work without any regard, without even those formalities in use in diplomatic relations in all civilized countries, especially when bound by a Treaty of Alliance.

Thus after the visit of the Italian minister to Abbazia the construction of the railway to Mitrovitz was announced, this being adverse to Italian interests; the day following the meeting of Salzburg, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Austrian Empire was officially announced; the day after the renewal of the Triple Alliance, the persecution of the Italians in the Empire was intensified and increased, and General Conrad, Chief of the Austrian Staff and a notorious Italophobe, was recalled to office.

And that Conrad had been placed on the retired list on the eve of the renewal of the Treaty of Alliance (a despicable piece of flattery to Italy), is proved by the fact that this gentleman was restored to his former post soon after the renewal of the Treaty, and the illustrious head of the Austrian Staff was not ashamed to declare that he had not in the least changed his mind with regard to Italy.

It was, also, after the renewal of the Treaty that methods were adopted against the Italians similar to those used by Caroline of Austria against the Neapolitans,

in the time of the Bourbons. An imperial ukase commanded the sequestration in all shops of postcards bearing the likenesses of the Italian royalties; the proprietor of the Politeama was banished from Pola, because an officer who appeared on the stage had been hissed from the gallery; ten Italian subjects belonging to the *Edera* Society of Pola were expelled on the pretext that the portraits of Dante and Garibaldi had been found in the premises of the society; and a pastry cook was arrested and expelled from Trieste because in a supply of chocolates (*gianduia*) which had arrived from Turin, the portrait of Garibaldi was found on some of the wrappers.

The order of the day of Austrian policy with regard to Italy was "down with the Italians," and this work of ostracism and destruction ought, according to Austrian logic, to have cemented the fictitious ties of friendship, which were in reality a form of odious and intolerable domination.

Are further proofs necessary? During the Libyan war a great many Italians were expelled from Austria under the most futile pretexts; and we were on the point of being attacked by Austria!

All remember the sorrow of Trieste, wounded to the quick by the decrees of Prince Hohenlohe. I shall not enter into the discussion of the technical and juridical reasons of these decrees, which were a well aimed blow at the Italianism of Trieste, because on the Italian employés of the municipality was imposed the choice of sink or swim, go away or, renouncing Italian nationality, become Austrian citizens, cowardice or misery!

By such methods the Government succeeded in placing

all the offices of State in the hands of the Slavs, ousting the Italians. The proof is that of 4,700 Government employés at Trieste 3,900 are Slavs. According to the decree of the Lieutenant of Trieste, not even the municipal doctor can be considered a communal official, because he does not take an oath. And yet the Slav element, which infiltrates and tries to overpower the Italian element, is still uncouth ; it has no history either of literature or art ; is uncultured and models itself on Italian civilization, which meanwhile it stifles by the deliberate purpose of the Government of Vienna !

All know the *Via Crucis* of the Italian students maltreated by the Slavs, repelled and beaten by the pan-Germans. I recall merely the episodes of Vienna and Graz, where the struggle assumed a tragic character. At Graz 200 Italians fought against 1000 Germans ; the wounded were numerous on both sides (1907).

No less overbearing, nor less armed, were the Slav workmen against the Italian.

At Zara something similar took place to that which history records of the fate that befell the Italian workmen at Aigues Mortes. Italians at war with the Slav element were thrown into the sea, and the magistrates, called on to decide on those guilty of the cowardly aggression, absolved the accused ! The judgment was a cynical display that concealed the premeditation of this atrocious political crime.

The persecution and the acts of violence of every kind of which the students were the object, reached such a point that the Municipal Council of Trieste passed a resolution protesting against such measures (May 18, 1903). The answer was given the same year by the

Emperor Francis Joseph, who, in receiving the Austrian Delegations, replied to a Trieste deputy, who had recommended the Italian University: "Trieste shall never have it." Similar to the reply of the Emperor was that of the Minister Koerber to the representations of the Commune of Trieste, which had remonstrated on account of the invariably hostile attitude of the Government. "The Austrian Government only protects the populations that are irreprehensibly loyal and patriotic."

At the same time that the communal liberties of Trieste and its autonomy, with the suppression of the scholastic and industrial endowments, became increasingly restricted and limited, Austrian susceptibility extraordinarily increased. Erethism is, as is known, the substratum of passion, and this again is a form of weakness, even if it is not a fertile source of criminality, individual or collective.

The Marcora incident is an irrefutable proof of the aggressive and criminal susceptibility of Austria with regard to Italy, and of the subjection in which Austria intended to hold our country for her imperial aims. The modest *nostro* Trentino uttered by the President of the Italian Chamber, signifying "ours" by race and language, roused to fury the Cabinet of Vienna, which laid claim to I know not what act of homage, that should humiliate our country in the person of the illustrious and beloved President of the Chamber.

Much diplomacy was required to find a formula that should calm the heated and hostile imagination of Vienna without bringing serious injury down on ourselves, and it became known (I have incontrovertible proofs of the

fact) that meanwhile our good ally, of those days, collected on the frontier some divisions of cavalry, which would have been able to gallop over the Venetian plain and sweep away human life and property without fearing any obstacle !

It served as a warning, because the astute mind of Alessandro Fortis, then President of the Council of Ministers, perceived the grave danger of military nihilism to which for many years the Italian policy of *Noli me tangere* had, under the pressure of the extremists, condemned us.

With him was initiated that progressive increase on the military and naval budgets, upheld with such faith and eloquence by the lamented Mirabelli, which led to the awakening of a prompt action that was at first to secure us the conquest of Libya, and soon after lead to the defence of our sacred rights, trampled on by the hereditary enemy and ruler of Italy.

The Italian character of the Julian Venetia, of the Trentino and of Dalmatia, has consequently been subjected to a methodical system of corrosion and atrophy by means of a forced influx of the Slav element, which dispersed, isolated, and reduced that of the Italian in numbers and in vigour.

This element resisted and opposed as long as it could with all its native energies. It recalled and reanimated its relations with the mother country by various means, but especially by that of the meritorious and patriotic *Dante Alighieri* Society, evoking the closest sentiments of national solidarity. It faced all the sacrifices common to filial devotion, but unless freed by this holy war, it is

destined to perish, fatally besieged as it is, ensnared, assailed, tortured by the anti-Italian policy of the Government of Vienna. This Government, convinced that in the struggle for the survival of the races, the Italian would surely, as in the past, succeed in conquering and absorbing on its own soil the Slav element, and would prove a menace to the constitution and peace of the Empire, devised every means—police, schools, the Church, the bank—to achieve its aim.

The tried patriotic firmness of the unredeemed territories, the nationalistic aspirations of Italy, certainly not unknown to the Austrian Government, predisposed even the Parliament and the public administration of the Empire to ever increasing and open hostility against the Italian element. The relations between the two States had now become strained to the utmost, unendurable and irreconcilable.

This situation explains the formidable defence works of the Italo-Austrian frontier, on which the Austrian Government has spent vast sums, especially when we consider the none too flourishing economic conditions of the country and compare the defence of the western with that of the eastern frontier of the empire. Besides the numerous and entirely modern fortifications with which the Austro-Italian frontier is encompassed, it suffices to remember that a single strategic railway has cost Austria about half a milliard.

Meanwhile a strange political situation had arisen. The Cabinets feigned oneness of purpose, while between the two races suspicion increased, and the ancient all pervading hatred burst forth and shaped events. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs surpassed themselves in

courtesies, exchanged visits while arms were being prepared, arms that were not to be used against a common adversary, but were to serve these diplomatic masqueraders to deal us a deathblow when the hour had struck.

Nevertheless even to mediocre sociologists it should appear clear as noonday, that the growing sympathy between Italians on either side of the frontier vibrated with generous impulses, continually fed, as they were, by the wrongs and the mortal injuries that Austria inflicted on our unredeemed brothers.

It would have been a wise and far-sighted policy to govern the Italians of the Trentino and Julian Venetia with the methods and laws of the State common to all the other races of the Empire. But Austrian character was and is passionate, and being passionate and self-centred, cruel and impulsive, it has contributed to maintain all the more fervently the Italian character of those provinces.

Carried away by anger at the loss of the domination which she had held for centuries over Italy, Austria avenged herself on the Italian population of her Empire. The oppressive exactions, the pauperising and sanguinary persecutions, the unreasonable prohibitions, the poisonous snares, the humiliating flatteries, the methods of government, sometimes bestial, in the execution of the inflexible and criminal imperial determination to suppress Italianism, vaguely concealed behind the veil of diplomacy, had now filled the measure.

The Trentino, Julian Venetia, and Dalmatia are Italian territories ; their soul is Italian, even as Latin was the root of their earliest civilization. To this extreme

edge of Italy there befel, as well as to Lombardy in the first half of the past century, the unhappy fate of a harsh and hostile domination, essentially upheld by force and the prestige of arms ; relying on the power of which the Emperor Francis I. replied with overbearing disdain to the Lombard deputation headed by Gonfalonieri, " You belong to me by right of cession and by right of conquest." Thus has Austria always dealt with Italy.

We have used the utmost tolerance in dealing with Austria. The exit of Seismit Doda from Crispi's ministry, because at a banquet at Udine he had listened to a toast in which allusion had been made to the *Italianità* of Trieste ; the violence of the language and the pretensions of Austria in the Marcora incident ; the dismissal of General Asinari di Bernezzo, imposed by Vienna solely because he had expressed the patriotic idea that the ties between the race should be maintained both in and outside the political boundaries ; the dismissal from office, notified by telegraph to the Prefect Sorge, because the students of the Naples University had succeeded in shouting *Abasso l'Austria* under the Austrian Consulate, situated at a short distance from the University, prove the tolerance of Italy, and the bitter and envious susceptibility of Austria, always aggressive towards Italy.

We cannot renounce the Italian character of the Trentino, of the Julian Venetia and of Dalmatia, for the same reason for which Austria has sought by illicit means to quench it ; and because the Mother Country cannot remain deaf to the cry of sorrow of our people remaining under the Austrian yoke, cannot remain

indifferent to the memory of the martyrdom of the Italians of these provinces, victims of the holy aspiration of one day being united to the common Mother Country.

We cannot renounce this character without rendering ourselves guilty of high treason towards those inhabitants of the Trentino, the noblest part of the country, who fought like heroes in the wars of independence; and towards the *Lega Nazionale*, which desperately and triumphantly struggled against Slav invasion of these lands, where labourers, employés, professional men, artists, and students had been saving everything they could on the most urgent necessities of life in order to contribute millions of crowns, collected with difficulty, constancy, and sacrifice in order to realise the enduring aspirations of the race.

We cannot renounce it because the literature of these countries is Italian, the art Italian, Italian the history which connects it with Latinity; against which the cynical plan of suppression was actuated with inflexible cruelty, as for example by sending to the front line in Galicia, regiments almost exclusively formed of all the fit men of the Trentino and Istria.¹

We cannot leave to future generations the Mother Country undefended against the implacable aggressive and imperialistic tendency of Austria-Hungary, we cannot forget that which Ricasoli, Premier at the time, wrote in 1866 to Visconti Venosta in the field: "Without Istria we shall always have Austria mistress in the

¹ It is well known that the 94th Regiment of about 4,000 men was formed almost exclusively of Italians, and lost between killed, wounded, and prisoners, 3,500 men.

Adriatic." We ought not to have remained fatalistic and indifferent to the menace of the House of Hapsburg, thrust upon us by the head of a great and intransigent military party in the Empire, the present adversary of our Cadorna ; it is necessary to weaken Italy in a great war, annihilate her politically and in this wise extinguish every Irredentist desire of the Italians !

Ah no ! The life of nations is ruled by the immutable laws of history, as the life of the individual by those of heredity. It is not permissible to infringe them. Centuries of dominion over the Italian provinces of the Empire, centuries of preparation, made with every care and study against Italy have impressed such an organic structure on the political conscience of Austria that only great political upheavals and the superiority of arms can disturb or overthrow it. To the insolent and inborn disloyalty of the adversary we can no longer oppose our traditional good faith without falling into the network of snares which the history of Austria-Hungary has spread over Italy, without falling into the ridicule caused by the resolve which her well known bad faith concealed under her latest offer.

This war is perhaps the most legitimate of those that are being fought in this cyclonic hour, which is passing with such terrible ruin over the world. The history of a whole century had prepared the soul of the nation, had day by day revived the generous impulses, and finally determined the resolve of openly taking up arms, with the sacred anger inflamed by the voices which rise from the thousand graves in which Caroline of Austria suppressed the noblest spirits of Southern Italy, with enthusiasm revived by the proud protest of Matteo


Renato Imbriani and of Bovio ; with the loyalty of those who rise to defend the rights of civilization ; with the generosity of hearts beating with the sacred pride of race, proud of its history and its existence ; and openly against a nation, which in the Treaty, while simulating friendship, was preparing the ultimate ruin of our country.

LEONARDO BIANCHI.

VII

DENUNCIATION OF THE TREATY OF
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

PROF. PROSPERO FEDOZZI



VII

DENUNCIATION OF THE TREATY OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

AMONG the many true and just things contained in the first essay of this volume, there is one pre-eminently just and true ; that to our sense of fitness the thought would have been intolerable that our war, felt and proclaimed by all as a holy war, should have begun with an act of felony, a breach of faith to that Treaty which for more than thirty years has constituted the pivot of our foreign policy. Educated by traditions of thousands of years of civilization, we are not naturally prone to slack morality ; on the contrary the respect for law flows in our blood as a vital element so that we have an insuperable aversion for the acts of contempt committed against justice.

Diplomacy has several times lifted a hem of the sacred veil which shrouded the Triple Alliance, proclaiming that its aim was purely defensive. And this sufficed for the unheard-of act of brutality committed by Austria on Serbia to appear at once to all Italians as contrary to the spirit of the Treaty, silencing hence the slightest doubt lest we should be implicated in a *casus fœderis*. However faultily the Treaty may have been

drawn up, the most elementary sense of right was offended by the thought that it could oblige Italy to follow the fortunes of her ally in the most violent and outrageous adventure, determined as this ally was to pursue the mirage of her own imperialistic ideas, contrary to the manifest interests of Italy, and what is more without any previous agreement or warning. A compact that would have obliged Italy to act in this way would not have been called one of alliance, but of vassalage. No excessive share of pride was necessary in order to rebel against the idea.

However if any one still harboured scruple or doubt on this point, our enemies took it on themselves to remove it, publishing precisely those articles of the Treaty, which allow us to give a strict proof, as attested by documents, of our perfect loyalty.

The entirely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, which declaration of competent authorities had previously made certain, was clearly confirmed by the publication of the articles III. and IV. of the Treaty, that determined the obligation of the Alliance when one or two allies found themselves engaged in a war. In both these articles only a defensive war is contemplated, such an eventuality being regarded under two distinct headings, establishing under the first the duty of active co-operation, and under the second that of benevolent neutrality.

Art. III. " Si une ou deux des Hautes Parties contractantes, sans provocation directe de leur part, venaient à être attaquées et à se trouver engagées dans une guerre avec deux ou plusieurs Grandes Puissances non signataires du

présent traité, le casus foederis se présentera simultanément pour toutes les Hautes Parties contractantes."

Art. IV. " Dans le cas où une Grande Puissance non signataire de présent traité menacerait la sécurité des Etats de l'une des Hautes Parties contractantes et la Partie menacée se verrait par là forcée de lui faire la guerre, les deux autres s'obligent à observer, à l'égard de leur allié, une neutralité bienveillante. Chacune se réserve, dans le cas, de prendre part à la guerre si elle le jugeait à propos pour faire cause commune avec son allié."

At the beginning of August, 1914, Austria and Germany maintained that Italy ought to enter the war on the side of her two Allies, the *casus foederis* foreseen by Art. III. having come to pass. But very soon they abandoned this assumption, which must have appeared absurd in the light of the most elementary common sense, as being so glaringly at variance with facts. Later on, in the note replying to that of the Italian Government which denounced the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, the Austro-Hungarian Government declared that the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin had loyally accepted the declaration of Italy's neutrality: nevertheless they deplored it, not holding it consistent with the spirit of the Treaty. And when, after our declaration of war on Austria, the accusation of treachery was hurled against us, our enemies were pleased to say that this treachery had virtually been committed in Italy's refusal to march at the side of her allies. Dissertations and angry phrases, however, avail nothing against the eloquence of facts, whence it results that Austria in attacking Serbia, while fully aware that it would be impossible to localize the conflict and exclude Russian

intervention, had been the aggressor in the great conflagration.

With even greater tenacity Austria and Germany upheld the lesser eventuality, asserting that in virtue of Art. IV. Italy was bound to maintain an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards them. The press and representative men of the two empires were untiring in proclaiming in every key that the war had been thrust upon them, thus giving it to be understood that Italian neutrality was obligatory and that departure from it would be a violation of the Treaty. After our declaration of war on Austria this leading note in the Austro-German war speeches gradually subsided, and if now that necessity for peace makes it convenient for the two confederate empires to assume the garb of lambs, impartial and confident voices were not formerly lacking, especially when the fortunes of war favoured the Central Empires, to assert that the war had been willed by the Empires themselves for the attainment of long predetermined aims, and at a moment when it was possible to strike their unprepared adversaries. And indeed we cannot understand how from the simple affirmation they could come to prove that Austria-Hungary was forced to war by a menace to her own safety.

It must above all be borne in mind that according to Art. IV. of the Treaty, the obligation of benevolent neutrality only arises when the safety of one of the Allies is threatened by a *great power* and is thus forced to declare war. Consequently, even if the attitude of Serbia could without question be considered as contrary to international law, and implying a threat to the safety of Austria, in such a manner as to oblige Austria

to declare war, nevertheless Art. IV. would be in no wise applicable, Serbia being a very small rather than a great power.

Austria, it is true, was threatened by Russia, but only after Austria's provocation to Serbia and subject to Austria's conduct towards Serbia. The Austrian note of July 23, 1914, was an actual provocation to the great powers who had interest in, and a right to, the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Balkans, that is, Russia and Italy. For the note, in the enormity and brutality of its demands, was so utterly out of proportion to the possible offences of Serbia, as to show even to the most charitable that Austria merely sought a pretext to resume the realization of her dream of expansion in the Balkans. All this has since been so fully and forcibly brought to light that it is not worth while to dwell upon it ; only we may remember that the premeditated and firm determination of Austria to make war is sufficiently shown by the fact of her refusal to accept Serbia's note of reply, containing as it did an almost entire acceptance of Austria's demands. Further by her declaration that neither England's and Italy's proposed mediation, nor even the entire acceptance on the part of Serbia of the conditions stated in the note of July 23, would have had the effect of putting an end to the hostilities then scarcely begun (July 31, 1914), of the Austro-Hungarian army. At the last moment, under pressure of the Powers, which made every possible effort to avert the calamity of a European war, Austria declared that she had no intention of making territorial conquests in Serbia ; but we know of what value are such declarations when made at the beginning of a war ! However

that may be, the conditions stated in the note of July 23 were such as almost entirely to abolish the political and economic independence of Serbia, and therefore sufficient in themselves profoundly to disturb the Balkan equilibrium in the maintenance of which Russia had the chief interest, and Italy in virtue of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance not only the interest but the right.

The manifestly aggressive character of the war made by Austria rendered inapplicable the Articles III. and IV. of the Treaty, and, therefore, exonerated Italy from any active participation, as also from observing benevolent neutrality. But it had also in the first place the highly important result of annulling the Treaty, and restoring to Italy the most complete liberty of action.

A defensive alliance and an aggressive war are a contradiction in terms. The aggressive war of an ally against a third State finds no sanction in any literal rendering of the Treaty,¹ but is undoubtedly found in its defensive spirit, neither disputed nor disputable. If we wanted to use a strictly juridical phrase, we might say that the aggressive war declared by an ally on a third State annulled the object of the Treaty of Alliance, conceived solely with a defensive aim, and, therefore, irremediably annulled the Treaty itself.

¹ We must not forget that we are only acquainted with the articles of the Treaty published in the German White Book. Among those not published there may be one that expressly forbids an aggressive war. There certainly cannot be one that permits it, denying the defensive character of the Alliance; since our enemies would not have failed to publish it, in order the more energetically to refute the legality of Italy's conduct.

Certainly the Treaty could not deprive the three Allied Powers of the capacity of making an aggressive war on another power, but while this was outside the aim of the bond of alliance, an aggressive war could not be made without previous agreement between all three allies. And Austria has in no way the right to dispute this, since according to Giolitti's statements in the Chamber she had asked in July and October, 1913, whether Italy would be inclined to follow her in the war which she wanted to declare on Serbia. Austria did not make any objection with regard to Italy's refusal, and the circumstance is valuable as showing in our enemy herself the conviction that the Treaty forbade her, without the consent of her allies, to wage the war which she had long meditated, and which only later, owing to internal necessities and time serving international polemics, was declared to be a defensive war.

The refusal received from Italy in 1913 accounts for the fact that Austria, after having decided on her action, evidently in agreement with Germany, did not even consult Italy before sending the note of July 23, 1914, to Serbia; a note couched in such terms as must inevitably lead to war. Such an omission was at open variance with Art. I. of the Treaty, which, as expressed by the circular note sent by our Government, when announcing to foreign Governments our declaration of war on Austria, "set forth a logical and general rule applicable to any compact of alliance whatsoever; that is to say, the pledge of proceeding to an exchange of ideas in the political and economical questions of a general nature that might arise; whence none of the contracting parties was free to undertake, without

previous common agreement, an action, the consequences of which might produce obligations on the others as contemplated by the Alliance, or might in any way affect their more important interests.”¹

No one could or can doubt that the maintenance of the Balkan equilibrium was precisely one of the strongest interests of Italy. It formed the specific object of Art. VII. of the Treaty of Alliance, and had given rise to continued exchange of views between the two governments, concluding with the agreement respecting Albania.² The note to Serbia intending to overthrow this equilibrium was consequently clearly an act which Austria should not have committed without the previous sanction of Italy, and that she committed it without such consent was a violation of Art. I. of the Treaty. This violation was immediately denounced by our Government. A document quoted *verbatim* by the On. Salandra in his speech on the Capitol, proves that immediately after having received news of the note to Serbia, both he and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the On. Marchese di San Giuliano, warned von Flotow, the German Ambassador, that “a step such as that taken at Belgrade, without previous agreement between the Allies, was contrary to the spirit of the Triple Alliance.”

¹ Art. I.—“*Les Hautes Parties contractantes se promettent mutuellement paix et amitié et n'entreront dans aucune alliance ou engagement dirigé contre l'un de leurs états. Elles s'engagent à procéder à un échange d'idées sur les questions politiques et économiques d'une nature générale qui pourraient se présenter, et se promettent en outre leur appui mutuel dans la limite de leurs propres intérêts.*”

² It is known that this agreement did not prevent Austria engaging in underhand proceedings directed against every manifestation of our influence in Albania.

The same day, July 25, 1914, our Ambassador at Vienna declared "that if Austria-Hungary had proceeded to territorial occupation, even temporary, without previously asking our consent, she would have acted in violation of Art. VII. of the Treaty of Alliance, and we, therefore, protested against this proceeding to safeguard our eventual liberty of action, as also our rights and our interests."¹ And during the days immediately following (the 27th and 28th), according to the statement of the On. Salandra in the speech quoted above, our Government, in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty, and the words of Art. VII. frankly declared to Berlin and Vienna that if adequate compensations were not obtained "the Triple Alliance would be irreparably shattered." Finally, at the moment when war broke out, the Italian Government, imparting greater vigour to a thought repeatedly expressed before, "declared to the Austrian Government that it would never admit that an attempt should be made on the integrity and political and economic independence of Serbia, since such would be contrary to our interests as also to the provisions of the Treaty."²

From all this it follows that Austria violated the Treaty in committing a most serious political act of general interest without first consulting Italy, in making an aggressive war without Italy's previous consent, and what is more a war directly averse to Italian interests. It also follows that such violations of the Treaty were no sooner committed than they were denounced by Italy, notwithstanding that she allowed several months to pass before she drew the natural legal conse-

¹ *Libro Verde*. Doc. No. 3.

² *Ibid*.

quences from them. But this delay, politically explicable and opportune, in no wise detracts from Italy's right to denounce the Treaty, a right which she acquired at the moment of its violation and never subsequently lost.

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It is not possible to doubt, nor in fact do we doubt, that the principle of the tacitly resolute clause, which according to the rules of general jurisprudence is understood in all bilateral obligations, applies also in all international relations. The well known deficiencies in the society of States present only the following differences, that while in private life the party injured by the violation has the right of choice of declaring himself absolved from the conventional compact, and that of legally compelling the violator to execute his engagement ; in international law instead the party wronged by the violation only has the alternative of declaring himself freed from all obligation, or acting by direct constraint on the violator, obliging him to keep his engagement. In default of jurisdictional guardianship there is the conception of the autotutelage of subjective rights which rules this as all other international relations.

The party injured of course need not follow either one or other of the two courses indicated but may submit to the violation, and consider himself still bound by his engagement. The right arising from the violation in favour of the faithful contractor may be renounced in international as well as in national law. But the renunciation to a right is always an act of great importance; and has a still greater importance when the subject which renounces is a State ; and this gives weight to the principle of common law, according to which the renun-

ciation to a right ought to be expressed, or at least be a result of facts, such as would leave no doubt as to the will of the person renouncing. And this principle should be applied in international law with still greater rigour than that universally used in private law. Our law courts have for example decided several times that the simple tolerance exercised unwillingly by the force of events cannot be interpreted as a manifestation of will pointing to the renunciation of the right of asking the annulment of a contract. Is it inadmissible that such a rule should be imposed with greater force in international relations so extraordinarily dominated by conventions and political necessities ?

We have seen that Italy not only showed disapproval of the conventional violations committed by Austria, but immediately denounced them, thus revealing her firm determination of asserting her own rights. However, Austria has maintained that even if there were violations on her side, Italy had forfeited the right of denouncing the Treaty, having committed an act based on the Treaty itself and therefore incompatible with her decision of not renouncing the right to consider herself released from every bond of alliance. And this act, was, according to Austria, our declaration of neutrality, which she pretends was made on the basis of Art. IV. of the Treaty. We have already shown how this argument is, legally speaking, absolutely erroneous, for Italy was not obliged in virtue of the Treaty to declare and maintain neutrality ; whence the logical conclusion that our declaration of neutrality was not the fulfilment of a duty but a free and spontaneous act ; consequently revocable at our pleasure. There remains little to add in order to

prove how in Italy's attitude there is nothing that can be shown against the free and spontaneous character of our declaration of neutrality.

No sooner was the state of war in which the Central Empires were engaged made known to her, than Italy expressed her conviction and decision that she was not compelled to follow them, the condition foreseen by Art. III. of the Treaty not having been verified. Unless it be contended that she ought immediately to have declared war on Austria in consequence of the violations committed by the latter, we cannot admit of any other solution on the part of Italy than the declaration of neutrality. Such a declaration might undoubtedly bear one or other of the two following interpretations—the execution of a conventional obligation, or a freely accomplished act. But while nothing obliged Italy *expressis verbis* to state with what intention she issued her declaration, her entire attitude clearly tends to prove her intention of accomplishing a spontaneous, and not a compulsory, act. All the ambiguity is on the side of Austria, who did not wish, or feigned not to understand, a perfectly clear issue.

The declaration of neutrality was made and published in the identical form always used by our Government in the case of wars waged by other States in which Italy did not wish to take part.¹ Had Italy indeed held

¹ The declaration of neutrality published in the *Gazetta Ufficiale* of August 3, 1914, is as follows: "Some powers of Europe finding themselves in a state of war, and Italy being at peace with all the belligerent powers, the Government of the King, the citizens and subjects of the kingdom are obliged to observe the duties of neutrality, according to the existing laws, and according to the principles of international law. Any one who violates these duties must suffer the consequences of his own actions, and incur, when such is the case, the penalties sanctioned by the law."

herself bound to the obligation of "benevolent neutrality," sanctioned by Art. IV. of the Treaty, some reference to it would have appeared in the declaration. But no reference to such an obligation is contained in any Italian diplomatic document. And in truth it would have been in the highest degree incomprehensible and absurd that Italy should have shown, no matter how, the intention of remaining bound to neutrality, when she had already so clearly and repeatedly declared that Austria's violations had compromised the existence of that Treaty, which precisely foresaw the obligation of neutrality. The statement that the declaration of neutrality was an act not dependent on the Treaty, but solely on the will of Italy and of her interests of the moment, constantly upheld by our government and diffused by our press, thus appears entirely justified. When on December 3, 1914, Salandra, the Premier, said in the Chamber of Deputies that "neutrality freely proclaimed and loyally observed, was not enough to safeguard us from the consequences of the terrible upheaval, which was spreading day by day and of which no one could foresee the end," he openly avowed that neutrality should be powerfully armed and ready for every eventuality to "safeguard our vital interests, to affirm and uphold our just aspirations," he gave the clearest and most precise definition not only of our policy, but also of the juridical significance of our neutrality.

But even admitting that all this may not be perfectly clear, and that Italy's actions at first may have lacked that directness calculated to make it understood that the neutrality had been declared in a manner both spontaneous and transitory, there would still remain doubt and

uncertainty as to the existence of the implicit renunciation of an essential right, such as that of asserting by denunciation the violations of the Treaty committed by Austria.

In the note of May 21, 1915, in reply to the denunciation of the Treaty, Austria feigned astonishment because, "*les faits allégués en première ligne par le gouvernement royal pour motiver sa décision remontaient à plus de 9 mois.*" But where could Austria find a precedent in international law, that obliges the State which has been the victim of a conventional violation to manifest within a given date its desire to dissolve the Treaty? The violation of itself engenders in the aggrieved State the right to the annulment, but as for the time and manner of exercising such a right, there does not exist any rule of limitation or restriction. This much alone may be granted, that the manner of putting it into execution generally consists in a formal act of denunciation, and that usually the exercise of the right does not follow immediately, but after a certain lapse of time from its origin. The reasons of this normal delay are as evident in the relations between States as in those between individuals. The person injured by the violation of a contract generally hastens to make known the violation; but also generally before coming to a rupture, before bringing the violator to justice to oblige him to fulfil the contract, he initiates amicable negotiations to obtain reparation and arrange some new agreement, which will endow the contract with fresh life, saving of it whatever there is to save. Only when such friendly negotiations do not reach a result which the victim of the violation

considers satisfactory, is the violation itself formally denounced to the judge, in order that he may award the reparation that is demanded. This mode of procedure, which in individual relations can be imposed by law, and which in any case is in conformity with custom,¹ is imposed with greater force in international relations, in view of the undeniable gravity, with which the definite rupture of a Treaty is invested.

Italy indeed could not have been withheld by any moral scruple from denouncing the Treaty, once its violation had been confirmed.² The present volume

¹ Any one acquainted with legal life is aware that very rarely does the plaintiff bring a case into Court without being able to affirm that he has in vain tried amicable measures to obtain from the defendant that which forms the object of his suit.

² In Austria's reply to Italy's note denouncing the Treaty, Austria boasts of the well-known services rendered to Italy by the Triple Alliance, thus seeking to throw the blame of ingratitude on Italy. Neither was there lacking a zealous Austrian author, whose legal sense was so obscured by political fervour as to cause him to write that the breach of the Treaty constituted an actual fraud (!) on the part of Italy, who, thanks to the Treaty, had wrested from Austria advantages and assistance, to which Austria would not otherwise have been held. Any one who is acquainted with Austro-Italian relations during the thirty years of the Alliance cannot fail to assign such assertions to the realm of juridical farce ! But the knowledge that we have profited by the Triple Alliance does not weigh heavily on our conscience ; and we must loudly proclaim that the advantages we have derived from it are considerably less than those derived by Austria and Germany. It is enough to remember that the Triple Alliance arose at the will and by the influence of Bismarck, who rightly foresaw that his country would derive from it the chief benefit. In fact the prestige of the Triple Alliance was almost exclusively exploited in favour of Austrian and German designs ; such political assistance as we derived from it is sufficiently shown by the attitude of our Allies during our war in Libya ! Lastly, if in virtue of the Triple Alliance we enjoyed

already contains in other chapters a sufficient demonstration of the hostile attitude adopted towards us by Austria during the entire course of the Alliance, so hostile as even to meditate aggression on two especially critical occasions of our life—during the Calabro-Sicilian catastrophe of 1908, and during our Libyan war in 1911.¹ Not only, therefore, from the juridical point of view, but also from the moral, no one could have found fault if in August, 1914, Italy had declared

a long term of peace, this benefit, common to the two allied countries, was embittered to us by hard sacrifices of our national self-respect.

¹ The intention of Austria-Hungary to betray us dates back from a long course of years, if not to the origin of the Alliance. Facts, which have recently come to light, and which are not, perhaps, sufficiently known outside Italy, illustrate the perfidy meditated by those who now hurl against us the accusation of disloyalty. That treason against Italy seemed natural to Austrian policy is sufficiently shown by armaments on the frontiers, armaments pushed with such intensity as to make Italy understand that the most serious menace to her peace was represented by her own ally. But the menace of aggression, while the Treaty of Alliance was in undisputed vigour, culminated in the two circumstances related above. In his speech at Naples, September 26, 1915, our minister, Barzilai, related how, owing to the communication of authentic documents of our staff, our Government had received knowledge of the conspiracy planned by General Conrad with the hereditary Archduke Francis Ferdinand for the annihilation of Italy. "An autograph sentence of the Chief of the Staff at the end of an account of the preparations on the frontier expresses the regret: 'Oh! why was I not listened to, when in 1908 I proposed to attack Italy?'" He piously regretted that he had lost the opportunity of the Calabrian-Sicilian disaster. Conrad was temporarily removed, perhaps because his scheme had appeared too daring and premature; but no sooner was the Alliance renewed before its expiration when, owing to the powerful influence of the Archduke and to our supreme humiliation the Chief of the Staff was restored to office. "And," continues the On. Barzilai, "as

the Alliance dissolved by the act and guilt of Austria. The fact that before reaching this extreme solution, Italy had sincerely and loyally made every attempt to try and save the Alliance, safeguarding at the same time the interests which the faithless attitude of Austria had compromised, should, therefore, be all the more appreciated.

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The negotiations initiated by Italy immediately after the opening of Austro-Hungarian hostilities against

regards Austria's preparations for war against us—never discouraged by Germany—a singular document one day reached the Chamber—a manual of German-Italian dialogues for the use of the Austrian army, compiled for the plan of invasion of our country, the authenticity of which was guaranteed by the seal of the Graz Command. This fact has never been denied by the Government of Vienna."

In the diplomatic note, announcing to foreign powers our declaration of war on Austria, the fact is recalled that "in 1911 while Italy was engaged in war with Turkey, the Staff at Vienna was actively preparing an aggression against us. And the military party zealously followed the political work, with the aim of drawing the other responsible factors of the monarchy into the scheme. At the same time the armaments on our frontier assumed an entirely offensive character. The crisis at that time was peacefully averted, thanks, as we may suppose, to the influence of foreign intervention; but since then we have remained under the impression of the possibility of a sudden armed menace, if, owing to accidental causes, the party hostile to us should gain the upper hand in Vienna." Moreover, the attitude of Austria-Hungary during our war with Turkey is amply shown by the Green Book, and the speech delivered by the On. Salandra in the Capitol on June 2, 1915. As for the faithful Germany, it is known how that nation rose in fury, hurling against us every kind of insulting words, while the Imperial Government openly aided Turkey with money, arms and officers, to whom a recent decree, issued without shame, recognised as a war campaign the time spent in Libya fighting against the Ally—Italy.

Serbia, and continued with greater intensity from the beginning of December, 1914, until March, 1915, had as their formal basis Art. VII. of the Treaty, which established the obligation of a preventive agreement and the right of compensation between the Allies in case of temporary or permanent occupation in the Balkan regions. This has given Austria a pretext for maintaining that Italy should have considered the Treaty as remaining in force from the moment that she invoked it in support of her own claims. And here the misunderstanding was no longer possible as on the declaration of neutrality; our Green Book existing to prove how both sides discussed at length the value and the meaning of Art. VII. and especially the possibility of admitting that in virtue of this article the compensations would have as object those territories subject to Austria-Hungary, towards which Italian aspirations were directed. But if the fact is indisputable, the real meaning is very far from the one apparent. In reality Italy considered, and had a right to consider, the Treaty as infringed by Austria from the moment in which Austria had declared an aggressive war on Serbia. Nevertheless Italy wanted to avoid the rupture, seeking to establish a fresh agreement with her faithless ally; an agreement which should revive the Alliance, eliminating from the relations between the two countries those causes which in the past had deprived the political bond of all colour of friendship.¹ Since this same

¹ Thus in the note which communicated to the neutral powers the declaration of war on Austria, our Government could affirm that "the conversations initiated immediately after July 23 had had the aim of giving the Treaty, violated and, therefore, annulled by the act of Austria-Hungary—a new element of life,

Treaty, which the parties concerned wished to reconstruct, contained in one of its articles a possible base of discussion permitting of a fresh agreement, it was natural that both parties should make use of it to enter into negotiations. But these negotiations soon assumed such an independent guise as to make each side understand that Art. VII. was nothing more than an opportunity or pretext for entering into diplomatic conversations.

No sooner had the Austrian Government, after much resistance, declared itself ready to enter into an exchange of ideas as proposed by the Italian Government, when the latter clearly explained that the compensations, on which they were to come to terms, were to concern territories situated under the actual dominion of Austria-Hungary. Italy was quite decided that the terrible hurricane, which others had let loose for their own ends, should not pass without the elementary and essential reasons of our defence on mountains and seas being assured, nor until our abiding national aspirations were satisfied by the removal at one stroke of the cause of our most bitter and most constant dissension with Austria. All this had been made very clear during the anxious period of our neutrality by the solemn manifestations of the people, no less than by the repeated declarations of the Government. And all this was apart from, and beyond, Art. VII. of the Treaty, evidently stipulated for quite different political situations such as could only be derived from fresh agreements ; " and that by means of the negotiations which had taken place " Italy had sought to see if, and how, it would be possible to give her compact with Austria-Hungary, which had already virtually ceased to exist, a more solid basis and a more lasting guarantee."

tions.¹ The Austrian Government, not without reason, could maintain that this article was not applicable, both because the occupation of Serbia was an occupation of war, and, therefore, transitory and uncertain, and because the compensations foreseen concerned the Balkan peninsula and not the territories already subject to one of the contracting parties. If Austria at a later date consented to treat on the base of cession of lands geographically and ethnically Italian, subject to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it was evidently not because she had changed her opinion with regard to the interpretation of Art. VII., but because she had at length made up her mind that the acceptance of Italy's point of view independently of the Treaty was the only possible way to re-establish the Alliance.

The negotiations conducted by Austria with the evident aim of wearing us out and of gaining time were

¹ Art. VII.—“ *L'Autriche-Hongrie et l'Italie n'ayant en vue que le maintien autant que possible du statu quo territorial en Orient, s'engagent à user de leur influence pour prévenir toute modification territoriale qui porterait dommage à l'une ou à l'autre des puissances signataires du présent Traité. Elles se communiqueront à cet effet tous les renseignements de nature à s'éclairer mutuellement sur leurs propres dispositions ainsi que sur celles d'autres Puissances. Toutefois dans le cas où, par suite des événements, le maintien du statu quo dans les régions des Balkans ou des côtes et îles ottomanes dans l'Adriatique et dans la mer Egée deviendrait impossible et que, soit en consequence de l'action d'une Puissance tierce, soit autrement, l'Autriche-Hongrie ou l'Italie se verraient dans la nécessité de le modifier par une occupation temporaire ou permanente de leur part, cette occupation n'aura lieu qu'après un accord préalable entre les deux Puissances, basé sur le principe d'une compensation réciproque pour tout avantage, territorial ou autre, que chacune d'elle obtiendrait en sus du statu quo actuel et donnant satisfaction aux intérêts et aux prétentions bien fondées des deux Parties.*”

fatally destined to failure. The territorial concessions which Austria seemed disposed to make were far from satisfying our national aspirations and the most elementary requirements of our safety. Their value, already very limited, was further reduced by the fact that their execution was adjourned until the end of the war. On the other hand it certainly was not enhanced by the proposed German guarantee, a guarantee which, in spite of its favourable although uncertain chance of being fulfilled, would have placed Italy in a condition of inferiority compared with Germany. The flashes of sincerity which appeared in the anger that broke forth in Austria and Germany on our declaration of war, sufficiently showed with what disposition of mind and what *arrière-pensées* the concessions had been counselled by the latter and made by the former of the two powers—our enemies of to-day. Thus from the political point of view we may say that it was fortunate for Italy that she could not come to an understanding; but from the other point of view, which only interests us here, suffice it to remark that Italy was in no wise legally held to stipulate an agreement which, in the form it was proposed by Austria, militated against her interests and her dignity.

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The rupture of the negotiations having taken place, relations between Italy and Austria-Hungary remained precisely in the same condition in which they had been placed by the war of aggression declared on Serbia. The hope of bestowing, by a fresh agreement, new life on the alliance, which the war had compromised, having been shattered, nothing remained to Italy but to exer-

cise the right, which she had acquired at the end of July, 1914, and never since lost, namely: that of declaring herself in her turn released from that conventional bond which Austria had first violated. Our declaration of war that followed, far from violating a Treaty, which with Italy's formal legal denunciation had fallen to nought, must be considered as an ulterior and equally legitimate consequence of the violation committed by Austria; that is to say, as a means of safeguarding those Italian rights and interests which Austria, by her attitude, contrary to the letter and spirit of the Treaty, had offended, in refusing to give adequate satisfaction.

PROSPERO FEDOZZI.

VIII

ITALY'S WAR AND ITALY'S WEALTH

PROF. G. ARIAS

VIII

ITALY'S WAR AND ITALY'S WEALTH

IN the first pages of his book, Del Vecchio has nobly said that the estimate of the economic value of the lands which we hope to redeem matters little, because a moral reason, higher than any calculation of profit, unites the nation to its territory and causes foreign domination, however insignificant the injury it may inflict, to be felt as an insult by each and all.

But it interests us less to assess the value of those lands still subject to the foreign yoke, great though it be, than to understand that Austrian domination over our territories and Germany's aspiration to hegemony over our country, manifested by many signs, represent, or rather we should say represented, for Italy a grave obstacle to the development of her economic, political and intellectual energies. They further represented the greatest menace to the future of our country and race, and the most serious insult to our right of economic and moral independence, which is among the most fundamental and sacred rights of nations.

The examination of the economical causes of our war cannot, therefore, be separated from that of the juridical, political and moral causes ; it would be incorrect to say that the economic reasons are of more importance than

the others, and equally unprofitable would it be to investigate to what degree ; we should lose ourselves in an insoluble problem, a problem that cannot be propounded, for these so-called economic motives which justify our war are precisely fundamental and cannot be isolated from the entire question, of which also the juridical, political and moral motives form a part. We were obliged and we have willed to come to a trial of arms, not only for the greatness but for the very life of our country, for our existence in the present and the future. If in the abstract this existence can be divided into the many forces with which it is endowed, in reality it is one, and in each of its aspects sacred to us and to civilisation. Sacred to us and to civilisation, whether we consider the complete and independent development of our economic energies, which is the first and essential element of life for every nation ; whether overcoming the purely material interests, we concern ourselves with our legitimate political influence outside our natural boundaries ; whether in raising ourselves to the higher spheres of legal and moral rights, we remember that the special mission of Italy is the defence of law, which she taught the world ; and that it is her duty as that of every society and every individual to respect and defend those supreme moral principles which ennoble life and render it worthy of being lived.

Italy, therefore, we repeat, is fighting for her life, also for her material existence. And it is precisely on the latter point that some further explanation seems still opportune.

Stretching so far into the Mediterranean, that her

furthest Sicilian coast almost touches the shores of Africa, Italy among the other rights which she owes to her fortunate geographical position, possesses one, namely, that to her four greater Tyrrhene and Adriatic ports, Genoa, Venice, Trieste and Fiume, which more than the others belong to the continent, pertains the right of collecting and transmitting to the people of Central Europe, up to certain limits which cannot be accurately defined, the merchandise coming from Eastern Europe and Asia, from North Africa and in part also from America, while receiving and forwarding that which coming from Central Europe is destined for those distant shores. That which matters is clearly to see this as an essential element of our mission in the economy of Europe, certainly not similar to that which others, blinded by the despotic desire for domination, arrogate to themselves, but which every one who bestows merely a glance on the map of our country, must recognise as belonging to us. Each of the four ports has its zone of radiation—besides Lombardy, and a part of Piedmont, Genoa dominates almost the whole of Switzerland and the western part of South Germany. The domain of Venice should extend not only over the valley of the Po and the Trentino, but over the central zone of South Germany and certain regions of Austria. Another part of Germany and the greater part of Austria are under the influence of Trieste. Fiume presides over the traffic between Hungary and the Mediterranean countries and beyond.

It is precisely this our natural domain which is now usurped or violently disputed by Austria and Germany. By Austria, who dominates over Trent and

Fiume, and arrests our pacific penetration across the Alps into Germany, Austria and Hungary ; by Austria who in the days, which for her were happy, of an alliance that granted her all the rights without imposing any duty in return, did not hesitate to make use of any expedient of violence or cunning in order to dispute with Venice, the ancient Queen of the Adriatic, the slightest hope of further expansion there or beyond the Alps, and who even stifled every breath across her own ancient gulf. By Germany who, pre-occupied with securing by every means her dominion on the Mediterranean, with the increasing spirit of invasion of her ports of Hamburg and Bremen, not only deprived our Genoa of every possibility of extending her commerce on the other side of the Alps, but even audaciously penetrated into the very heart of Lombardy and Venetia.

Austria has made use of the frontier which was iniquitously imposed on us in 1866, not only as a means of hindering our defence, but also to prevent Venice from peacefully regaining her lawful dominion beyond the Italian frontier. Venice, in fact, has almost entirely lost her zone of expansion beyond the Alps. In 1912, the traffic from Venice to Germany scarcely amounted to 2,282 tons, to Austria 29,235, to Switzerland 14,793. Contemptible figures ! easily explained not only by German policy, which has secured to the northern ports, and with the benign acquiescence of Austria, the penetration beyond the limits assigned to them by nature. Also and perhaps more by the Austrian policy as to the right of entry into the ports, a policy yielding on all points concerning the competition of Trieste with the German ports, but unyielding

in the extreme where antagonism between Venice and Trieste might be fomented, although such antagonism had no reason whatever for existence.

Owing to tariffs the sphere of action of the port of Trieste meets at present a barrier at Prague, a barrier which extends from Prague to the Bohemian-Bavarian frontier, beyond Nuremberg and Munich as far as the Lake of Constance. Austria has carefully avoided seriously to resist the German invasion ; she has on the contrary so arranged the cumulative tariffs of her railways as to aid rather than oppose her, giving preference, for instance, to the transportation of German goods beyond the river ports of Bohemia and Silesia. *Vice versa* she endeavoured to wrest from Venice a great part of the traffic which belonged to her, with the apparent aim of aiding the port of Trieste in its accepted natural antagonism to Venice, but in reality to accentuate and even provoke the rivalry between the two Italian ports, to increase the revenues of the Austrian railways and the Austrian treasury, and to cause it to be believed, by those who had not fathomed the problems, that the prosperity of Trieste is inseparably allied to the peaceable maintenance of the imperial régime. It cannot in fact be denied that the tariff war of our ex-ally, which we too long regarded with stoic indifference, succeeded in depriving Venice of more than one important element of her commerce. When the line of Pontebba was opened the Austrian railways used every effort to reduce the sphere of action belonging to Venice, and to reach this aim they instituted absolutely prohibitive tariffs on the Tarvis-Pontebba line, at the same time favouring with great reductions the route of Peri. The port

of Venice was thus prevented from supplying the Austrian zone with provisions, which pertained to her sphere of commerce. This was not enough. The shortest route, by more than 150 kilometres, for forwarding from the Adriatic goods direct to Munich, Nuremberg and Würzburg, until a few years ago, would have been that of Peri, via Venice, but the most economical route was always that via Trieste and through the Pusterthal, on account of the tariff war vigorously waged by the Austrian railways to favour the transit between Trieste and Bavaria, to the detriment of Venice. Finally, we may remember that more recently Austria, in order considerably to reduce the distance between Trieste and Munich, Berlin and Vienna, and to favour the competition of Trieste with Venice for traffic direct to Austria and Central Germany, caused three new Alpine lines to be constructed ; from Trieste to Villach and Klagenfurt, from Mollbrücken to Schwarzach, from Selzthal to Klaus-Steyrling.

Austria has thus favoured Trieste to the exclusive detriment of Venice, but has not done all she could and should have done fully to develop the natural capacity of Trieste. It is, therefore, clear what the deliverance from Austrian domination and invasion would mean respectively for Trieste and Venice. For the former, it is true, this deliverance might seem to imply the relegation of some element of traffic unduly absorbed ; but on the other hand it should mark the beginning of a more vigorous competition against the ports of the north, through which Germany exercises so violent a pressure against the Mediterranean ports, aided by the most varied economic and political measures.

Venice does not aspire to deprive Trieste of any natural element of her *hinterland*, rich, vast and capable of a still further development, but wishes to deliver herself from Austrian oppression, which obstructs her path to Italian territories and territories non-Italian pertaining to her influence. Neither does Trieste aspire to compete with Venice in a zone that does not belong to her, but wishes to centralise in ever increasing measure for herself and Italy the wealth that accrues to her from her accessible position for the exchanges of a part of Europe—central, vast, populous and rich—and the European and Asiatic Levant.

Whoever rules over Trieste dominates in fact the commerce of the Levant, which represents, above all in value, a conspicuous part of Triestine commerce, about 50 per cent. of her maritime exports. In 1911, maritime exports to the Levant, comprising the Far East, amounted to more than three million quintals out of a total of little more than nine million of exports, or strictly speaking to 35·11 per cent., representing a value of 345,409 millions on 712,389; that is to say, 48·50 per cent. Maritime imports from the Near and Far East amounted to five and a half millions, that is to 25·45 per cent. and that, which is more important, corresponds to a value (I quote always the statistics of 1911) of 272,350 millions of crowns, that is 36·58 per cent.

In maritime exportation to the Levant (strictly speaking European and Asiatic Turkey, Candia, Cyprus, etc.), Turkey naturally holds the first place, and receives by way of Trieste more than a million and a half quintals of merchandise, representing a value of 180 million crowns, out of the 200 which, strictly speaking, represent

the total of the trade with the Levant. The day on which European and Asiatic Turkey, freed from a slothful government,—such as the Turkish, which stifles every initiative,—rises to a new life (and that day now seems approaching) we shall see the commerce of Trieste with the regions formerly belonging to Turkey increase in an extraordinary degree. Germany knows it, and as she hopes, rightly or wrongly, to secure the richest spoils on the day of partition, she aspires to the possession of the Adriatic port which dominates the commerce of the Levant, not only to have the route free towards her Eastern colonies, but also unduly to appropriate the wealth which nature has generously bestowed on Italian Trieste. And not being able to possess Trieste she demands that it should at least be “international.”

Unfortunately it is not rare to encounter Italians who, in order to prove their “equanimity,” profess anxiety about such “rights” of Germanism, and are disposed to accept the corollaries, conciliating the national rights of Italy with “German greed” in some of the many fantastic projects of an autonomous Trieste—a possibility which we shall see after one moment’s reflection even from the economic point of view, lacks any serious foundation. No one certainly thinks of denying or preventing Germany, even the whole Austro-German continent, from collaborating with the other countries of Europe in the colonisation of the East—either European or Asiatic—to develop the inexhaustible resources and promote the renascence of civilisation, and with this end in view to make use of the great waterway of our Adriatic and the port of Trieste, which is *par excellence* and because Nature has so ordered it,

the terminus of the great trade route. But Trieste is also, for all natural and national reasons, an Italian station, which Italy claims for herself, and will keep under her own dominion for the same excellent reasons for which no one in Europe asks Germany to deprive herself of the effective dominion of her great northern ports, solely because they serve for the commerce of not one but several nations. If "considerations" or judgements of this nature succeeded in prevailing, the consequence would be that the day—which we hope may be near—in which Genoa recovers her importance as the port of South Germany, Germany could demand that the port of Genoa, as that which supplies German territories, should be made international. And Switzerland in her turn and with greater reason should obtain as much for Genoa, Marseilles and the German ports, by which she is supplied.

That the outrageous pan-German designs of penetration, political and commercial hegemony, which label themselves not only Hamburg-Trieste-Constantinople, but actually "from Berlin to Bagdad" should comprise, beyond the terminal port of the Adriatic, that also of the Tyrrhene Sea, cannot be doubted. To-day, however, we may well hope that the European conflict, which these insane desires have provoked, may have the effect of frustrating them for ever.

It is, however, certain that for several decades Germany has been looking on Trieste with envious eyes. Why? Perhaps the relations of Germany with the Adriatic by way of Trieste are of sufficient importance to justify these ambitions? Statistics show quite the contrary.

The traffic of the port of Trieste amounts to about 55 million quintals, 31 of which represent the traffic by sea and the remaining 24 that by land. Well, Germany's share in the traffic by sea is represented by an absolutely insignificant figure (little more than two hundred thousand quintals in 1911, that is a ratio of 0.75 of the total traffic), while Italy's share amounts to more than four million quintals (13.90 per cent.) a greater proportion than the Austro-Hungarian ports themselves, which, in addition, are for the most part Italian (12.09). Naturally to the traffic by land Germany contributes in greater proportion, in ratio of about 7 per cent. We may note, however, that the goods from Germany are of little account (2 per cent. of the railway traffic in imports), while the traffic to Germany represents about 11 per cent. of the export by rail, almost double that to Italy.

Consequently, the German Empire receives from Trieste a certain amount of goods, as it does from other Italian ports, but sends a quantity so small as to be almost negligible, when we consider the enormous export traffic of Germany. Nor can it ever be otherwise, not even if, indeed far less if Trieste (admitting such a dreadful hypothesis) were to become a German port, since Germany certainly would not aggrandise Trieste at the expense of those northern ports, towards which, with the acquiescence and assistance of Austria, she has succeeded in diverting a considerable part of the commerce of Trieste.

But dominating Trieste, Germany would conquer a new and powerful instrument for the policy which seeks to impoverish all the Mediterranean ports in favour

of the northern. A fatal policy, of which Genoa, Venice and Trieste itself experience the hard consequences even now. Should the important traffic to and from the Levant, which from geographical reasons belongs to Trieste, fall into grasping German hands, Italy would be deprived of a great part of her natural wealth, which as all are aware is susceptible of infinite development. Because, mark it well, to one who knows Germany and her methods of violent economic imposition, Trieste belonging to Germany would mean not only that the traffic of the East would be wrested from Italy, but would further mean the subjugation of Venice and of the other Adriatic ports on the Italian coast. It would mean the transformation of the entire Adriatic,—the Adriatic which was formerly the Gulf of Venice—into a German lake ; it would mean the entire removal of one of the lungs through which Italy breathes.

On the contrary Italy must also recover the other Italian port which with Trieste collaborates in the Adriatic traffic with the East, dominating the whole of Hungary, of which it is the natural port,—Fiume. Woe to Italy should she renounce Fiume ! The economic power of Trieste would then indeed be entirely ruined to the advantage of the rulers of Fiume.

Trieste and Fiume, once Italian, should peacefully develop their commerce within their respective zones, and secure permanently and wholly to Italy control over the Levant, which the two Adriatic ports hold within definite limits, excluding the possibility of unlawful invasion, otherwise than as the result of premeditated and unjust political violence.

And here the usual protectors of non-Italian interests

counsel us not to deprive Hungary of her only port, which would be a grave injustice to the chivalrous Magyar people. But the Hungarian Government during these later decades has employed with constantly increasing asperity all Austria's most odious practices against Italian influence in the chief port of the Quarnero, "*Ch' Italia chiude e i suoi termini bagna*,"¹ and does not conceal its intention of stifling or effacing by every means Italian nationality, or at least everything that recalls it. Italy must recover this region which belongs to her by geographic and ethnic right; Hungary will anyhow for geographical reasons make Fiume her landing-place.

As the eastern frontier, penetrating into our territory almost to the gates of Venice, has allowed Austria to check the harbour development of our chief Adriatic port, so the possession of the jagged coast and the thousand Istrian and Dalmatian islands gave her also the mercantile dominion over our sea.

At the end of 1911 the Austrian merchant navy could boast of a fleet of 1,794 vessels, of the net tonnage of 410,000, little less than double the tonnage of 1867 (233,162). Trieste holds the first place with 222 vessels and a tonnage of 308,956; Dalmatia follows (800 vessels, tonnage 58,964); Istria comes next (674 vessels, tonnage 40,687), and lastly the district of Gorizia-Gradisca (98 vessels, tonnage 1,274). If to these figures we add those of the Hungarian merchant navy (220 vessels with a net tonnage of 133,852) we have a total of more than 2,000 vessels with a net tonnage of about 550,000 tons. Naturally among the factors of this remarkable

¹ "Which bounds Italy and laves its confines."

development are of chief importance the singularly favourable natural conditions, and the industrious activity of the people of Trieste, Istria and Dalmatia, who are in great part people of our race though subject to foreign rule.

Our merchant navy, although exceeding in tonnage by almost one half that of Austria and being not much inferior to the French, is only the fifth among European fleets, while in 1872 it occupied the fourth place in entire tonnage, and was only surpassed by Great Britain, Norway and France. It is now left far behind by Germany, which occupies the second place in Europe, following immediately after England. One, and perhaps the greatest of the causes, which has hindered the progress of our industries in maritime commerce—a natural and important source of Italy's wealth—is undoubtedly the servitude to which Austria has condemned us in the Adriatic. Usurping two of our greatest ports and the entire Dalmatian shore, she has gained possession of the principal lines of communication, especially with the East, while, deprived as we are of the principal harbours—ours by right, we have not been able to withstand with any hope of advantage her powerful competition.

Further, being thus mistress of the routes which lead from the Adriatic to the near or distant East, Austria was able to proceed to a radical renovation of her navy, substituting on a large scale the steamship for the sailing vessel. So that to-day, setting aside vessels of less than 100 tons, the net tonnage of sailing vessels in Austria little exceeds the thousandth part of that of steamers, while the same proportion in Great Britain is

still a tenth, in France little more than a fifth, and for us over three-fifths !¹

Hence the re-conquest of the Adriatic is indispensable for a more vigorous development of our trade in maritime transports, which undoubtedly in full progress, is yet in some measure retarded. This is certainly not owing to lack of initiative on the part of our shipowners, but rather to the sad conditions of absolute inferiority in which we find ourselves in our Adriatic, and in consequence in the entire Mediterranean. "Because," as Barzilai has recently and well said, "the liberty of the Mediterranean is dependent on the safety of the Adriatic. As long as she is surrounded by snares in her land-locked sea, Italy can never prosecute the great commercial struggle without incurring the danger of being stabbed in the back."

But maritime Italy is confronted by another great problem—how possibly to deliver her national commerce from servitude to the foreign yoke. Certainly some natural causes which cannot be eliminated—and which reduce the value of our fortunate geographical position—we have not like England and Germany coal in our own country—are against us. Much, however, may be expected from our determination and from the wisdom of State measures. Certain it is in any case that German invasion, favoured by our patient acquiescence, is here also. For at the time of the last commercial conventions it induced us to concede also in this field everything without asking anything, or at least only

¹ See for these data: Roncagli, *L'Industria dei trasporti Marittimi*, in the publication *Cinquant'anni di Storia Italiana*, edited by the R. Accademia dei Lincei, I. p. 61.

very little, in return. Germany secured for herself unconditional liberty of flying her flag without even adequate compensation to the customs. And she knew how to take advantage of the fact. In 1911, German participation in our traffic was 3,380 vessels of a tonnage of $8\frac{1}{2}$ millions, while the share of the Italian merchant navy in German trade was 50 vessels of 76,000 tons.

These statistics of the two contracting parties show whether Italy or Germany derived the greater advantage from the so-called Alliance, which in the economic field was drawing us by diverse roads towards that same vassalage of which it was the mainspring in the political field. But on this point some further observation is necessary.

All know how serious for Italy and for the moment also for France were the consequences of the rupture of the Italo-French commercial treaty (1888), which assured to French industries a large clientèle in the Italian market, and to our southern agriculture exportation to France of some of its most important products. The south, following the advice of agriculturists, had begun to transform its cultivation, giving greater care to that of trees, better adapted to the nature of the soil, and above all encouraging the culture—at that time so profitable—of the vine. It was confronted with so grave a crisis on the closing of the French markets that its successful redemption, on which even now in great measure the future—not exclusively economic—of our country depends, was arrested at one blow. Soon after (December 6, 1891) the treaties with Austria-Hungary

and Germany were renewed, and marked the beginning of a fresh period of our economic history, that of our close union with the Central Empires, more than once glorified by the Germans as the direct and only cause of our enviable economic progress. But this is a great error, into which we ourselves have fallen, or rather have preferred not to recognise, enforcing to the point of sacrifice our devotion to the allied nations. No one would deny that in these treaties with the Central Empires an immediate partial compensation was offered some regions of Italy, in the sudden overthrow of our commercial exchanges with France. But if we consider that in the period 1881-7 the average of the Italo-French exchanges reached 660 million of francs, with 307 million of imports into Italy, and 353 of exports to France, while even in 1898 our commerce with Austria, Hungary and Germany together barely amounted to 612 millions, that is to say, did not reach the same amount as with France eleven years before. If we consider that again in 1901 our exports to the two Allied Empires amounted to 332 millions, that is, did not reach the figure attained fourteen years earlier with France, we see that even in the field of commerce, though compensation was not lacking, it was neither so immediate nor so abundant as it pleases our ex-allies to describe it, nor as we for a certain time imagined it to be.

But in the financial field there was certainly no shadow of compensation for the consequences of our rupture with France, formerly the depository of our consolidated funds, since in the darkest hours of our politics and finance we have received very precarious

aid from Germany, too much concerned with her own interests and too little with ours. That same Germany, to recall a single example, in the years 1896-7, the darkest hour of our danger, hastened to sell a great part of our consolidated funds, retaining solely 485 millions, whereas France kept 754 millions. But the comparison between that which we lost in the severance from our Latin sister, and the compensation we were able to obtain in drawing closer economic ties with the Central Empires is only one element—and one not always safe or easy to estimate, on account of the difference between the contracting parties and the change of times—in judging of the advantages and the disadvantages of our political and economic alliance with the Central Empires.

One fact, however, is certain, that Austria and still more Germany profited more, much more than we, by the alliance, and that our traditional complaisance towards the Allies reached its zenith at the time of the last treaties, that of 1904 with Germany, and that of 1906 with Austria, both concluded at a time of ardent enthusiasm for the Triple Alliance. From 1901-1903 to 1910-1911 Austrian imports to Italy increased by 64 per cent., and ours into the Monarchy by 21 per cent. ; German imports into Italy by 143 per cent. ; ours into Germany only by 50 per cent. Neither do these figures indicate, even approximately, the true conditions so far as Germany is concerned. The flood of wares, which especially after the last treaties, poured from Germany into Italy, would not in itself be considered either as a sign of our inferiority, or as a legitimate motive of our resentment. But it becomes such when we reflect that German commercial policy, protected by

favourable commercial conventions, by political influence, by a powerful offensive and defensive organisation, and by an entire absence of scruple towards her ally, proposed to transform Italy into a German colony, to impose German industrial domination in Italy at all costs, shattering every attempt at resistance on the part of our industry and reducing it to the position of a humble vassal.

This—German invasion—is indeed the gravest peril that menaced Italian trade. I say invasion and not competition, and it is essential to discriminate, because the competition of foreign capital and of foreign goods is as legitimate and beneficial as foreign invasion, for the countries which permit it, is illegitimate and dangerous.

Stuart Mill, in memorable pages habitually quoted by economists, who sometimes exaggerate their purport and significance, describes the immense advantages derived from the exportation of capital both to the countries which export and to those that import it. For the importer it enlarges the field for the employment of capital, and raises the falling profits ; while for the exporter it promotes a more extensive and perfect cultivation, and intensifies agricultural and industrial production. Nor can any objection be raised against it when it deals, as with England and other capitalist countries, with a real economic collaboration between the richest and most advanced nations, and the less rich which aspire to a higher development. But when commercial and capitalist penetration becomes one of the chief instruments of political intrusion, the tedious but sure way to arrive at the political enslavement of the countries against which it is directed, and to change

the national physiognomy by means of methodical propagation of their own industries in the countries marked out for conquest ; when it aims at the gradual absorption of the industries that flourish there and the destruction of those that dare to resist ; when it transforms itself into a coherent and methodical development of a scheme which, abusing the tolerance of others, aims at reducing the international exchange, a source of advantage for both contracting parties, into an odious relation of mastery and servitude, then competition becomes invasion.

And then the arguments suggested by pure hedonism fail. In vain we think of resisting economic competition by ordinary methods, unavailing against the threatening political organisation, which seizes upon and urges you to suppress your very individuality. In order to remove the root of the evil it is necessary that the nations, among which foreign penetration has been silently encroaching in the endeavour to stifle them (we know that German methods are identical in Italy, France, Russia, and even in England), should courageously unite and strenuously defend their existence by force of arms, in the name of the right of every civilised people to develop, even in the economic field, its own independent activity, repulsing the dictates of others.

This is one of the most serious reasons why Italy has ranged herself against the two empires and joined the Triple Entente ; the menace of a common danger, the necessity of defending herself against the same German imperialist ambitions, which are the negation of beneficent international competition. And thus even from

this point of view Italy, defending herself, defends all countries that are, or could be, menaced by the same snares, and proclaims that one of the supreme rights of peoples—the right of free economic existence—cannot be violated with impunity.

The future of Italian agriculture, especially in the south, depends in great part on the solution of two problems; the technical and the commercial. The first has no direct bearing on our subject; the second, on the contrary, forms an integral part of it. A powerful obstacle to regular and constant agricultural progress in the south is the uncertainty of the markets, too subject to the tyranny and caprice of the custom-house of the countries of exportation, frequently guided by their own immediate convenience, to which the too elastic commercial conventions are not a sufficient check.

Germany and the United States of America, both protectionist countries, the custom regulations of which bend too easily to the impositions of agrarian interests, are two important markets for the agricultural products of the south; they are not, however, certain markets, because they are pre-occupied with the competition which foreign products may exercise on their home productions; hence the menace of crises, that like a sword of Damocles hangs over the future of southern agriculture and contributes to retard its technical progress, which for other reasons is not always steady and definite.

To recover our lands subject to the foreigner, to free from the constant threat of custom-house reprisals the export of our agricultural products in those countries

(Austria meditated imposing a prohibitive duty on our vegetables in 1917, as she had already done on the importation of our wine into Julian Venetia); to secure the peaceful penetration of our commerce into any zone in or beyond the Mediterranean, resisting German arrogance, which almost everywhere, even in the Latin colonies of South America, threatens it; these are the means that can resolve, and effectively resolve, the agrarian problem of Southern Italy so far as concerns Germany. And to Germany's constant, and perchance periodical variations of tariff, to defend her own agricultural products to the prejudice of ours, we can no longer consent. But even if we cannot prevent it, it will always be more useful to make ourselves once for all independent of the German market—to which, however, certain of our products are too necessary to be rejected for any length of time—rather than to place ourselves at the mercy of well-known Teutonic discretion. Neither should we expect from the goodwill of others that which it is only lawful to demand from our own persevering activity, and from our decided attitude of virile resistance against the attempts at suppression, increasingly unreasonable and audacious, perpetrated to our detriment by pan-Germanism.

We cannot pass over this question of Italian agriculture without mentioning the contribution, by no means negligible, which the annexation of the Trentino will bring to the agricultural wealth of Italy. A small advantage certainly in comparison to that of the moral, military and political order, but nevertheless appreciable when we think, for example, that the traffic from the Trentino in timber alone, and entirely to Italy, amounts

to four million of crowns annually. And this, although hindered hitherto by the scanty means of communication between the Trentino and Italy to which the Trentino belongs, in contrast to the numerous roads that connect the province with German Tyrol, to which Austrian policy wished by force to link it. Add to this the breeding of cattle favoured by magnificent pasturage, the production of wine, the culture of mulberries which is making much progress, contrary to that which unfortunately takes place almost everywhere in Italy, fruit farming and many other industries agricultural, or connected with agriculture. And in order to render less incomplete the picture of Trentine wealth, we must not forget the hydraulic power, estimated at two hundred and fifty thousand horse-power. Austria would neither exploit this on the spot, nor allow it to be exported. She would not exploit it in fear that the industrial transformation of the Trentino valleys and the immigration of the Italian workmen might be the means of evoking fresh political troubles; nor would she export it, owing perhaps to innate distrust of Italian initiative. But Italy will certainly make use of it, as she has already made use of that of other Alpine regions,—for example the Valtellina,—for the benefit of new Trentine industries, and of those of Venetia and Lombardy, which insistently demand a fresh supply of life-giving energy.

Equally just and necessary must our war be judged when considered in connection with other vital problems of our national economy.

Italy is a country that imports capital and exports

men. No one is ignorant of the prodigies performed by Italian labour abroad, and all know that before the war the hard-earned savings of our emigrants contributed to the amount of nearly half a milliard to neutralize our annual commercial deficit. Under certain aspects emigration should be reckoned among the factors of economic improvement of our southern regions, an improvement which, although not equally diffused, is evident in many ways. Above all it may be regarded as a direct source of a more equal distribution of agrarian profits between capital and labour by the considerable increase of agricultural wages, which in past times were ridiculously small and inadequate. These and others are the evident benefits which Italy derives from emigration, and which have already been sufficiently, and even too insistently, described by several writers, over anxious to ignore other less hopeful, although no less certain effects of this phenomenon. Consequences, I mean, of a moral, political, military and even economic order ; the laxity of habits and the weakening of family ties ; the evil repute in which Italian colonists are held in American cities, owing to the humble offices, scorned by Americans, performed by our compatriots ; the physical exhaustion frequently caused by enervating labour, and greed for immediate gain ; the weakening of our military organisation owing to shirking, formidable in certain provinces ; the decay of the smaller industries, the anti-economic subdivision of the agricultural properties, and sometimes even the decline of agriculture itself, caused by the lack of hands and the excessive price of labour.

Anyhow, it is certain that with regard to her sons,

who practise even to the point of sacrifice the Italian virtue of thrift, Italy is confronted with two great duties: that of imposing on foreign nations a greater respect for the Italian name, and a higher appreciation of Italian labour, always incomparable as regards power of production, sometimes as regards skill; that of gradually reducing emigration, to intensify the more profitable exportation of produce, and when possible of capital, exploiting more intensively and with more uniformity in her various regions her own productive energies.

Italy could not have hoped to solve either one or the other of these two problems, if in the moment which decides, and perhaps for centuries, the destinies of Europe, she had remained aloof, rather than unsheath the sword, as she has done for the cause of the right of nations to independent existence. Shame would then deservedly have fallen on the Italian name, and the misery—sometimes, alas! very bitter—of our brothers scattered throughout the world, would have been multiplied a hundredfold—our brothers who now enthusiastically hasten to rally to the banner of the country, blessing the war that will free the Italian soil and vindicate the Italian name.

Further, to resolve the other serious problem of more intense national production, such as our inexhaustible resources permit, and I should say even impose on us, in order that Italy should no longer send away her sons in such numbers, among other conditions are indispensable the command of capital and the conquest of foreign markets. But certainly not the German "colonial" capital (I take the idea from Riesser, one

of the most illustrious German economists, who, in his work on the great German banks, classes certain of our houses of credit, well-known under Italian names, among German colonial banks, and alongside that of the German African Bank).¹ It is not this capital, of doubtful substantiality, albeit of unbounded ambitions, that can guarantee aid and encouragement to our economic aspirations. Much on the other hand may be expected from the union of our envied energies and natural resources with the great savings of richer nations, such as England and France, of whom we may ask, and reasonably expect fraternal co-operation in the common conquest of wealth, without having to fear sinister designs of subjugation.

After the war the new economic orientation towards England and France may be for us the beginning of a new economic life, the beginning of a loyal co-operation between English and French capital and Italian activity in agriculture and industry, and may mark the approach towards a definite solution of the southern problem. For in the south, latent energies, awakened by emigration, demand the collaboration of powerful means, such as we cannot furnish, and of a wise political and administrative organisation, which has been lacking up till now, owing, let us admit, to the excessive respect for "liberty" of individual initiative, almost as if public bodies, above all the State, had not among their highest

¹ Riesser, *Die deutschen Grossbanken und ihre Konzentration in Zusammenhang mit der Entwicklung der Gesamtwirtschaft in Deutschland*, Jena, 1912, p. 371. Beside one of our well-known institutions appear, for example, the "Deutsch-Westafrikanische Bank," the "Kamerun-Eisenbahngesellschaft."

aims that of collecting, stimulating, completing, directing, and where defective, even replacing, the energies of individual citizens.

The moral and political problem is also vaster and higher than all those on which we have rapidly touched, and its solution is an indispensable condition for that of all our economic problems.

It is certain that this war has sealed the pact of our national unity, has buried dissensions and feuds between social groups of different provinces and cities, has induced individuals to lay aside their enmity and to sacrifice on the altar of country their low egoism and less noble passions, and has raised the soul of the Italian people to a lofty ideal.

Well ! these new virtues will not be lost. They will be multiplied and purified : moreover, the sovereignty of the State and the authority of public bodies, having been strengthened in the moment of the great trial, will display more intensity, more vigilance and more forethought, even when ordinary life resumes its interrupted course. We shall at length attain that economic national unity, which for reasons, chiefly historical, are too often lacking among us ; social competitions will be meliorated and rendered more humane, and the sad rivalry between different provinces and cities will tend to disappear ; private interests will be more readily sacrificed to the common good. And at length the preconception, belied by the experience of this tragic hour, that the inertia of the State and of public bodies represents the indispensable model of a wise economic policy having been overcome, individual forces will be oppor-

tunely and correctly drafted into public activity, which may undoubtedly fail, but which cannot be judged "necessarily" fallacious.

Thus, and thereby our first statement is confirmed, the economic reasons of our war are closely interpenetrated with moral and juridical causes. Our war in short is justified also by our right, which is, in fact, the right of every people, that of complete economic independence, of free development of our activities, and of all the elements of our wealth, hitherto fettered in various ways by the injustice we have suffered, and among its happiest consequences will be that of drawing closer the mutual bond of solidarity between citizens themselves, and between the citizens and the State; a factor, too often neglected, yet none the less vital for the conquest of material wealth, as for every form of true national progress.

GINO ARIAS.

IX
NECESSITY AND REASON FOR THE
PRESENT WAR WITH TURKEY

PROF. ARRIGO SOLMI

IX

NECESSITY AND REASON FOR THE PRESENT WAR WITH TURKEY

THE EASTERN QUESTION

THE war that Italy declared on Turkey on August 21, 1915, is the consequence of the long series of violations of international treaties, perpetrated by the Ottoman government and authorities during the brief period that followed the treaty of Lausanne, the treaty which closed the first Italo-Turkish war. It appears, however, fundamentally, as a necessary consequence of the attitude assumed by Italy in the tragic contest between the great European nations, for the essential aim of safeguarding her own vital interests in the convulsed East. These violations, pursued with singular pertinacity, to the detriment of the dignity and rights of our country, formally and substantially legalised on our side recourse to arms ; but only this attitude fully explains the deep-seated reasons, the moment chosen, the extension and the aim of this second war against Turkey, that impels Italy ever further and more boldly among the determining factors of the European war, and the new political adjustment of the world to which this war will give rise.

Hence the present Italo-Turkish war is intimately connected with the problem of the ordering of Eastern Europe and of the routes towards the East, a problem which for more than two centuries has been known as the "Eastern question." Moreover, Italy as a Mediterranean country by geographical position, by tradition, by ethnic, economic and political relations, naturally turns towards those regions and the routes leading thither. At a moment when, the European balance being overthrown and by no fault of hers, the whole continent is passing through a period of violent crises, that awakens and lays bare all the great problems of the life of modern nations, the part that Italy intends to assume and uphold in the protection of her own interests is consequently manifest.

When at the end of the seventeenth century the Eastern question was mooted in the terms in which we know it, it was in reality an ancient one already. The delightful region, bounded by wonderful peninsulas projecting into two seas and dominating two great continents, had witnessed the development and florescence of the ancient civilisations, had seen how on the massive Roman foundations there arose the Empire of Byzantium, that for so many centuries represented one of the strongest bulwarks of civilisation between the barbarism of the East and the barbarism of the West ; had experienced all the ferocity of the Turkish invasion, which had built up a powerful empire founded on violence. As soon as the various political and military forces of Europe had regained the consciousness of their historic mission, the political order of this region had attracted not only their interest but also their

military and diplomatic activity; and the maritime republics of Italy, and later the continental States had several times made the weight of their arms and the glory of their conquests felt to safeguard an equilibrium sufficient to hold secure, free and profitable, the routes of commerce and civilisation.

The new barbarian horde had but lately appeared from Asia Minor to turn menacingly against Europe; after the victories of Kossova, Nicopolis and Varna it took Constantinople itself by assault, when the Sea of Marmora and the Black Sea became inland seas of a vast Empire, whose dominion stretched along the basin of the Danube as far as Vienna. The co-ordinated and united efforts of the whole of Europe, which had meanwhile discovered the new routes of commerce and the new countries of the West, were required in order that the Turkish menace should be arrested and repulsed on the Raab, below Vienna, at Buda-Pesth, Belgrade, Nisch and Zenta. Thenceforth began the irreparable decadence of the Ottoman Empire, a power upheld by no virtue but that—now discredited—of brute force; thenceforth the simultaneous pressure of the various European States from west and north, and the slow but continuous retreat of the Turks towards Asia, has introduced and outlined in its modern aspect the Eastern question, as the result of the various aspirations and of political pressure, which have met in fatal conflict in this region.

In fact after Venice, which had remained almost alone in the struggle against the Turk, had fulfilled the historic mission of checking the advance of the Asiatic horde and saving Europe from a sudden downfall,

the new continental States, their fibre strengthened within the ample boundaries of modern nations, turned boldly against the invader. Austria first gained the dominions of Bohemia, Hungary and Transylvania and the prestige pertaining to a great Catholic Empire, and then Russia, after having driven the Cossacks of the Don to the south and encircled the Caspian, appeared on the Black Sea, directing her covetous aims on the Ottoman Empire and on Constantinople itself; while France and England, already in contact with the Moslem world at various points, secured to themselves the sea routes and stretched their dominion almost to the frontiers of Turkey.

The Mussulman menace now however arrested and the imminence of the danger averted, discord among the various and opposing European aspirations towards the East gave rise to a strange balance of contrary forces. Hence the various nations of Europe, in mutual fear that with preponderance in those regions one or other might acquire overwhelming dominion, severally aimed at preventing the conquest by others while each strove to secure its own influence on the Turkish Government. This Government consequently found itself threatened and favoured at the same time. The ancient invader, now confined within the Lower Danube, Egypt and Mesopotamia and open to the influence of the various nations, although at times constrained to yield to their claims, ended by becoming a kind of necessary guardian, appointed temporarily to administer, in the name of irreconcilable European rivalries, a great disputed patrimony.

The Eastern question thus assumed the curious aspect

under which we have known it for two centuries, and which the great crisis lately broken out seems intended finally to resolve. Arrayed on one side were the insuperable forces of varied European interests, Austrian, Russian, English, French, demanding satisfaction or exciting opportune controversy or useful *ententes*, according as in Europe predominance and coalition asserted themselves, and these at times threatened the unstable equilibrium. On the other hand these same interests—ever renewed—now here, now there, among various nations, would spring up to oppose the full benefit to be reaped by every act of the rival's covetousness, each nation consolidating by individual means the disconnected organism of an Empire incapable of upright administration and valid defence of its rights.

The first tendency made itself felt at times by direct intervention of the nation interested,—Russia, France or Austria; but more frequently with the pretext of satisfying aspirations, always real and lawful, of Christian races subject to Mussulman dominion,—Greek, Slav, Roumanian, Armenian or Syrian,—for whom in turn sympathy was awakened in civilised nations. The second expressed itself in the aid, more or less direct, lent to Turkey now by one, now by another, or by various nations together, to prevent too violent a displacement of the political forces at stake, and in order to oppose to the cupidity of others individual advantage, frequently under the guise of defence of Mussulman interests. The former tendency resulted in numerous wars fought in the East, chiefly by Russia, but also by France and England, as well as in the struggles and

revolutions which brought autonomy to Greece, Serbia, Roumania and Bulgaria. From the other current arose the wars of partial defence of Turkey, tenaciously waged especially by England and France in support of the principle of the integrity of the Mussulman Empire, a principle occasionally side-tracked or contradicted more or less directly by the practice of creating autonomies and reforms, enforced with greater or lesser sincerity and strength, but always rising afresh as an indispensable condition of the balance in the European East.

In this opposition is summed up the entire history of more than two centuries of European policy in the East, the various phases of which this is neither the place nor the time to recall or explain.

For my purpose suffice it to record how, during the course of the nineteenth century, after the violent shock of the Napoleonic wars, audaciously extended to the East, the struggle of these tendencies took the form of a great duel between Russia and England, the former of whom, intent on opening a passage to the Mediterranean, necessary to her economic development and expansion as a great power, waged bitter war against Turkey, determining the autonomy and independence of the Balkan States, and gaining a direct influence over European policy. Meanwhile England, already mistress of the Mediterranean and interested in preserving her ascendancy in the routes to the East, was induced, frequently with the aid of France and Austria, to arrest by force of arms Russia's threatening advance, defending with more or less singleness of purpose and efficacy of means the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

GERMANY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION

During this long conflict, however, at the end of the nineteenth century, a new pretender had come forward, with interests clearly differing from the others and with the firm intention of satisfying these interests without hesitation and without scruple.

Germany, this new pretender, after having divested decadent Austria at Sadowa of every craving for hegemony in the political affairs of the West, to which Austria had more particularly devoted herself; after having defeated at Sedan the other great Western power that could have given her umbrage, raised the might of her Empire over a surprised Europe. In her design of world-wide expansion and domination for her laborious and strongly-organised people, she did not hesitate to enter into competition with the two great maritime empires, England and Russia, which from east and west of Europe stretched their huge talons over seas and continents. And finding all, or almost all, the territories accessible to colonisation already occupied or mortgaged by older political forces, she was naturally led by geographic, economic and political reasons to turn towards the East, where in the midst of long standing disputes, and to the disgrace of modern civilisation, the astute, cruel and infamous Turkish rule still prevailed.

Here a fresh field to European cupidity still remained open, and it so happened that the field was fertile, rich and attractive. Germany, always slow in her movements and ponderous in her political conceptions, long hesitated before turning positively towards her goal, and the contemptuous judgement on the East pronounced by the great creator of the German Empire,

a judgement which the logical development of German policy tempts us now to consider ludicrous, is sufficiently well known. But she then came to a definite decision, notwithstanding the apparent aimlessness of her crude policy, and was carried onwards by the very force of things. It is but just to recognise the legitimacy of these aspirations, all the more that Germany, constituted but tardily in her national unity, and absorbed in her continental policy, had remained almost excluded from colonial dominion. But the basis of this legitimacy crumbled away, when the German nation presumed, in the name of its exclusive interests, to overthrow the continental balance and acquire despotic predominance.

It is known that the first step on this path was taken in the time of Bismarck at the Congress of Berlin. Germany then placed herself at the head of the European coalition which wrested from Russia the fruits of her victories over the Ottoman Empire. By contributing to bestow on Austria the administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, she made compensation, as it were, for the provinces lost and the prestige compromised at Solferino and Sadowa. She spread the germs of an irreconcilable feud between Austria and Russia, which soon burst forth, and urged Austria once more towards the East, artificially buoying up her loosely knit empire, and imbuing it with fresh sources of hatred, of national discord and of disruption.

This is not the moment to recall the facts whose origin can be traced to that event, around which the history of the whole of Europe has centred during the last thirty years. While Germany, entrenched in the solid organisation of the Triple Alliance, continued

with increasing audacity her policy of domination, the forces necessarily opposed to her were gathering around. On one side Russia, stifled by German penetration and checked in her aspirations towards the Danube, the Dardanelles and Armenia ; on the other France, wounded in her self-respect and in her heart by the treaty of Frankfort, panting for revenge, resumed with increased fervour her traditional Mediterranean and colonial policy and in 1891 concluded a standing alliance with Russia. Further, on every side, England began to feel the injury of commercial and colonial competition, and the danger of German aspiration towards hegemony.

Once drawn into this new world policy, Germany clearly revealed her designs. She wished even at the expense of Turkey to strengthen Austria in Europe, in order to make her an instrument against Russia, and to realise the contemplated march of Germanism towards the East, which was to pave the way for the Central Empires to universal dominion. On the other hand she wished to permeate the decrepit Turkish organism, in order to acquire the directing hand in commercial and railway concessions, and to strengthen in her own favour its cohesion, especially in Asia, with the aim of excluding French and English influence and of thwarting Russian aspirations. Hence while on one side she supported Austria in her attempt at universal absorption in the East, helping to close Serbia's access to the Adriatic and thus embitter Austria's strife with Russia, on the other she offered herself as protectress of the Turkish Mussulman world, wrested the most favourable concessions for it and gained its confidence and compliance.

The Eastern question thus occupies almost the centre of the great conflict of the present day. When in 1888, Germany by means of the *Deutsche Bank*, obtained the first railway concessions in Asia Minor, she had perhaps none but an exclusively economic aim, differing in no wise from that of England and France, who had preceded her in like enterprises. But having laid the basis of the new world policy, the political aim of her action was soon evident. In 1898 took place the famous journey of William II. to Palestine, which revealed the German Emperor in the light of the voluntary defender of the Mussulmans throughout the world ; and soon after circumstances pointed to a Turco-German intimacy that was never again interrupted.

The alliance was now an accomplished fact. In the struggle between the European nations for predominance in the East, Germany conceived the design of that grand line of traffic, which, starting from Hamburg, touching Vienna and Constantinople and crossing Anatolia, Armenia and Mesopotamia, was to reach Bagdad and thence the Persian Gulf. This line, the true line of the German *Drang nach Osten*, was not only a line of traffic, but was intended as the " mailed fist " stretched forth by the great German nation ; and this fist closed the route to the long-cherished aspirations of Russia towards the Mediterranean and towards Persia ; it threatened England in her Mediterranean routes, in the Suez Canal and in her aspirations towards Persia and Mesopotamia ; and aroused the justifiable fear of France with regard to the disproportionate and dangerous preponderance of the hated enemy. From 1903 onwards Germany's entire policy has been directed

to the realisation of this scheme, and her unbounded arrogance has induced her to consider this vast field as exclusively reserved and destined for herself.

As of old the fresh menace, however, had the effect of pacifying and harmonising the hitherto divergent interests of the other European nations. The concession of the railway as far as the Persian Gulf had scarcely been concluded, when in 1904 it had already put an end to the long discord between England and France, who, readily forgetful of Fashoda, immediately concluded the Mediterranean agreement, a prelude to a more lasting *entente*. Soon after, in 1907, England and Russia came to terms on the great question, which had appeared insurmountable, of Persia and Mesopotamia. The effect of these *ententes* was speedily felt. England could arrest the German railway at Basra. France succeeded, although with some difficulty and renunciation, in realising her aspirations in Morocco. Russia, checked in her expansion towards the Far East, resumed with increased fervour the trend of her western policy, and with the aid of French capital formed the project of new railways in Armenia and Anatolia, destined to cut the line to Bagdad.

In her unbounded arrogance, in her political exclusiveness, in her determination for predominance, Germany could not or would not seek new possible agreements. She defined the action of her adversaries an encircling manœuvre which she intended to prevent, break up and shatter. The crisis concerning the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the other no less bitter concerning Morocco, were incitements for her to hasten her designs. At the end of 1912, amid the complacent

blindness of Europe, she succeeded by means of an extraordinary war tax in completing the final formidable military preparations, and when the fresh Balkan crisis rendered evident the danger of losing, with the ruin of Turkey, the only route that still remained open for her predetermined world-expansion, she hesitated no longer and declared war.

Certain of overcoming her enemies, Germany in the beginning did not take the trouble even to extend the conflict to the routes towards the East, at which she principally aimed. She thought that for her world-wide projects it would be sufficient to defeat her unprepared enemies on the well-known fields of Paris or the routes to Petrograd and Moscow ; and declared herself ready to guarantee the integrity of France on the Continent. She knew that once victorious, she would easily have been able to impose peace, and with peace her own uncontested predominance in the world. But, as we know, the design, thwarted by the heroism of Belgium, fell shattered on the Marne, and incurred the danger of further defeat in East Prussia and Poland. It was, therefore, necessary to change her plan and prepare for a long war, secure nevertheless in the conviction of final victory. The German forces in the East were also mobilised, and three months after the beginning of the European war she overcame the last hesitation of Turkey, already two years before prepared for war by sagacious German organisation. On October 29, 1914, the Turco-German armed cruisers suddenly bombarded the Russian ports of the Black Sea, throwing Turkey into the European conflict alongside the Central Empires, with the intention of threatening the English

routes of the Red Sea, and by the proclamation of a Holy War in Arabia, Egypt and the other regions of North Africa, of creating difficulties and embarrassments for the Allies. Above all, however, with the intention of closing to Russia every outlet towards the west, from the Danube to the Black Sea, from Armenia to Kurdistan and Mesopotamia, and to isolate, wedge her in and strangle her.

The attack on the Dardanelles, which owing to the methods and forces employed could not achieve a great military aim, takes our thoughts back to the ancient war of Ilium. It has served not only to dissuade the Turkish army from other threatening enterprises, but also to show the firm determination of the allied nations to settle once for all in a definite manner and within possible limits the ancient Eastern question. The military action of the Allies, which did not succeed in the peninsula of Gallipoli, has been transferred in all its vigour to Salonica and Albania ; where in addition to Germans and Turks, they have had to fight against fresh hostile forces, those of the Bulgarians ; but in one place or the other, at the most sensitive point of the great Oriental chess-board, they will continue until the moment when the basis of a just equilibrium is established.

ITALY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION

All these events indeed had not taken place without Italy's intervention at some given moment at least. Having gained her independence, she had manifested, even from her first acts, her desire, in virtue of her own strength, to be a new factor in the European balance, which her rise had contributed to alter, and for

geographic, ethnic, historical and political reasons she was induced to turn to the *punctum saliens* of European politics ; the East.

Nay, even before then New Italy had been led by good fortune, and by the genius of one of her greatest creators, precisely to the centre of the Eastern question in one of its most decisive moments, when little Piedmont, amid the still living flames of the revolution of '48, embodied the entire soul of the country, showing herself, as by a miracle, seated amid the assembly of nations, as an entity living and great. The Crimean expedition, destined to check the attempt at Russian predominance in the Ottoman East, found Piedmont by the side of England and France, among the European powers intent on consolidating the Turkish Empire under their own control. In his famous speech on May 6, 1856, in the Piedmontese Chamber, after the Congress of Paris, Count Cavour had clearly explained the aims of Italian policy in the East ; to prevent the Ottoman Empire falling under the control of a single nation, interested to destroy or to absorb it ; more particularly to provide that the Christian populations subject to that Empire, themselves in part Italian, or bound by historic traditions to Italy, should have sufficient guarantees of existence and development ; to recall by the political influence of her armed intervention the commercial energies of the country towards those shores where the recollection of her ancient glories still survived.

The entire policy of Italy in the Eastern question was defined in these terms. Nothing had escaped the foresight of the great statesman. And to these terms, after a long period of oblivion, Italy was bound to return,

when at the dawn of the new century, imbued again with the knowledge of her true and practical interests, after long deviation she will be recalled, as by fate, to her former status. The maintenance of the *status quo* in the Balkan peninsula, and in the Ottoman East, the protection of Italianism and the furtherance of Italy's trade in the East were to become the fundamental canons of Italian policy, in the renewed agreements of the Triple Alliance, in the Mediterranean conventions with France and England, in the spirit and the practice of all relations with the powers interested. The ancient traditions of Genoa and Venice, evoked by Count Cavour, had to be resumed and revived by the present Italy, as soon as her external and internal conditions placed her in the position to accomplish the function for which she had arisen and was destined.

But for this a long period was necessary. The ponderous effort to achieve the unity of the country, arrested unfortunately at Custoza, had left discontent in the mind of the nation, which, moreover, found itself with exhausted finances. The country became centred in itself, a prey to violent strife of parties, which accused one another of incapacity and blunders. Just at this moment the Russo-Turkish war brought the Eastern Question again to the front, in terms almost identical with those of the Crimean war. Once more Russia, in her overpowering anxiety to open a useful passage to the West, overcame Turkey after a bitter struggle and imposed on her the Treaty of San Stefano, which confirmed the predominance, direct or indirect, of the great Slav nations. And once more the European powers, in virtue of the exalted protection which they exercised

on the Ottoman Empire (Art. 9 of the Treaty of Paris), and in their own interest to guarantee the existence of this strange political body, still regarded as an independent State, intervened to arrest Russia, to prevent her gaining predominance, and to modify and reduce the fruits of her victories. The situation was identical. There was even a more favourable side ; it was not necessary, as in 1856, to have an armed intervention ; diplomatic action sufficed ; the Congress of Berlin undertook the task of regulating the entire complicated Eastern Question.

Italy, who nominally took part in the Council, was in reality absent. Forgetful of her ancient and recent traditions ; governed by men new to political life, whose set purpose was to act almost in opposition to their predecessors ; incapable in these conditions either of feeling or of satisfying her own real needs, Italy withdrew from all active participation in the settlement of the greater European questions, and appeared to take pleasure in a culpable inertia, which her statesmen of that time called purity. She preferred to ignore those acts of far-sighted diplomatic provision, such as had been proposed by some of her greatest public men—Visconti-Venosta and Crispi. She arrived at Berlin ignorant of the preliminary agreements already established between the Powers ; she renounced the right of intervening effectively in any discussion of importance ; she remained passively indifferent to the increase of power accruing to Austria by her administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and also to her further claims of guarding and patrolling the waters and territories of the Balkan peninsula. She did not perceive the

fresh and approaching disturbance of equilibrium in the Mediterranean that was being prepared there. She kept silence and continued to remain satisfied with her isolation, while party hatred raged in the country.

The occupation of Tunis by France was a cruel but not decisive awakening ; on May 20, 1882, Italy adhered to the Triple Alliance ; but a few months after, invited by England, she refused to take part in the re-establishment of order in Egypt.

Nevertheless, the force of events drew Italy towards that East which she seemed deliberately to ignore. Not many years had passed, when the casual acquisition of a landing-place in the Red Sea (1881) induced her to occupy Massowah (1885), which was however under Ottoman domination, and to initiate her colonial policy, imagining that the new acquisition alone could compensate for the errors of twenty years of foreign policy. But in this new enterprise, in which she frequently lacked the sense of opportunity and proportion, she was to encounter fresh disappointments. The military error of Adowa (1896) once more reduced Italy to the state of depression in which she had been thrown after the war of '66 ; it suggested further sacrifices, excited fresh indignation, and occasioned additional mistakes.

But at last, even amid cruel trials, the character of the nation was formed. After having overcome the financial crisis, gained confidence in the virtue of her people, recovered faith in herself, Italy, in truth, reawoke and her foreign policy once more took the right and vigorous course.

Italy looked to the Mediterranean, where, to her injury, the balance had been broken twenty years before,

without protest on her part. In agreement with England and France (1902), although forced to new concessions and new renunciations, she was guaranteed the right of occupying the Libyan region, which, in the hands of any other European power would have been a continual danger to her very existence. Italy looked towards the East, and the fresh agreements of the Triple Alliance guaranteed her the preservation of the *status quo*, or the right of compensation in the Balkans, where the Macedonian reforms were entrusted, by European consent, to Italian direction (1904); while a foreign policy—at last consistent and honest—resumed in the Mussulman East the vigorous defence of Italianism, which gave signs of a promising re-awakening.

But meanwhile Germany had revealed the design of her own Eastern policy. While her engineers and merchants laid her boldly designed railways and the network of a flourishing industry across Asia Minor, the diplomacy of Germany skilfully substituted at Constantinople her own influence for that of England and France, presenting herself as the protectress, and security for the integrity, of the Ottoman Empire, and initiating a work of vigorous penetration in the army, in finance and in the administration of Turkey.

The Moroccan controversy, which had remained suspended at Algeciras, showed Germany the difficulty of breaking the meshes of the interests already spread over the few regions still open to European influence, and confirmed her in the determination to seek the beginning of her world supremacy principally in the East. She consequently redoubled her subtle work in the Ottoman Empire, resenting the fact that

England should carry her railway as far as Basra, and that France and England should have hastened to consolidate their privileged positions in North Africa ; moreover, she became anxious lest these two nations together with Russia should thwart her designs in Asia Minor and in the valleys of the Euphrates and Tigris.

Italy was aware of these obscure doings, which threatened after so many sacrifices to cut her off from every outlet on her sea and throw her back, as after Custoza, after Tunis, after Adowa, into the desperate mortification of party strife ; but, in her desire for external peace, she neither moved nor prepared. She continued to suffer Germany to hold her of slight account in the Alliance ; Austria to irritate her by the oppression of the unredeemed territories and to menace her by the strength of her fortifications on the frontiers ; France, no longer an open enemy, to suspect her. She waited in silence until the force of events drew her almost reluctantly into the midst of European strife.

But fate willed that her intervention should be in reality the unconscious act which was irremediably to overturn the unstable balance of the European East and provoke the solution of the gigantic problem.

THE FIRST ITALO-TURKISH WAR

The first shock came really from Austria, when on October 7, 1908, the act of Annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, explained by the exigency of giving recognition to the political rights of the Slav subjects of the Monarchy, disturbed the balance in the Balkans and stirred up public opinion in Europe. The act was juridically legitimate and changed but little existing

conditions. By an agreement between all the nations of Europe, Austria had obtained the right of administering the two provinces, without limit of time or action ; this right, peacefully exercised for thirty years, had created a permanent condition of things, which no one, not even Turkey, had any illusion of being able to modify. Nevertheless, the movement was politically inopportune. Turkey, which but a short time before had achieved her pacific constitutional revolution, under the impulse of an audacious party, devoid of scruple, and craving for enjoyment and dominion, detected therein an offence against her rights, practically forgotten, of high sovereignty. Russia had difficulty in repressing internal public opinion, stirred by the fear of seeing shattered the long-cherished aspirations of their Serbian brothers in the two Serbian provinces ; Italy beheld the renewal of the popular Irredentist movements. A European crisis arose, which dragged on for nearly a year, and left international relations somewhat strained. Germany, although disturbed in her intimate relations with Turkey, resolutely took the side of Austria, but owing to the pressure of Russia and Italy, Austria was obliged to yield the rights, recognised by the Treaty of Berlin, on the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar and the Montenegrin waters ; so that actually her prestige was lessened. Threatened more closely by Slavism, and put to enormous military expenses, she meditated revenge.

A short time after, in July, 1911, Germany in the famous blow at Agadir provoked the new European crisis on account of Morocco. This fresh crisis rapidly produced the following effect : France without opposition realised control over the vast Empire of the

Sherif, once more modifying in her own favour the Mediterranean equilibrium. Germany, a non-Mediterranean Power, caused her right to colonial compensation to be acknowledged. A few months before (November, 1910) the intimacy between Turkey and Germany had been further strengthened by the loan of 150 millions to the former ; and the exclusive German influence was now felt not only at Constantinople and in Asia Minor, but also in Tripoli and Cyrenaica.

Italy saw that if she still delayed, the last extremity of the African coast which faced her would be lost for ever, and a foreign power would be installed opposite her shores, as a constant and imminent danger. It was no longer possible to hesitate ; and when the Franco-German agreement concerning Morocco became an accomplished fact, she resolved on the occupation of Libya.

The enterprise was justified and the moment was ripe. The right of Italy had been recognised by France and England ; the alliance with Germany and Austria seemed to guarantee that these Powers, which on their own account had ere then enlarged their dominions, would have supported Italy in her legitimate increase of power in the Mediterranean, a meagre compensation for the disturbance of the equilibrium which had several times been effected to her disadvantage ; the *rapprochement* with Russia, sealed by the visit of the Czar to Racconigi in October, 1910, promised the support of the eternal enemy of the Turk. These Libyan regions, which had been only for the last few decades under Ottoman dominion, had been so neglected that traffic in slaves was carried on, and the inhabitants led an

almost primitive life. Nor, owing to the continuous and resented exactions of Turkish officials against the despised Italians, was it possible to attempt, at least with any success, economic and civil penetration. Italy who, already in 1908, at the time of a diplomatic incident with Turkey, had perhaps under the régime of Abdul Hamid meditated the occupation of the province, but who, owing to the usual tergiversations, had been checked in her design by the revolution of the Young Turks which suddenly broke out in Constantinople (July, 1908), would perhaps have been still satisfied with simple economic concessions. Such had already been attempted by the Bank of Rome and by other Italian *entrepreneurs*. Italy clashed, however, with the systematic opposition of the Turkish Government, which, even under the new constitutional régime, continued its ancient methods of hostility against her, and of negligence and abandonment of the distant province. The European crisis, provoked by Germany for Morocco, still prevailed ; nor was pacific Italy altogether guilty, if, for the first time in the name of her legitimate and vital interest, she ventured to intensify and prolong this crisis.

The ultimatum to Turkey on September 28, 1911, accompanied by a long justification, declared Italy's determination to occupy Tripolitania and Cyrenaica with a military force. But the enterprise soon showed itself difficult. It clashed with the susceptibilities of the Young Turk party, then at the head of government, which had proclaimed its determination for a revival of the Empire and protested that it could not cede even a vilayet that formed an integral part of the Ottoman dominion. This ultimatum irritated the

great European Powers, accustomed to Italian acquiescence, and unaware of the latent energies of the revived nation. On the other hand, in her programme of action against Turkey, Italy had limited at least in part the field of her offensive, since from the beginning and several times afterwards in the course of the war, faithful to her international engagements, she had expressed the firm determination not to disturb the *status quo* in the Balkans (September 26-30, 1911, March 7, April 20, 1912).

A strange situation was thus created, which demanded from Italy a serious expenditure of energy on account of the irremediable dilatoriness of military action, but which levelled a fatal blow at the resistance, already troubled, of the Ottoman Empire. The action of Italy, restricted to Libya, could not deal any effectual blow at Turkey, which had neither real interests nor army there, and could therefore at the expense of the Arabs—easily deceived and roused—resist for an indefinite time, without detriment or dishonour to herself.

On the other hand, the inert European coalition, which had formed round Turkey, barred to Italy the passage in the Aegean, the Dardanelles and the way to Asia Minor, preventing her from dealing a resolute blow at the enemy, and thus putting an end to an artificial, weak and useless resistance. It appeared as if there was a desire on the part of the European powers to revive the ancient coalition that protected the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. This, however, was a serious error on their side, since Italy did not threaten Turkey, nor was the vilayet of Tripoli a district of vital importance to any but Italy.

And the error was fatal to Turkey. The decree of annexation of November 4, 1911, issued when it was evident that Turkey—encouraged by the demeanour of the Powers—had resolved on a passive attitude, justified itself as a decisive warning of our country to the Porte and the European Powers that we meant to carry to a successful end the enterprise which we had legitimately conceived and carried out with entire regard to the rights of others. But we were not understood. Germany, fearing to lose the influence which with difficulty she had obtained over Turkey, would not support Italy in the same way as she had supported Austria at the time of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Austria saw in Italy's action a menace to her aspirations towards the Aegean ; and seemed for a moment to meditate war on Italy.¹ England and France, now excluded from all effective moral power over the new Empire, restricted themselves to lending a correct diplomatic support. Russia alone moved, and tried to find a solution. She was, however, regarded with too great suspicion to obtain a hearing. The war continued fatally on its course, a difficult course for Italy, a tedious one for Turkey. It revealed, however, the nerve and vigour of the young, resuscitated nation, and on the other side the irremediable decadence of Turkey, which appeared incapable of a valid military defence.

A few weeks sufficed for this revelation. The attack on the military ports of the Ionian Sea, with the sinking of the Turkish torpedo boats, although immediately stopped by Austria ; the fall of Tripoli and the heroic

¹ Speech of the President of the Council, the On. Salandra, in the Capitol, June 2, 1915.

landing at Bengasi; the operations in the Red Sea and the menacing revolt of the Yemen, were signs not to be mistaken. At the end of December an economic understanding between Serbia and Bulgaria was already spoken of; and in February, 1912, the meeting at Sofia between the royal princes of Serbia, Greece and Montenegro for the celebration of the majority of Prince Boris indicated something more than a simple economic *rapprochement*. On April 20, 1912, two days after the Italian guns had destroyed the forts at the entrance of the Dardanelles, was signed at Sofia the secret agreement between Serbia and Bulgaria for war against the Ottoman Empire; and a short time after when the occupation of the Dodecanessus and the Battle of Psytos (April 20-May 17, 1912) had openly showed the military impotence of Turkey, the Balkan Quadruple Alliance was formed.

This new war drew ever nearer and more menacing; but Turkey, in her senile ignorance, perceived nothing. She continued to protest that the dogma of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire—the dogma already suggested by the indulgent complicity of the civilised Powers, and by the necessity of defending the principles of the Caliphate—prevented her yielding to the claims of Italy. We know that the negotiations for peace, laboriously carried on between August and October, were only concluded on October 18 with the peace of Lausanne, when the armies of the Balkan Allies were already in the field against Turkey. The fate of the old Empire was irrevocably marked out, and Turkey would have been driven back to Asia, if at the last moment the European coalition had not been induced to save her

once more at Ciatalgia, by the Conference of London, and if later the unfortunate rivalry of the Allies in arms had not reopened the gates of Adrianople, restoring to her for a moment with facile and renewed pride a show of European domination.

The blow which Italy had dealt to the foundation of the phantom colossus, although with all possible consideration, had prepared the fall. It was fortunate for Turkey, and we do not know whether it was entirely due to fortune, that the circumstances above related, arresting her at the brink of a precipice, allowed Germany to take up the threads of her sagacious organisation, destined to prepare the old Mongolian wolf to be instrumental in the Austro-German attack on civilised Europe, and to resist the coalition of the European Powers who had at last decided to condemn her.

THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE AND ITALO-TURKISH RELATIONS

The Treaty of Lausanne represented a compromise between the firm desire of Italy to give practical value to the decree of annexation of Libya (which had become law on March 12, 1912) by excluding every form of Ottoman political sovereignty, and the obstinate resolution of Turkey, not openly to recognise the transference of any soil of Islam,—which it was said formed an integral part of the Ottoman Empire,—into the hands of a government of infidels. On the basis of this compromise Italy obtained full and entire authority in the disputed territories, implicitly recognised by the Sultan with the clauses of the Treaty, and the fiction of the autonomy granted to the Arabs, which was an entire

abandonment of the region. She consented, however, to admit a religious sovereignty of the Caliph of Constantinople, expressed in the concession that the name of the Sultan, as Caliph, should continue to be repeated in the solemn Mussulman prayer on Friday, as well as in the right of having a representative of his own at Tripoli, with the name of Naib-ul-Sultan, and of appointing the Supreme Judge, the Kadi, charged with administering justice to the natives, directly or by means of his vicars, in obedience to the sacred law of the Sceriat (Firman of Mahomet V. and Royal Decree of Victor Emmanuel III. October 17, 1912, art. 2). Turkey on her part obtained the restitution of the islands of the Aegean, provisionally occupied by Italy, but promised to recognise *de facto* Italian dominion in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, the religious authority of the Sultan excepted, and to give effective aid in the suppression of hostilities in these regions (Treaty of Oct. 18, 1912, art. 1 and 2, and preliminary protocol of Oct. 16, art. 6). As a surety to Italy, it was agreed that the restitution of the islands should take place only after Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were evacuated by the officers, the troops and the Ottoman civil officials (Treaty, art. 2). It was agreed that the representative of the Sultan and the heads of other religions should in the first place obtain the approbation of the Italian Government, in the form of the royal assent (protocol prelim. art. 2). Other clauses of varied importance followed.

The agreement was ingeniously framed: although, like every ingenious construction, it concealed the possibility of equivocations, when good faith was lacking in its application.

In a literal interpretation of the Treaty, in which no account was taken of the reasons of the agreement and of the position reciprocally guaranteed to the two contractors, the concessions made to the Sultan were liberal, and comprised much more than a simple religious sovereignty. The right of causing the name of the Sultan to be repeated in the solemn prayers of Friday, according to the public law of Islam, is one of the attributes of sovereignty, not merely a simple religious practice. And this sovereignty seemed to find embodiment in the office of a vicar, nominated by the Sultan, and in the more delicate office of the Kadi, to whom were reserved the functions of civil jurisdiction between Mussulmans and the appointment of civil judges in matters concerning common law. Thus, with such a complication of privileges, it was easy to make the Arabs believe that the Italian government in Tripoli was nothing more than a provisional military occupation, delegated by the Sultan of Constantinople. It might lead to the belief that in reality the public power still belonged to the Caliph, who in the Mussulman world is not a religious chief, but the embodiment of the temporal powers necessary to preserve the unity and integrity of the Mussulman State. And astute Turkish diplomacy would have been able to cultivate in itself and others the illusion of an effective public power and the hope of an easy return of the province to the direct government of Constantinople.

I have said that the interpretation would have been in substance misleading. The implicit recognition of the full and entire sovereignty of Italy in Libya precluded the possibility of any false impression of an

effective authority of the Sultan of Constantinople, and compelled the privileges conceded to the Caliph to be considered, in the intentions of the Italian Government, under an exclusively religious aspect. It had been wished to guarantee to Libya respect for the hitherto existing Mussulman cult and law, and some privileges had been accorded to the Sultan of Constantinople, who, at the time of the Italian occupation, was in this region head and supreme defender of this cult and of this law. These privileges, great though they were, could not annul the fact of Italian sovereignty over Libya, nor exceed the religious limit, within which only the public law of Italy, by its fundamental principle, expressed in the Treaty (Art. 2) could admit a co-operation of powers.

This authority, exclusively religious, of the Sultan had not been happily conceived ; nor did it respond to the theoretic system and the historic development of the Mussulman world. Differing from the Pontiff of the Catholic religion, the Sultan of Constantinople assumes a real temporal dignity, he is certainly not a religious chief,¹ and his power as Caliph is neither necessary to the life of Islamism, nor recognised by a simple majority of its devotees. It is nothing but a pretence, which gradually declines as the Ottoman Empire wanes in its effective power. We may even say that the historic development of late centuries tends to detach from the power of the Caliph the various Mussulman territories, fully autonomous, without breaking the unity of the religious faith.

¹ See the criticisms on the Treaty of Lausanne raised by Santilana, and republished by Mantegazza. *Questioni di politica estera*, VII. Milan, 1913, p. 178.

Nevertheless, the Treaty of Lausanne could afford the basis for an attempt at sincere co-operation between a European Government and the Sultan of Constantinople, in the religious and legal administration of a country formerly placed under the entire sovereignty of the latter, thus rendering possible the co-existence of an Italian military and civil government and of a Caliphate, reduced to proportions predominantly religious. The reservation of the assent given by the King to the appointment of the religious representative of the Kadi and of his vicars (prelim. protocol, art. 2) in imitation of the *Exequatur* and the *Placet* in the ecclesiastical civil law of the Catholic Church, seemed a sufficient guarantee for a correct working of these organisms subject to the influence of the Ottoman Emperor.¹

Moreover, even every event seemed to combine in suggesting to Turkey a loyal understanding with Italy. The Balkan victories menaced the existence of Turkey in Europe and had dealt a death-blow to the prestige of the Sultan. Italy, to avoid the European conflagration, had sincerely joined the Powers, which in London had again promised once more to save the old tottering

¹ See my article: *Lo stato e l'Islamismo in Libia*, in the *Rivista di diritto pubblico*, 1913, p. 129 ff. By a royal decree of August 22, 1915, issued two days after the fresh declaration of war in Turkey (*Gazzetta Uff.*, September 10, 1915), the problem concerning the religious and judicial administration of Libya was settled in conformity with Italian law, and in a way suitable to a Mohammedan region. The privilege of invoking the name of the Sultan in the Mussulman's public prayers was abolished, also that of the representative of the Sultan (Naib-ul-Sultan), besides the right of appointing the Kadi. Religious liberty, Mussulman law in relation to personal law, and the rights of religious foundations (*vakuf*) with entire independence from the Sultan of Constantinople, were guaranteed.

organism. The loss of a distant province, always neglected and devoid of resources for the Empire, could not be greatly regretted ; and still less if such a loss served to save from Greek occupation a part at least of the islands in the Aegean—those in the hands of Italy, who was pledged to restore them as soon as Libya was evacuated by Ottoman troops and officials.

But not from Turkey could the vigilant sense of her true interests be expected, when even the phantom of a misunderstanding had been allowed to exist. She began at once from the very moment of signing the Treaty of Lausanne to violate its claims, since she did not seriously adopt any measure to put an end to hostilities in Libya, to release the Italian prisoners of war, or withdraw the Ottoman soldiers, who had organised the resistance of the Arabs, as according to her solemn obligation she should have done.¹ At first we might have believed that the tergiversations had been suggested with the astute intention of leaving the Aegean islands in safety pledged to Italy, until the Balkan hurricane had passed over, with the object of claiming them back from Italy in time of peace. Peace, however, arrived, and nothing was modified in the attitude of the Ottoman Government. Enver Bey had directed the hostilities against the Italian army until the end of November, 1912 ; Aziz Bey, who succeeded in the direction of the Arab resistance, abandoned this region with 800 regular troops only at the end of June, 1913, owing to the continued pressure from the Italian Govern-

¹ See the circular, dated August 21, 1915, to our representatives abroad, of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the On. Sonnino, to explain the reasons of the declaration of war on Turkey.

ment. But several Turkish officers had remained in Libya and others were sent there to continue the conduct of the guerilla war against the Italian troops. At the same time the representative of the Sultan at Tripoli, aided by the emissaries of the Young Turk party and by some German Italophobes, laid a net of petty snares, turned from the work of pacification to which Turkey was practically pledged, and with calculated inertia or positive encouragement, aided the resistance of the Arabs. An understanding with Turkey proved impossible ; neither had it been possible among other things to arrive at the appointment of the Kadi contemplated by the Treaty of Lausanne.

The reasons of this attitude are not difficult to discover. The war against the Italian army in Libya had been organised by a small number of regular Ottoman troops, who took advantage of the easily aroused Mussulman fanaticism and of the old Berber and Arab passion for guerilla warfare, on the score of large and sure promises of victory, of material and moral succour, and of lasting attachment. Only in this wise could the hated and accursed Turk become the respected pivot of an obstinate resistance. The pledges undertaken by military chiefs could not be annulled, as this would have been accounted a betrayal ; and on the other hand it would have been grievous to the Turks to put an end to a war which they conducted with a very slight sacrifice of men and money. The hope of recovering the islands of the Aegean did not repay the moral injury, and in sight of the Arabs of Libya, the disgrace of abandoning a vast region, which had suddenly shown itself faithful and self-sacrificing. Moreover, the Turks

still hoped to regain the country, where they had succeeded in maintaining the recognition of the Caliph's power, and the hope was fostered by the equivocal interpretation of the Treaty of Lausanne.

When the recapture of Adrianople in the days of the second Balkan war seemed to restore the prestige of the Empire, which had been seriously compromised, Turkish policy became more active and astute also in Libya and the clauses of the Treaty were more openly violated. The military re-organisation of Turkey, undertaken by Germany, convinced the Turks that they were rising to a new life, and consequently the despatch of officers to Libya became more frequent, and closer the network of diplomatic and religious intrigue. The war, in fact, continued in the Italian colony, and only the military occupation of a great part of the country succeeded in breaking up the Ottoman organisation, and restoring for a short time a relative peace.

THE NECESSITY FOR THE PRESENT WAR

The European war having broken out, after a short period of hesitation, Turkey deliberately placed herself alongside Germany and Austria and against the Allies. In Italy's attitude of loyal neutrality, it might have been believed that even to avoid creating difficulties for Germany, Turkey would have assumed an attitude of prudent reserve. Enemies were sufficiently numerous without her seeking to create others. And it seems that Germany would have liked the new Turkish policy to follow on these lines.

But this was not and could not be. Turkey had now

placed her very existence in jeopardy; and since she dared to range herself in opposition to her ancient enemies and her old friends, now allies, whose power she had already several times experienced, how could she have shown consideration for Italy, who during her own war, prevented from all energetic action by the passive demeanour of the Powers, had in the eyes of Turkey no military prestige whatever? How could Turkey have shown herself friendly, since her new allies had just guaranteed her deliverance from the hated tutelage of the European nations, and when she had been promised the restitution of Egypt and Tunis, Algiers and Morocco? Tripolitania was the most recent loss, and that most sorely felt. To Ottoman pride, fed by German pride, subtle distinctions were not permitted, and consequently Italy, although neutral, could be no other than a despised enemy.

According to the German thesis and the text of the proclamation of Mahomet V., the Holy War of Mussulman fanaticism was only to strike France, England and Russia. Practically, however, since the end of 1914 it had also been proclaimed against the Italians in Africa, but had only been waged in Libya, since in Libya alone existed deluded and inflammable material; there alone were to be found religious chiefs subservient to the Sultan of Constantinople; while in Egypt, Algeria and Tunis, where a long and peaceful government had accustomed the populations to understand the benefits of civilisation, where the Mussulman religion lived free, far from treacherous Ottoman falsehoods, the instigations of Constantinople could find no hearing. One of the subtlest weapons that Germany hoped to

use against her enemies fell blunted, the blade turned precisely against the country, which, in her astute policy, she would have wished to spare.

Thus Turkish penetration in ever-turbulent Cyrenaica was intensified. In April, 1915, as Sig. Sonnino's circular informs us, "thirty-five youths of Bengasi, whom in December, 1912, Enver Pascha had taken against our wish, to Constantinople (where they were admitted to the military school), were sent back to Cyrenaica without our knowledge and notwithstanding contrary declarations." And soon after "a mission of Turkish officers and soldiers, that was bringing gifts to the Senussi chiefs in revolt against the Italian authorities in Libya, was captured by French naval forces."

The Triple Alliance having been denounced and war declared on Austria, Turkey had no further reason to show any consideration to Italy through her officials, accustomed to despise all Italian rights. Although Italy had not declared war on Turkey, hostilities had been begun in Asia Minor against the numerous and prosperous Italian colonies exposed to Turkish perfidy. The history of these persecutions is briefly outlined in Signor Sonnino's circular, and it is unnecessary to repeat it. To the Italian ultimatum of August 3, which recalled the Ottoman authorities to the observance of the elementary rules of respect for the personal liberty of the Italians of Anatolia and Syria, the Turkish Government replied with a formal assent, which a few days later was denied by facts. The repatriation of Italian subjects was prevented and their property was not respected.

This took place on August 9. On the 21st of the same month, as we know, Italy declared war on Turkey. The many violations of the Treaty of Lausanne, the continued hostilities against Italian subjects in the Ottoman Empire, the contempt shown to every legitimate request and every legitimate Italian interest in the East, were causes more than sufficient for war. Italy had perhaps reason to reproach herself for delays and toleration, never any for impatience or neglect.

But the fresh declaration of war by Italy on Turkey did not derive its origin solely from the serious and legitimate motives here enumerated. It is connected, as we have pointed out, with the attitude of Italy in the great European war. Italy, a Mediterranean nation *par excellence*, whose interests are predominantly Mediterranean, could not remain outside the conflict, which centres round the ancient Eastern question, and which it intends to solve or to renew. She would otherwise have been guilty of an act of contumacy, which would have cost her still more dearly than that which her absence from the Congress of Berlin cost both her and the peace of Europe.

The errors of Austrian policy had given Italy cause for the intervention to which she was summoned by supreme reasons of ideal justice and civil defence. If, in the first thrilling hour of her war, she aimed at the eternal enemy, who under the semblance of an ally had first menaced and then provoked her, she certainly from the beginning perceived the vast extent of the conflict and the obvious and secret aims of the belligerents ; nor did she ever suppose that she might escape the fatal consequences of her acts.

The war prepared and waged by Germany has as its objective the hegemony of Europe ; hence it is fought on the Rhine and Vistula and hence it rages furiously on the Danube. But it seeks its satisfaction in the East, where a vast field of action stretches, where Russia can be suffocated, where the great world-wide routes of England and France can be threatened and where the dominion of a great part of the globe can be secured. To prevent Germany realising these ends, already in part initiated in the organisation of Turkey, the attack on the Dardanelles and Bosphorus was directed, with the purpose of depriving the decadent Ottoman Empire—too long protected and saved by the indulgence and rivalry of civilised nations—of every desire to harm.

But in order that this should actually be achieved and a solid guarantee found for the peace of Europe, it is necessary that, against the claims of Germany to hegemony, no less than against the possible aims of any other nation, there should be formed in the Balkan Peninsula, where the European equilibrium is still unstable and sensitive, a solid bulwark of independent States, secure and satisfied, as far as possible, within their frontiers, so that the European structure, on this side hitherto incomplete, may henceforth rest on a firm basis. The Holy Alliance believed that it had provided against French hegemony by extending the dominion of the conservative Empire of the Hapsburgs ; but the equilibrium produced was unjust and sterile, and was modified by the advent of the Italian Kingdom, and then by Prussian preponderance. Later, against the menace of Slav hegemony in the East, the Congress of Berlin thought of bestowing a fresh increase on the

hybrid Austrian power in Europe, and consolidating the infamous Ottoman Empire in Europe and Asia. The design, which could not however prevent the necessary assertion of the rights of the smaller Balkan nations, has proved a failure, placing the artificial creations of credulous Europe at the service of audacious Germany.

The first Balkan war against Turkey, encouraged by the Libyan war, attempted to repair the error ; and in its heroic phase followed the course of fatal events, but it encountered too many obstacles to meet with a satisfactory result. Austria, interested in preserving discord, feared to see her aspirations towards hegemony in the East shattered, hence the aim of her existence as a great nation ; and, upheld by Germany and with the approval of Italy, who acquiesced to avoid the outbreak of the European conflagration, she provoked the creation of the State of Albania. This State undoubtedly possessed the ethnic and historic rights of nationality and independence, but lacked that compact spiritual and moral cohesion which vital organisms are able to acquire amid the severest trials. This new creation excluded Serbia from all access to the Adriatic, to which by ethnic, historic and moral rights, she legitimately aspired ; wrested from heroic Montenegro the fruit of her victories ; forced the Allies to a partition of territories differing from that contemplated in their agreement and dictated by justice. It thus provoked a second murderous and deplorable war of nations, only a short time before united by fraternal ties. It gave back to Turkey a part, even though illusory, of her lost prestige, ruined the basis of the new equilibrium so wisely initiated, and left wide open the doors to instant

quarrels, irritated minds being ready and intent on fresh provocations.

This, as we know, gave rise to the European war. Austria wished to weigh down in her own favour the still insecure balance, which tended to the other side ; and taking advantage of the Balkan discord, which she had raised, and backed by Germany, she actually succeeded in neutralising the action of the greater part of these nations. These, placed between the two great continental empires, skilled in seductions and threats, and the great Powers allied in the struggle,—with whose favours, but also with whose unbounded egotism and irreparable acts of injustice they were already acquainted,—seemed inclined on account of these discords, threats and ill-will to remain aloof from the strife, in which their fate, with the fate of Eastern Europe, was principally decided, or to enter it with intentions contrary to a sane and just balance.

An artificial and curious situation was thus formed, which, while it condemned to inertia or error those who ought to have been among the necessary actors, left a free hand to the two despotic empires which for centuries have been the natural enemies and oppressors of the Balkan nationalities. This could not last. The Balkan nations, and principally Roumania, looked to neutral Italy, who they knew had attained to power from motives no different to their own, whom they knew to be disinterested, great and noble. Our intervention in the European war against Austria was the first heavy blow struck on this entanglement ; Roumania, although for the moment restrained by military reasons, pondered and perhaps awaited her hour ; Bulgaria was induced.

to provoke a crisis decisive for her crooked designs ; Serbia became more conciliatory.

In the vast conflict, the action of Italy could not confine itself to the Alps and the Adriatic. Urgent reasons impelled Italy's intervention in the East. The war of Italy on Turkey renders evident the firm determination to solve the old Eastern question in a spirit of justice, and as her war on Austria had turned the war balance in the West in favour of the European coalition, which the preparation and the ponderous strength of the Central Empires had hitherto succeeded in maintaining ; so our declaration of war on Turkey promised in the East the aid of a new force in favour of justice and right.

The intervention of Italy made certain that the appeal of the great Allied Powers was not instigated by selfish intentions, but by the just desire that the Balkan nations, directly interested, should bear their tribute of sincere pacific agreements or decisive military action to the creation of a solid and lasting political adjustment. The intervention of Italy announced that a new and pure force had decided to fight in the two fields against the two old Empires, Austria and Turkey, for a noble end and for the right of long oppressed nations.

To this object, the declaration of war on Turkey, Italy adds another, no less lawful, that of the defence of Italian interests in Asia Minor. Here Italy possesses still living traditions, active colonies of our compatriots, encouraging promises of profitable employment of civil energies. Italy could not have consented to the creation of a new situation, without her direct intervention, if she did not want to find herself once more plunged

into a fresh period of economic depression and moral dejection.

We know that a few months before the outbreak of the European war, Italy, placing in evidence the sacrifices sustained for the possession of the Dodecanessus, had obtained from Turkey the slight concession of Adalia, which was recognised by England, with a partial renunciation of her preconstituted interests on the neighbouring region. Austria and Germany, then apparently allied, had striven as always to thwart these our lawful aspirations, but had not succeeded. Italy now finds herself in the possession of the Dodecanessus with an initial concession towards a vast region, wealthy and open to European energies, and finally holds an understanding, almost equal to an engagement, with England. Italy must take advantage of this favourable situation.

In whatever manner it may be decided in the future to resolve the problem of Asia Minor, whether directly by founding colonies or indirectly by zones of influence, Italy can look with confidence on this region, which faces the islands occupied by her, without danger of opposition from other European aspirants. It is well known that Greece aims at Smyrna, opposite her islands, where she is awaited by a strong contingent of her own race, and where a vast country stretches, capable of satisfying every ambitious desire. France has turned for long centuries to Syria, Russia to Armenia, and perhaps to a line through Anatolia towards the Egean, England to the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia.

The intervention of Italy in the East, therefore, signifies war alongside the Allies against Ottoman barbarism.

It is not now given us to foresee the direction, the

form and the measure of our intervention ; it will, however, be in conformity with the value of our aspirations, our rights and our strength. The declaration of war on Turkey signifies that the Treaty of Lausanne, by which a loyal *entente* with the Ottoman Empire was attempted, has fallen to naught ; it signifies that Italy has decided to bring the weight of her arms to the solution of the Balkan problem, following on a path of equitable respect for the rights of nationality, disturbed by the hatred of neighbours and by menacing aims ; it signifies that Italy, taught by sad experiences, is determined to protect her vital interests in the East ; if necessary even by direct armed intervention.

Whatever the issue of the struggle, Italy will no longer have in Libya the menace of the disguised Ottoman power, no less foreign to the Arabs than to ourselves ; she will not have to reproach herself with being absent during the attempt to create a stable settlement of the Balkan nations, such as to guarantee the peace of Europe in the region which for centuries has been oppressed and convulsed ; she will not have refused her contribution to the sacrifice necessary in order to concur in the future settlement of the Eastern Mediterranean, where she is invited by the glorious memories of her past and the impetus of the revived energy of her sons. The purity, sincerity, the reality of Italy's aims, equally removed, now and always, from an insensate desire for domination as from a timid and selfish inertia, give to her war both on the Alps and the Mediterranean, the pure and sacred confirmation of justice.

ARRIGO SOLMI.

X
ARTES ET ARMA

PROF. GIUSEPPE ALBINI

X

ARTES ET ARMA

ONE day at Bonn, in July, 1907, after having visited the house where Beethoven was born (and before this name we all bow, as Giuseppe Verdi *manu propria* asserts on its modest walls), I watched the Rhine flowing nobly and peacefully on. It may perhaps have been close by that Julius Cæsar built the second bridge over the river, as he had already built a first not far from Cologne, in order that Rome might pass with fitting majesty into Germany, and this was the first entrance of Latin genius in the lands beyond the Rhine. But who now thinks of those bridges otherwise than as memories or as symbols? Now isthmuses have been pierced and even the seas—seas closed by special civilisations—merged in one vast sea; and men go and fly like Beethoven's sonatas and symphonies, like the melodious song of Italy, safely and without barriers to every shore. He, who gave first and most largely to the common treasure, does not presume to dictate to the man who afterwards gives his share; but while every one possesses and affectionately clings to one country, one form, one conscience, all his very own, the different nations, agents of civilisation, have a common understanding and interpenetrate one another. In

spite of the opinion that the greatest intellects belong to the entire human race, they bear nevertheless the peculiar characteristics of their own race. They are the great intermediaries ; ideal diplomatists without petty artifice, perpetual ambassadors, whose letters of credit, recognised by all, are furnished by their genius. Culture creates a thirst which they know how to quench. Civilisation refines us in harmonising our feelings ; humanity urges us to the same lofty aims ; thought, art and poetry trouble and console us with the same aspirations, with the like enthusiasm. And how natural it is that it should be so. Or thus it seemed to me gazing on the pure and peaceful sky mirrored

im Rhein, im schönen Strome.

A year ago, almost to a day, among friends we had desired and planned a visit to Leipzig to see the exhibition of books. The triumph of the printing-press represented as it were the country where the more educated spirits fraternise with that which we all love and that which is lovable in each of us.

To-day, I ask myself, how could Germany adorn this, her great centre of culture, to attract and hospitably receive the *élite* of the intellectual world, when she already meditated and matured her projects of war ? When war broke out—*monstrum horrendum informe ingens* !—it was as if a flame had suddenly enveloped this splendid exhibition of choice treasures ; and one even felt prompted to set fire to the books, since such glories of the human race had not availed to convince man that he must be humane. It seemed, and still seems, impossible that a small number of men should

have ventured to let loose the scourge of bloodshed, without being, as it were, drowned in it in imagination ; that they should have unchained violence, armed with every device with which our restless civilisation has brought ancient barbarism to perfection, without picturing the darkness of infamy which would gather round their name, the weight of sorrow and carnage on their conscience, so that there are to-day imperial mantles for which no honest beggar would exchange his rags.

And yet Germany was most worthy to be the meeting-place of the devotees of learning, gathering them together as a collection of the noblest instruments for its diffusion. When Antonio Salandra, rising to speak, first rendered homage to "learned, powerful and great Germany," there were some to whom his words appeared hardly seasonable. But he had rightly felt when he averred that his was a true Latin and a true Italian feeling, and that it was only permissible to one who spoke for Italy, and on the Capitol, both alike immortal, to recognise and to reverence all that is true and admirable, in order to be able to add with a clear conscience and effectually *huc usque licet*. Moreover, I leave to learned men the task of investigating the remote origin of the soul of races, a task more arduous, to-day, at any rate, than that of discovering the sources of the Nile. However just and profound the observations which have been made on this subject, a conjecture and belief, or at least a by no means superficial impression, remained that the original differences, the discords and friction of centuries, should have given place to-day to a *rapprochement* of good understanding, and for

closer and more permanent reasons than should be dictated by alliances, even of more than thirty years standing. For in reality certain sympathies exist ; on one side the fascination of an ancient and still enduring splendour, of a name occasionally ignored, but always attractive and vivid ; on the other the crowning triumph of an immense national pride of an intelligent, strong and laborious race. Whence it appeared that without atrocious crimes committed, or given the possibility of reform, the *discidium* need not be fatal and lasting. However, if it pleases the Germans to appear still such as they were to Germanicus, *inter secunda non divini, non humani juris memores*, we are no longer like the Greeks and Romans of the age of Tacitus, admirers only of their own selves and belongings, glorifying nothing but antiquity. It is an attribute of superiority, it is a privilege of certain people, it should be the enduring conquest of civilisation, never to confuse, never to distort, never to exceed. In the daily expenditure of words in newspapers, committee and academical meetings, exaggeration abounds, and forms and outlines are lost ; but in due time good sense reasserts itself and speaks with judgment. Thus we did not disavow any of Germany's true titles to greatness ; we do not deny the influence she has had in recent times on culture in general, our own included. . I would add further ; unless the hurricane of brutal violence ends in disturbing all serenity of mind, and the determination to impose force causes all else to be forgotten, we shall neither be inclined to reject or despise whatever of beauty or of note hails from Germany or Austria nor whatever of utility or worth that Germany has

taught us to appreciate. Let us mark however all that is defective or deformed in this greatness and those influences, which even—not without fault of our own—have redounded to our injury. Take for instance Richard Wagner (if it be permitted to illustrate the idea in taking so renowned a figure, that of a man whose very features, although somewhat hard and cross-grained, express so much resolution and strength) ; his great music remains ; his theoretic constructions and determined phrasing, which in any case ought never to have met with more than a very *rationable obsequium* among us, are so far from remaining unquestioned that it would appear almost as a sign of the power of this art that it could be raised to such beauty, vitality and universality on so frail a structure.

Germany of present times has spoken and acted in ways that seem inconsistent. She has often been heard to arrogate to herself the foremost place in civilisation and been seen to assume the rôle of supreme arbitress of Europe (of Europe for the time being), alleging one knows not what predestination of excellence ; and then again has assumed a humble, modest attitude bordering on self-abasement. She is known to protest that she desired nothing more than her free place in the sun. A pretext and a pose, we should say in the current phraseology ; extremes but only outwardly opposed. A verse of Giusti recurs insistently to my mind :

*Il Monarca sarà probo
e discreto ; un re del globo
saprà star ne' limiti.*

The fact is that Germany's discretion depends on the existence of similar conditions, and is consequently equivalent to the ambition of a dictatorial sovereignty. And on what is this founded?

I happened to mention Julius Cæsar. In the books of *de bello Gallico* (also in other Roman authors, but for us *summus auctorum divus Julius*, actor and author) there is a pre-supposed idea. Admitted that from time to time the rapacious pro-consul would bring forward a reason for undertaking or extending his war of conquest, it is none the less true that here and there enemies intolerant of the new dominion, rebellious for love of their early independence, are almost always implicitly, but sometimes even openly and formally not only excused but glorified. Vercingetorix, against whom Cæsar was cruel even to *morte corporale*, has obtained his greatest monument to immortality from Cæsar's Commentaries; as afterwards Arminius was depicted by Tacitus (the investigations of critics do not concern us here) and in spite of every negligence and injustice, defined *liberator haud dubie Germaniae*. But as I have just said there was a great underlying idea which guided the Roman leaders inflexibly and surely; the privilege and the right of Rome to spread her civilisation; almost an irresistible impulse to place herself outside the law in preparing the reign of law. Who to-day in Europe can seriously aspire to a similar mission, or give credence to a similar infatuation? Germany has undoubtedly proclaimed that she is conducting the great war in order to bring peace and liberty to all, more especially security to the smaller nations; the afflicted world, however, is not convinced;

the world does not enjoy the prospect of dependence on the providence and good will of a single nation and replies :

Teutonicam rabiem quis tolerare potest?

(May Pietro da Eboli, the great flatterer of Henry VI., be punished by the fact that of his spirited and ingenious poem the above pentameter, echoing the cry of the followers of Tancred against the Imperialists, has received undue prominence. His *Teutonica rabies*—an epithet not even then new—precedes by a century and a half the *Tedesca rabbia* of Petrarch's divine Canzone.) And as more appropriate to the present time than to any other recur to my mind the lines of that poet both godlike and human, the greatest poet that Germany has ever produced.

*“ Möcht ” ich den Menschen doch nie in dieser schnöden
Verirrung*

*Wiedersehn ! Das wüthende Thier ist ein besserer
Anblick.*

*Sprech 'er doch nie von Freiheit, als könn 'er sich
selber regieren !*

*Losgebunden erscheint, sobald die Schranken hinweg sind,
Alles Böse, das tief das Gesetz in die Winkel zurücktrieb.¹*

This is not the hour to loiter amid the luminous traces of German genius, which truly “ *auf Flügeln des Gesanges* ”

¹ “ Oh ! may I never again see human kind so inhuman !
Worse than the savage brutes,—may I never again be a witness
To the violent crimes of Freedom's perverted apostles :
Giant Evil bursts forth, as soon as the wise regulations
Self-imposed by man are ever so slightly remitted.”

Teesdale's Translation.

(and let us add *des Gedanken*) found its most vigorous and widest expression. It would be better to consider the works of learning and criticism, directing our gaze not only towards their most illustrious exponents, but also to the host of vigorous representatives and effective promoters of culture; a pleasant Latin word for a pleasant thing, be it culture of the soil or of the intellect. But neither can this be our present object. I pause before a phenomenon which one of these learned men on a day of darkness *sub luce maligna* has revealed to us. With us, as a rule, all that has been food for the mind, that has lightened our hearts and charmed us, becomes part of our nature, remains ours for all time, becomes one with us. Even if it were to happen that any of the supreme intellects that have rendered Germany famous, at a given moment should reject and despise our affection and admiration, these nevertheless would not be weakened. Still less is the light of classic beauty, which knows no eclipse, weakened or interrupted once it has been revealed to us, beautifying humanity with its eternal rays. We may tear away the covering of flesh from a man as from a Marsyas or a martyr, we cannot separate our being from those inner vestments which give form to it, from those interlacings of delicate acanthus that adorn it, of that in short by which it is vivified and ennobled. On the contrary some of those great friends of culture, proud of their abundant possession, have seemed to treat it as a resplendent garment, which can be cast off, or even as an armour which adds arguments of force and material weight, not as a treasure which suffices in itself and as only an ideal increment of the mother country.

“ Weigh this also,” said insolent Brennus ; but he only threw a rude weapon into the scale. Who could imagine that the excellence of science and learning would be thrown into the scale to overbalance the weight of justice, to offend the rights of nations, to stifle the sense of humanity ? The swift wing that soars on high cannot change into deadly lead. The Italian school, even if it too frequently forsook its humanistic traditions, never violated those of humanity and liberality, and while refining the spirit never contemplated whetting the sword.

Nevertheless, the hour is coming—*venne il dì nostro!* in which, greater than school and science, looms the nation. In calm weather the devotees of fine and lofty studies do as Dante did when walking towards the mountain on which his desire and eyes were fixed with longing. He describes his feelings in admirable words—

*la mente mia che prima era ristretta
l'intento rallargò sì come vaga,
e died i'l viso mio incontra 'l poggio
che inverso 'l ciel più alto si disaga.*

But, I repeat, a time comes when these broad views must be reduced, and we must warm ourselves at our innermost fire, look within, concentrate and bestir ourselves. In the same way as Dante himself, who said *a me è patria il mondo come a pesci il mare*—and no one ever said it with greater reason ; woe to those who refused to recognise this heroic creative spirit as their fellow-citizen or were terrified by his images !—in the same way that Dante professing and feeling himself a citizen of the world, was meanwhile devoured with

longing for one district and one city ; we, who aim at enlarging our every horizon and exercising a higher brotherhood, enlightened and active, are obliged to associate with our neighbours and those with whom we have ties of blood or of feeling. We shall use our strength not to overcome, but to resist, and preserve as much as possible of the acquired treasures of civilisation in steadfastness and courage. Because while respecting all works of genius, inspired songs, the laboured results of others' efforts, we want above all to protect and strengthen the tree of our life, from its roots to its topmost branches.

We have a great duty to accomplish *domi bellique* : and they who fulfil it in war, now teach others its true fulfilment, the strict conscientiousness and supreme devotion it demands. It is thus that we shall resume the rôle which historically and naturally devolves on us, and sustain it without the emphasis and boasting, which are but vanity of vanities, so as to continue on our ways with that ardour claimed by well-reflected enterprises and noble causes.

There are some who are content to be led by the hand and trusting to their guide scarcely look to the road ; but strong and ardent natures are less obedient and more self-reliant. They are not quarrelsome, neither intractable nor ungrateful, but proceed by innate, unerring instinct. The chief masterpieces of poetry are those which almost naturally develop in all their grandeur from a single idea, as from a spark, not those produced by assiduous and laborious reflection, like the *tunicatum cepe*, by addition of fold on fold. The work that issues from a deep-seated germ will be a work

worthy of admiration. Latin virtue will lend it efficiency, and with efficiency attractiveness and direction.

That significant and in his pedantry, amusing personage, Wagner in "Faust," expresses himself with a modesty and a discretion all his own, almost as follows :

" I devote myself ardently to study ;
And know much, but desire to know all."

À *propos* of which an accomplished critic of Goethe says : " This *famulus*, whom we should now call *libero docente*, having in time become a professor, would be convinced not only that he knew everything, but everything better than any body else." Just so ; now for some time past, this Wagner has made himself a position, set up house and had a family. I do not altogether say that the luminaries of German learning are of this stamp ; but that attitude of lofty satisfaction, and not in learning alone, occupies a large place, and that air of convinced assurance carries activity and aptitude beyond their just and useful limits. Thus (if it be permitted to take an example from a private source) it is not seldom that a critic, approaching let us say a Greek or Latin poet, has thought that he was himself addressed in the same way as Giovanni Prati once wrote, as it were to propitiate the supposed biographer or judge of the future :

*gl'inemendati carmi
lascio emendarli a te.*

Imagine Horace allowing himself to be corrected by a German or even by an Italian or a Fleming ! But our mind even if it willingly indulges in mental recreations,

may more *ludus imprudentiae*, must guard against verbose levity no less than heavy self-sufficiency, when renewing and strengthening itself at the healthful source of its traditions. Humanism (one of the many things which we believed to have fought against in fighting its imitations or corruptions; all too easy a victory, *corruptio optimi pessima*), was, and in its gradual evolution continued to consist of learning; it is based on learning, embracing as much of it as varying periods and the progress of studies permit. Petrarch, our great father, who in his enlightened mind and ardent intellect absorbed with the same ardour both inspiration and learning, disseminated them with such activity that he might well boast of uniting “*il lungo studio e il grande amore.*” It is likewise necessary for us to advance fully prepared and with faith and conviction that only in the domains of serious exegesis the spirit of true beauty can reside. But this is not the place to enter into details.

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There are people who prophesy and those who directly expect from the war a renewal of many things, as if the huge and unparalleled sacrifice were bound to claim compensations or modifications beyond those (and these are not few) of boundaries. And there are others who maintain that the war will not change anything; that after it we shall not be different, neither better nor greater than it found us; and that among other things literature will continue or resume its course from the point where it was interrupted by the war. This was said the other day by a voice now hushed; the voice of an elect youth, immortalised by courage and death.

Is it possible that the *aetas iam ingravescent* be stronger than the faith of youth? When in order to escape temptation S. Francis threw himself into the thorns, these thorns blossomed into rose bushes, and the rose trees for centuries bore leaves stained with blood and endowed with many virtues. Alas! this immense wave of blood spilled on the earth will not have the effect of the drops of S. Francis, and the earth will resume its colour unchanged. But that no trace of so much blood will remain, it is hard to believe. Not to-day, and not while this deadly hatred rages and while the pile of mutilated corpses rises ever higher, while every muscle is strained, and neither sight nor voice is calm; not to-day and not perhaps to-morrow. It will be for the rising generation and for another yet to come. But this incalculable holocaust of life and courage, lamentable but admirable, amid such sorrow of mothers, such sufferings of the poor, such destruction of civilisation and beauty, throws a long and terrible shadow, where fatuity cannot venture to intrude, and raises a flame that must illumine and purify. Thus also in literature and art. It may not be the advent of a new poetry; but of something certainly breathing health and nourished on sincerity; no longer that din and farrago which resembles the shameful debauch at the end of a banquet, or the abundance of late autumn of discoloured and withered leaves. Who can believe that our boys, endeavouring with their youthful minds to grasp the meaning of this devastating war, with their little tri-coloured flags marking on the maps the advance of fathers and brothers in the Alps, on the rivers and in sight of the Italian sea, could one day be upholders of

despotism, prone to injustice, avaricious and ungenerous, inclined to trifle with life and with the spoils and magnificence of the past, or to boast with the noisy petulance of innovators ?

With regard to poetry, prophecies are hazardous, as theories and forecasts are vain :—*spiritus ubi vult spirat*. But in culture and in life good counsel and intention alone tell. And Italy, who loves civilisation and believes that civilisation is advancing, has been able to adapt herself to the most bitter and the most brutal trials, facing them with her ancient valour (with even greater, if it be true and woe if it be not—that the man of present times finds the duty to kill and massacre harder than did his forefathers) ; Italy has at the same time shown an ever clearer sense of right, justice and beauty. Italy must see to it that her innate genius shall expand and reach full maturity ; that her beautiful traditions shall be carefully preserved and placed to such good account that everything she has lavished on others may be repaid to her in greater measure. This is Italy's task, and herein she will discover a mine of new treasures, as marvellously beautiful as the ever-recurring springtide of our sunny land.

GIUSEPPE ALBINI.

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